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1. Executive summary
1. Executive summary
1.1 The importance of the industry
Both in terms of employment and production the food and beverages industry is
one of the world’s largest businesses. Annual global sales of packaged food
reached US$ 2.8 trillion in the early 1990s and the market for processed food has
grown particularly quickly. Profitability has consistently been high, even in
recession years, and the vigour of the industry thus performs an important
countercyclical function. The present Report investigates the conditions for the
industry to perform successfully.
1.2 Innovations and supply in the industry
1.2.1  A “low-tech” industry?
The food and beverages industry has generally been regarded as a “low-tech”
industry. In the present Report we do not claim that the industry in isolation is
very technologically advanced (although some of the firms within the industry
indeed are). But we do argue that the traditional perception of the industry does
not render full justice to the innovativeness of food and beverages firms in
general. In fact, we find that a substantial level of innovation activity of diversified
kinds is taking place. The considerable size of this industry in many economies
implies that many of its firms will be especially responsible for making use of
innovations developed in other technologically more advanced industries (e.g.
biotechnology). Secondly, we claim that it is already near the forefront of
industries in the application of a breadth of different scientific advances, i.e.
innovating by means of “new combinations” of scientific disciplines. Thirdly, and
partly as a result, we also claim that the industry possesses high potential for
future economic growth, by dint of becoming a “carrier industry” for embodying
technological advances developed upstream.
1.2.2  A “supplier-dominated” industry?
Despite its “low-tech” reputation, a striking observation from the study is the
radical nature of both product and process innovation in the industry over the past
twenty years or so. While this has frequently been pointed out in regard to the
“high-tech” industries, it has much less often been noted as pervading a range of
industries usually regarded as being rather “low-tech”, like food-processing. Of
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course there is a high degree of dependence on those developments in high-tech
areas, like information technology, biotechnology and advanced materials; but
there is much more to pervasiveness than the simple “supplier-dominated” view of
such industries would suggest. In particular, we can draw attention to the great
variety of technological impulses - the range of scientific disciplines and
technological fields - which suppliers are being called on to deliver to these
“users”, and still more to the complexity of integrating all of these through
indigenous efforts within the user industry such as food processing. 
1.3  The role of demand in innovation
1.3.1  Demand and technological development
The supply-side factors are one reason why we find that the “supplier-dominated”
label is no longer adequate as a characterisation of this industry. But the most
important reasons lie on the demand side. For one thing, firms in this industry
assess product innovations as being as important as process innovations in their
goals of innovation, and see market developments as more important than either.
A second argument in this connection is that clients or customers, not suppliers,
emerge as the most important single source of information for innovation.
Suppliers of materials and components and suppliers of equipment are listed as
second and third respectively. Except for “conferences, meetings, and journals”,
the technology factors appraised here have had negligible importance as a source
of information to the innovation process alongside market factors. We also find
indications of the considerable importance of proximity between users and
producers.
1.3.2  The role of final demand
Changes on the demand side are being exerted not only through intermediate
demand, e.g. of manufacturers for technologies, but also through final demand:
through consumer behaviour (including the effects of “globalization” of tastes and
products), through public opinion, and through intensifying regulatory standards
(in regard to health, safety, environment, etc.), which are of course partly by way
of response to public opinion. The shift of emphasis from technology to product is
altering the nature of process change in the sense of how automation is
developing, and also altering the divisional structure of large firms and the nature
of competition and collaboration in the industry. The interactions between the
supply-side elements (different technologies etc.), and especially between the
demand side and the supply side, are likely to prove the key determinants of
national and supranational success in innovation in the industry. In our specific
research - using the CIS data provided, but including other data sources as well -
we find a remarkable emphasis on creating new markets when firms list their
objectives for innovation. 
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1.4  The role of demand in consumption patterns
1.4.1  The national systems of consumption
Demand patterns show evidence of “globalization”, resulting from such factors as:
better means of transportation and communication; increased tourism; the forging
of the European single market; and the internationalization of firms within the
industry. Despite these trends towards internationalization of consumer tastes, we
find that Europe is still by no means homogeneous with respect to food and drink
culture. Far from it: there are large differences both in the actual content of the
culture and in the degree of homogeneity of the nations. Furthermore, national
borders are of great importance in distinguishing these different cultures. A large
degree of overlap between linguistic regions and food culture regions suggests that
the consumption patterns are deeply rooted in the historical and cultural
development of the nations.
1.4.2  National tastes and external competitiveness
The results clearly indicate that the national consumption patterns are important
for the development of the industry. If firms within the industry are to expand in
export markets, these national differences are important to take into account. In
recent years barriers to free trade have decreased, better logistics and distribution
systems have been developed, as have better methods for the preserving and
packing of food and beverages. All these factors have eased consumer access to
products from abroad and consequently the access created for foreign firms to
national markets. But this is merely the physical access to markets: it is clear from
the study that mental barriers also exist and persist. The historical, culturally
rooted pattern of demand is of particular importance to this industry and indirectly
influences the limits imposed on market innovation. 
1.5  The importance of profitability for innovation
The market-driven development of the industry is further displayed in the
relationship between innovativeness and profitability. At first sight,
innovativeness and profitability seem unrelated at the firm level in this industry.
This finding, however, conceals intra-industry and cross-country differences. The
impact of innovativeness on profit varies depending on the home country in which
the firm is based and on the phase of the business cycle. The most innovative
firms persistently show the highest levels of profitability and least susceptibility to
risk through critical phases of the business cycle. More importantly, they are the
13
only ones to make profits above the norm continuously from 1977 to 1989.
Conversely, the least innovative persistently display the lowest rates of profit.
Profitability, for both firms and countries, emerges as being a function not only of
using and developing advanced technologies but of orienting production to
meeting changes in consumer demands.
1.6  National systems of innovation
The national innovation system appears from this and other studies as being of
substantial importance. This finding may seem to contradict notions of
globalization of production and technology, but the industry is heavily dependent
on “external” sources of technology, such as suppliers and public laboratories, and
turns out to draw most of its technology from local sources. This fits with what
might be expected from a so-called low-tech industry. It could be argued that
industries where innovations are heavily dependent on new scientific
developments would be less reliant on the national innovation system - in
particular those parts of the system which support research, general education,
interplay between universities and industry, etc. However, the more informal
institutions are important elements of a national innovation system, and are not
necessarily related to high-tech industries. User-producer relations are critical to
the generation and implementation of user-led innovations, and the technological
trends towards increased complexity suggest that these are likely to become more
important still in the near future.
1.7  Future development of the industry
1.7.1  Technological competitiveness of the European industry
From scrutiny of the patent data, analysed on country or regional bases rather than
corporate ones, we can derive two broad conclusions for Western Europe. The
first is that Western Europe has generally fared reasonably well in patenting in
food and food-related areas. This has been associated over the period 1969-1994
with a strong performance in pharmaceuticals, and to the extent that
pharmaceuticals act as a “paradigm” for the food-processing industry, that may be
some comfort. However, in the light of broader analyses of innovation trends in
the industry, and if new paradigms like biotechnology, electronics and
instrumentation come to predominate in food technology, then West Europe’s
broad disadvantages in these areas could become stumbling blocks.
1.7.2  The spread of industrialization in Europe: cohesion
The second conclusion is that food processing does have some inherent a priori
advantages for disseminating industrialization across countries. Many currently
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advanced countries began their industrialization from strengths in this area.
However, in recent times - at least so far as the patents evidence goes - these
benefits have been reaped more by the medium-sized countries of Western Europe
than by the smallest and most disadvantaged. The indications from our data are
that the gaps are larger still in terms of implementing new technologies. Hence,
while food-processing possesses many potential advantages for catching-up
countries, much remains to be done to reap its benefits among the later developing
countries. This may also be the case in Eastern Europe.
1.8  General policy implications
The general tendency in policy-making to date has been to emphasize the supply
side. Thus, policies have aimed at supporting scientific discovery activities and at
protecting the use of the results from widespread illicit copying. Such policy
instruments include, for example, R&D subsidies, tax deductions on R&D
expenditures, support to “high-tech” industries, funding of research institutions,
and protection of intellectual property rights. In fact these instruments have been
the main components in science and technology policy in the OECD area for the
past few decades. The EU’s recent Green Paper on Innovation if anything
reinforces these patterns.
Our results strongly indicate that a shift towards the demand side is needed in
policy-making at all levels: in firms, countries, and supranational bodies like the
EU. This should also be accompanied by a shift in emphasis towards downstream
technologies. The above-mentioned policy instruments are by contrast primarily
directed towards supporting technological development upstream. Users, such as
the food manufacturers, should not be seen just as the “problem” but as critical to
the “solution”. The focus needs to shift from knowledge creation to knowledge
diffusion, but also from upstream to downstream in terms of the knowledge
creation itself.
Recently policy-makers have recognized to a larger extent that knowledge creation
does not take place in a vacuum but is strongly path-dependent and systemic, and
that R&D is by no means the only input into the innovation process. We show in
our policy conclusions that systemic learning is essential for the accumulation of
technologies, and is most readily conducted at national or even supranational
levels.
2. Introduction, general background
2.1  The importance of innovation for the industry
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“Innovation is vital. It allows individual and collective needs (health, leisure,
working conditions, transport, etc.) to be better satisfied. It is also central to the
spirit of enterprise: every new enterprise is created through a process which is to
some extent innovative. In addition, enterprises need to innovate constantly if they
are to remain competitive.”
The above are the opening lines of the Green Paper on Innovation published by
the European Commission on 20 December 1995. The citation illustrates that in
recent years the importance of innovation in competitiveness and economic
growth has increased and so has the political awareness of the role of innovation
in industrial development. As a consequence, policies aimed at supporting
innovations have become still more important to policy-makers. Likewise the need
for a better understanding of the innovation process is urgent in order to guide
these policies and design adequate instruments. Unfortunately the statistics for
displaying this process have been rather poor. Policy-makers to a large extent have
had to rely on patent and R&D statistics - as output and input measures
respectively - which do not capture the nature of the innovation process very
satisfactorily. 
2.1.1  The data for the study
The primary objective of this Report is to make use of the new dataset produced
by the Community Innovation Survey (hereafter CIS), in order to give a much
more complete picture of innovation in European industry. This dataset will be
described more fully in Chapter 4. These studies are carried out under the EIMS
programme (European Innovation Monitoring Studies) and the present study on
Innovation in the Food Products and Beverages Industry is one of these studies. 
As just noted, the statistics for measuring innovations have hitherto been rather
poor. The Community Innovation Survey is focused directly on the innovation
process and as such is one of the best data sources for analysis of innovation
activities in the manufacturing sector. The data are based on approximately 40,000
answers to a harmonised questionnaire. The data do however have their
limitations. One of these limitations is that we have data for only one year/period.
Therefore, we use data from patent statistics when investigating developments
over several years. Patent statistics have their limitations also. In particular, one
would expect such data to be unable to capture all the incremental, downstream
developments, as well as the less radical combinations of existing knowledge into
new combinations. These features are typical characteristics of the innovation
process within this industry. Consequently, we use CIS data to display these
innovations. The preliminary conclusion from this short discussion about different
indicators is that, because of the complex nature of the innovation process, a
single indicator is unlikely to be adequate. Different indicators complement each
other as they reveal different aspects of the innovation process.
2.1.2  The general importance of the industry
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Studies in the member states and the preliminary analysis in the Green Paper
suggest that innovation is very different across size-groups of firms and across
industries. This is the background for a series of industry studies using the CIS
data. 
Several characteristics of the food and beverages industry make this inquiry into
its innovation patterns of substantial importance. This is demonstrated by its quite
considerable share in total manufacturing value-added in major countries -
between 10% and 18% (see Table 2.1.1).
Table 2.1.1: Food, drink and tobacco, shares of value-added in all manufacturing,
1988. 
Country Share in value-added,
%
Australia 17.8
Canada 13.4
Finland 11.9
France 12.4
Germany 10.3
Italy 10.8
Japan 11.5
Netherland
s
14.8
Norway 18.0
Sweden 10.3
UK 12.8
USA 10.4
Source: Wyckoff, A. (1994), p. 75
Production of food, drink and tobacco accounted for 4.6 billion Ecus and
employment for more than 2.3 million people in 1993. European firms tend to be
highly competitive in the international market for food and beverages. The
profit/turnover ratio of this industry is, moreover, very high at 7.7% in that year,
compared with 5.3% for the chemical industry and 4.7% for automobiles.
Furthermore, as this industry is an intensive buyer of inputs and equipment,
innovative activity in food and beverages is likely to stimulate research in
agriculture, chemicals, packaging, capital goods, robotics and so on. Finally, the
analysis of innovation in food and beverages may be useful for understanding
other traditional industries. 
2.1.3  The incidence of innovation in the industry
Although often regarded as somewhat “low-tech” in relation to the scientific
frontier, in fact innovation can make a valuable contribution to this industry
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(OECD, 1988). The large relative size of the industry in EU countries makes this
an issue of serious practical concern. 
Table 2.1.2 shows the breakdown among innovating food-processing firms, in
distinguishing those with innovations in the broad sense - that is products or
processes new to the firm -  and those with innovations in a more conventional
sense - that is share of firms with innovations new to the food and beverages
industry. The latter share is calculated both as share of all firms and as a share of
innovating firms. The data are taken from the CIS dataset.
Table 2.1.2: Share of firms with innovations new to the firm and new to the
industry 
Country No. of
firms
Innovating firms
- new to the firm 
(%)
Innovating firms -
new to the
industry 
(% of all)
Innovating firms -
new to the industry
(% of innovating
firms)
Belgium 98 68 35 51
Denmark 85 58 34 59
Germany 115 77 18# 24#
Greece 34 68 n.a. n.a.
Ireland 149 67 n.a. n.a.
Italy 1481 31 15 48
Netherlan
ds
221 66 24 36
Norway 173 38 27 71
Portugal 43 100* 40 40
Spain 279  35 n.a. n.a.
All 2678 43 16 37
* The sample in Portugal consists of firms that are all presumed to be innovative.
# Not directly comparable
The general perception of the food and beverages industry is of a rather low-tech
industry where those firms which do innovate tend to emphasize process
innovations. What comes out of the table above are two things in relation to this
established perception. First, there are actually large shares of firms who
introduced innovations in the period investigated. This may relate to the fact that
food and beverages firms are generally quite large, if indeed large firms tend to be
more often innovative compared to small firms across the range of industries.
However, we also see large differences among countries in the proportion of
innovative firms in the industry. Italian, Spanish and Norwegian food and
beverages firms generally have lower ratios of innovative firms than in other
countries, though the Italian figure (especially) is undoubtedly affected by the
large coverage of the dataset. Except for these countries there are actually high
ratios of innovating firms in this industry. Calculations for the whole dataset
without the country dimension show that on average 43% of firms are innovative
in this industry. This is below the average for the whole manufacturing sector
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  1 In the PACE study it was found that results for patenting of products and processes are very similar -
also compared to other industries (p.61).
(53%), but again that is partly accounted for by the Italian representation.  Thus, if
we calculate the total share of innovating firms without the Italian data we see that
57% of firms in the industry are innovative.
The above mentioned ratios of innovative firms refer to the definition of
“innovative” employed in CIS - that is firms who introduce products or processes
new to the firm itself. This definition includes therefore imitation. Taking
innovation in a narrow sense the table illustrates that the share of innovating firms
also differs across countries, but the ranking does not follow exactly  the share of
innovating firms in the broader sense. In particular, we see that firms in Norway
and Italy - two of the countries with the lowest ratio of innovating firms in the
broader sense - have a large share of innovating firms who introduced products
new to the industry, whereas firms in The Netherlands tend to be more imitative.
Second, an additional impression derived from analyzing the CIS data has to do
with the alleged orientation towards process innovations. The data indicate  a
similarity between the share of product-innovating firms and process-innovating
firms.1 This may have to do with the size effect mentioned above: large firms are
likely to have introduced both new products and processes in a three-year period.
On the other hand the strong similarity may be (and probably is) an indication that
product innovations and process innovations in this industry are interrelated to a
large degree. This is plausible if we think of a firm that introduces a new food
product: it is likely that such new products require some novelty in processing
and/or packaging.
Comparisons with other industries are undertaken in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 by way of
providing a context for the industry as a whole (compared to other industries) and
for the subsequent study of its own innovation patterns. Figure 2.1 shows
innovation output with respect to incrementally changed versus radically changed
products. Figure 2.2 shows innovation output w.r.t. products new to the firm
19
2
  Based on CIS data and Calvert et al.(1996). The food and beverages industry includes tobacco here.
versus products new to the industry.2
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2.2  The structure and development of the industry
As a downstream industry, food manufacturing (including drink and tobacco) has
traditionally been driven by market forces and product characteristics to a greater
extent than high-tech industries such as electronics. Until recent times, the
industry was regarded as one of a jumble of oligopolies, each firm of which would
be competing for market share, using brand loyalty rather than product innovation
as its main competitive weapon. With very stable products, technological
development was oriented towards cost-cutting, mainly through mechanization
and through substitution between materials. In more recent years, food
manufacturing has come to feel some of the effects of technological revolutions
occurring in some upstream industries, and is now receiving the impact of a whole
range of new technologies, underlying which have been major shifts in consumer
demand. Product changes and associated process innovation have characterised
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the recent state of the industry, as seen in Table 2.1.1 and as will be argued at
greater length in Chapter 5 below.
As oligopolists, such firms typically struggled for market share, and very often this
was construed as being obtained through the creation of brand names and of brand
loyalties among their consumers. Brand names and the advertising that went with
them were seen defensively as a guard against rapid erosion of market share by
competitors, and sometimes aggressively as a way of driving competitors down.
To a considerable extent, the pattern of takeovers and related organizational
manoeuvres was determined by the quest for ownership of such brand names - to
this day, corporations in the industry are often known much better by their stable
of brands than by their corporate image (of course in some cases the two are
identical, like the Coca-Cola Company).
Not only are the technologies of the industry demand-driven, but its organisation
also reflects its downstream and market orientation. Large firms in the industry
typically amalgamate several lines of business linked by a supposed market
affinity, but often with little or no apparent technological connection. The
technological structure of large firms is therefore highly differentiated. The firms
may have another core competence in textiles (Sara Lee), construction (Hanson),
toys (Quaker Oats), electricals (Ralston Purina), chemicals (Procter & Gamble,
Unilever), glass (BSN), and so on. 
The CIS data may also be used to illustrate some of the structural patterns of the
industry. In total 2678 firms of the roughly 40,000 firms in the CIS dataset belong
to the food and beverages industry. Table 2.2.1 shows the distribution of reporting
firms according to size in full-time employees.
Table 2.2.1: Number of firms in CIS dataset and their size distribution
Country No. of
firms
Size,
employees
mean
Size,employee
s, max.
Size,employees
, min.
Belgium 98  247 4404 4
Denmark 85 328 5850 40
Germany 115 628 16527 5
Greece 34 310 1853 13
Ireland 149 159 2833 10
Italy 1481 95 7030 3
Netherlands 221 525 43855 10
Norway 173 208 1653 2
Portugal 43 293 1614 3
Spain 279 208 1887 4
To give a background for the development of the industry up until the period
covered by the innovation survey we briefly describe the re-organization of this
industry taking place in OECD countries over the 1980s and early 1990s. On the
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demand side, the market for processed food has grown quite rapidly owing to
significant changes in lifestyles and extensive advertising campaigns. On the
supply side, the industry has changed in structure, showing increased
concentration and capitalization in most developed countries. As food processors
have been squeezed between controlled agricultural prices upstream and the
growing power of retailers downstream, they have sought increases in scale.
Another reason for pursuing large scale has been the attempt to spread fixed costs,
such as advertising and R&D expenditures, over a broader production base
(Connor and Schiek, 1996). The launch of a new product is now exceedingly
expensive. For instance, it has been calculated that it costs US$ 30 million to
launch a new product on the shelves of supermarkets in Europe’s five biggest
markets (ibid.). This interpretation implies that innovators would be inclined to a
strategy for internal growth of their firms.
External growth has also been notable, especially at the end of the 1980s. Over the
years 1985-89 alone, Rastoin and Oncluoglu (1992) identified 1567 mergers and
acquisitions, joint-ventures and other structural manoeuvres among the world’s
100 largest food-processing firms. The individual size of a number of these
operations, often stimulated by financial speculation, has also been extraordinarily
high. These combined internal and external strategies have helped promote
industrial concentration in most advanced countries (McCorckle, 1988). The
strategy adopted in the food-processing industry has tended to be one in which
individual “lines of business” within each large corporation continue to maintain
existing strengths, often with little technological link to other businesses in the
company. The companies are instead more often held together by demand-side
product-market interlinkages, of varying degrees of strength. 
In addition, the evolution of profit has attracted new investors. Profit in food-
processing is more resilient to fluctuations of the business cycle because the
demand for food is less elastic to changes in income than the demand for other
types of goods (Connor, 1983). This is a major reason why this sector was viewed
as a stable, countercyclical industry during the various crises of the 1970s and
1980s. Profit rates that were higher than in most other manufacturing sectors
(Marion, 1986; Dawson et al., 1987; Alc and Bedetti, 1988; Nefussi, 1989)
attracted important levels of investment from non-food industries, and from
institutional risk-averse investors such as pension funds (Caswell, 1987). As a
consequence, the funds available to firms expanded notably and the value of their
shares rose throughout the 1980s. Vieille (1996) argues that high levels of
profitability and liquidity helped account for the substantial external growth of
European manufacturers in the late 1980s and early 1990s: of the 100 largest
European manufacturing groups, food and drink (representing some 20% of the
total) had the highest ratios of cash flow to value-added, along with the highest
annual growth rates of the value-added.
The pattern of use of capital, labour, raw materials and energy also changed
(Goodwin and Brester, 1995). In general, the food and beverages industry is
erroneously believed to be labour-intensive. On the contrary, food-processing is
one of the most capital-intensive industries in the US manufacturing sector
23
  3 The Green Paper also concludes that industries usually assessed as low-tech may be highly innovative.
(Marion, 1986; Connor and Schiek, 1996). This trend was accentuated over the
1980s (Goodwin and Brester, 1995). Nefussi (1989) also points to the transition to
“intensive accumulation” in French agro-industries over the late 1970s and early
1980s. Technological change contributed to greater substitutability between food
inputs and non-food inputs (Goodwin and Brester, 1995).  
The range of technologies on which food and beverages companies are drawing
has greatly widened in recent decades, partly as the result of the emergence of new
“technological paradigms”, such as biotechnology and electronics (see Chapter 5
below). Confronted by such a world of growing technological complexity, the
food manufacturers are either buying up research-oriented businesses or, more
often, outsourcing the technological developments to independent firms (von
Tunzelmann, 1996). Similar patterns seem to be emerging for some of the new
research-intensive upstream industries (like biotechnology) in the modern era;
though the Japanese companies appear to be heading in a different direction of
focusing on applications and users. The food-processing firms are therefore still
mainly dependent on suppliers, in conformance with the view of the industry as
“supplier-dominated” (Pavitt, 1984), but the range of suppliers is widening far
beyond the mechanical engineering industry on which it used to lean so heavily. In
this manner, its feedback effects on innovation in supplier industries is becoming
far more wide-ranging.
2.3  The research agenda
The food and beverages industry is generally taken as a “low-tech” industry.
Nevertheless, as we have seen in Table 2.1.2, there is a substantial amount of
innovation activity taking place.3 After a short discussion in Chapter 3 on the
theoretical background for the study we discuss the data sources used in Chapter
4. We next proceed in Chapter 5 to discuss in further detail what is the actual
content of the innovation activity and what are the main trends and conditions for
the dynamics of the industry. 
In Chapter 6 we then investigate three sub-themes in greater depth at the firm
level. The first is to investigate with CIS data what are the characteristics of
leaders and laggards within the food and beverages industry. Firms are divided
into three groups: the best performing third being the leaders and the worst
performing third being the laggards. These three groups are mapped against some
key indicator variables; namely export share, R&D intensity, innovation-cost
intensity, turnover per employee, and share of new products. 
The second sub-theme explored will be the role of strategies in explaining why
some firms are leaders and others are laggards. The CIS data allow us to explore
the different objectives of the two groups of firms in relation to, say,. size of firm.
In this analysis the objectives of the firms are grouped in different ways, e.g. in
24
relation to product innovation, process innovation and market innovation. There is
a particular focus in the investigation on whether a relationship exists between
objectives and success.
The third sub-theme will be to have a closer look at the relationship between
profitability and innovation. This requires a longer-term view and information on
economic performance on the firm level. Both of these requirements cannot be
fulfilled by using CIS data. Consequently patent statistics are used on a sample of
large food and beverages firms. 
A major objective is to analyse differences across countries in such behaviour. The
country-level emphasis is maintained for three reasons: a) because of our view of
the importance of national systems of innovation; b) because of its significance for
policy-making; and c) more pragmatically, because of the country skew in
responses to the CIS questionnaire (e.g. the disproportionately high response from
Italian firms).
In Chapter 7 we move from the firm level to the interplay among firms and
between firms and their surroundings. More specifically, we explore (mainly with
CIS data) whether there is any importance attached by leaders and/or laggards to
user-producer relationships and whether the national system of innovation is of
major importance. User-producer interactions are not directly displayed in the CIS
data. However, the section in the dataset on information channels gives us some
indication. Thus, an emphasis on customers and suppliers may indicate a strong
importance of user-producer interaction. Likewise, the notion of the national
innovation system (NIS) is not directly addressed in the CIS data. Some indirect
indicators are the importance of institutions in information sources and the share
of firms who acquire and/or sell technology of certain kinds in the domestic
market or abroad; also R&D collaboration with public institutions helps indicates
the importance of the NIS. Some non-CIS indicators will be used as supplements.
Finally policy implications from the results are derived in Chapter 8, at the levels
of the firm, the country, and the region (the EC).
The study is conducted jointly by IKE, Aalborg University, Denmark and SPRU,
University of Sussex, England. Associate Professor Jesper Lindgaard Christensen
participated from IKE and coordinated the project. Dr Nick von Tunzelmann
participated from SPRU, working with Dr Ruth Rama, of CSIC, Madrid.
  4 Among the many sources for this Section should be mentioned Smith (1994) and Archibugi et al. (1994).
5
  These are broad topics and the discussion that is to follow is intended to be illustrative and focused, rather
than exhaustive. For an account of the development and state of the art in the economics of technological change
see Freeman (1994).
3. Theoretical background 
No empirical study or collection of data is totally devoid of theoretical and
conceptual foundation. The specific types of data collected, the way the data are
collected, the way the concepts are defined, and the way the data are afterwards
used, all reflect certain a priori perceptions of what the data are supposed to
reveal.
In the following the theoretical foundation for the analysis is outlined.4 The
discussion is kept on a general level, with a separate discussion (in Chapter 5)
being devoted to the specific characteristics of the industry. Thus, following the
general outline of research questions specified above, the theoretical background
will deal in turn with general innovation theory, strategy, the relationship between
profitability and innovativeness, user-producer interaction and learning and
national systems of innovation.5
3.1  Theory and the innovation process
In the minds of many people, and in many innovation studies, innovations are
associated with radically new products. Thus some studies focus on visible,
radical innovations like computers, synthetic materials, etc. However, the physical
end-product is only the tip of the iceberg. In fact, the major resultant innovations
are the outcomes of a long process, which is characterized by much more gradual
modifications than the impression obtained from focusing on end-products.
The term “end-product” is not that fortunate because even after commercialization
modifications continue, as feedbacks from users, sales offices, competitors, etc.
are important inputs to further development of the product. Kline and Rosenberg
(1986) emphasize this perspective by developing a so-called chain-link model of
the innovation process as an alternative to the traditional linear model, which had
seen the process as a continuous, progressive development from research through
development and production to marketing. As opposed to that model, the chain-
link model emphasizes feedbacks which help to formulate how to proceed. In
particular the model suggests that innovations are often the results of interaction
between market opportunities and the knowledge base and resources of the firm.
This model seems compatible with the “dynamic capabilities” view of the role of
the firm, as espoused in some recent literature (Teece and Pisano, 1994); in which
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existing resources have a major guiding influence on its development, but also
interact with external developments in markets, technologies, finance, etc.
These two properties - the gradual modification of products and processes and the
interaction with the market in this process - are especially important in the food
and beverages industry. In particular, they are important parts of the theoretical
background for two of our claims in this Report. The first of these is that the
traditional perception of the industry as being low-tech may seem true if measured
only by R&D intensities and patents, but in fact the industry may still be rather
innovative, through such gradualism and diffusion in the innovation process.
Minor changes of products and processes and combinations of existing knowledge
require R&D to a lesser extent and are less likely to be patentable compared to
more radical innovations in some of the industries traditionally assessed as high-
tech. The second claim referred to has to do with another traditional view on the
food and beverages industry: that the industry is particularly process-oriented. As
will be argued in more detail later, the response from the market is very important
to the innovation process within the industry.
Thus, we see innovations in food and beverages as results of an open-ended,
evolutionary process, which makes it hard to date the start and end of an
innovation in time and to see it as a single event. Innovations are often a result of
small deviations from everyday routine activity and are often created by new
combinations of existing knowledge. This suggests that many innovations, even
the more radical, involve elements of incrementalism, and learning is a central
characteristic of the process. Application of an existing product, process or new
knowledge to a new area may yield great effects and may contribute to further
modifications of the original innovation. In food and beverages this has indeed
been the case, as witnessed by the immense effect of developments within
packaging.
3.2  Innovation strategies
In a rapidly changing world the opportunities for firms to develop successful
innovations are not random but follow certain historically circumscribed lines with
respect to technological, market and financial developments. The ability and
willingness of firms to adapt to the changing environment are not random either.
Within the limits indicated above, the single firm faces choices among the range
of alternative strategies for survival and growth, choices which are often vital for
the future of the firm. This is the rationale for investigating the role of innovation
strategies of food and beverage firms.
Discussing strategies for firms and the effect of such strategies may sometimes be
a rather difficult task, because they are not always easily identifiable and their
influence may likewise be hard to detect. Nevertheless it is useful to have a
framework or a typology of strategies before trying to investigate what their
effects might be. The picture becomes blurred by the fact that there may exist
different strategies in the same firm at the same time, because some products may
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be developed with one strategy and some with another. Furthermore, one strategy
may be adequate in one branch of industry and not in another, not to mention in
one country compared to another.
Further complications could be added. For now we shall use as a tool for analysis
an elaboration of a well-known typology in line with Freeman (1982, p.163) and
Kay (1988, p.288) (who adopts Freeman’s framework).
In spite of all the cautions about defining strategies and identifying them with CIS
data, some effort is made to use the data to separate firms with different strategies
in accordance with the above-mentioned typology. Several different parts of the
questionnaire may be used for this purpose, as is illustrated below.
Table 3.2.1: Strategy identification and CIS data
Strategy Offensive Defensive Dependent Imitative
Importance of
R&D
large large absent absent
Importance of
Product-/process
product product product process
Sources of
innovation
internal,
research
institutions
competitors costumers-
/clients
competitors/
general
available
information
Extend product
range
yes yes within main
field 
yes
Acquisition of
technology
results of R&D licensing,
hiring skilled
employees
acquisition is
from mother
enterprise
Transfer of
technology
licences, R&D
performed for
others
sales of
equipment
none
Appropriability patents lead
time
Develop
products new to
the industry
yes no
Note: the strategies are those readily defined from the CIS data.
Some of the above variables are more obviously related to a particular strategy
than others. In practice some will be combined so that only one of the data
variables in a group - or more than one group - of variables should be rated highly
whereas others are mandatory. For example, it could be argued that a firm with an
offensive strategy must develop products new to the industry, but the kind of
transfer of technology could be either “licences” or “R&D performed for others”.
This will complicate the picture, but still the strategies may be possible to identify.
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3.2.1  Offensive product development strategy
An offensive innovation strategy may be suitable when there are large advantages
of being first into the market. The strategy aims at getting technological and
market leadership. Using this strategy a long time-horizon is often necessary, and
this enhances the danger of irrelevance of the product when it finally becomes
ready for introduction. By then, a competing or similar product may have
established market dominance or the conditions in the market may have changed
as a result of public regulation, changes in consumer preferences, etc. Therefore,
property rights and lags in competitive responses and imitations are important
factors to take into account when deciding on this strategy (Kay, 1988, p.288).
An important prerequisite for this strategy for the firm is either its own research
and development department or easy access to relevant basic research. This
enables the firm to develop products from ideas generated internally, but also to
incorporate externally generated knowledge into the product development.
3.2.2  Defensive product development strategy
Following this second strategy a firm may be able to eliminate some of the large
uncertainties “upstream”, by developing or redesigning products which have been
introduced by others. Firms may thus accept to be behind the first-comer firms but
not too far behind. The nature and timing of innovation is somewhat different
from the offensive firm but this is deliberately chosen, in order to benefit from
mistakes made by first-mover firms and to react to responses from the market.
This is not to say that this strategy does not involve R&D and is costless. In fact, it
is often necessary to maintain a large knowledge base in-house precisely in order
to be able to respond quickly to actions taken by competitors, such as successful
radical innovations. Typically the defensive firms emphasize product
differentiation. This enables them both to maintain a non-specific knowledge base
and to utilise the differentiation of products as a kind of insurance against market
fluctuations.
3.2.3  The dependent strategy
Some (especially small) firms may choose to be linked to a larger firm, group of
firms or government institution. Such firms, often sub-contractors, usually make
only minor, incremental innovations, often at the request of the dominant firm, or
they adjust to changes in specifications. Thus the responses from customers are
vital as information sources for innovations. R&D is most often absent in firms
following this product development strategy. If the firm uses R&D it is often not
in-house but most likely based in a parent-firm. 
3.2.4 The imitative strategy
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Imitators rarely introduce more radical innovations but try to produce new
products developed by others, either by utilising cost advantages (labour costs,
material or energy costs) or by taking advantage of being in a specific market,
through having superior distribution or marketing facilities, or benefits from
special legislative conditions or public sector demand, etc. To enhance such cost
advantages, process innovations are ranked relatively higher than product
innovations compared to the priorities in firms following the other strategies.
R&D is limited but on the other hand imitators must keep up with technical
information sources in order to know about optimal production techniques and
potential products or process techniques worth imitating.
3.3  Profitability and innovation
Intuitively it would appear that one of the primary driving forces for innovation is
the search for profits, as innovation and risk have traditionally been associated
with above-normal profits. Other influences and multiple interlinkages however
complicate any attempt to draw simple statistical conclusions.
3.3.1  Impact of Innovation on Profit 
Although, in most cases, the results reached by different empirical studies show
positive associations between innovation and profitability, there is some
divergence in research outcomes.  
First, the association of innovation and profitability is more complex and difficult
to measure than often imagined (Rosenberg, 1982). The extent to which
innovation can increase profits depends on some rather diffuse interconnections,
with innovation having both direct and indirect effects on corporate profitability
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Geroski et al., 1993). Direct effects include the
classical influence on profit via market share; indirect effects include improving
competitive advantages in a variety of forms (Geroski et al., 1993), with examples
including the building of core competencies and the ability to imitate new
products or use new equipment. Although less explored, innovation may also have
an impact on financial aspects, which in turn can affect performance. Projects
launched by successful innovators, for instance, may inspire confidence on the
part of investors or financial institutions (Chaney et al., 1991). This situation is
likely to alter financing methods, with indirect effects on the rate of profit. 
Effects of innovation on profit are probably even more diffuse when the ratio of
R&D to sales is small, as in food and beverages. Therefore, we do not expect
linear models would give full account of the influence of innovation. On the
contrary, we undertake a complex analysis in which a variety of both financial and
technological factors will need investigation.
30
Second, evidence suggests the effects - especially direct effects - of innovation on
profit are likely to be small, even in high-tech industries. Branch (1974) found a
positive association between the number of patents per unit of assets or profit in
111 firms related to seven US industries (food-processing was excluded). Yet his
chi-square coefficients for innovative output are small, indicating limited effects.
Geroski et al. (1993) also found a positive association between commercially
significant innovations and profit margins in a sample of large UK firms.
However, increases in profitability were modest in most industries and, moreover,
negative in food and beverages.
One further reason to expect small direct effects in food and beverages is that the
period for the innovator to obtain monopolistic gains is short, because most new
foodstuffs are easy to imitate (OECD, 1988). Expectations of direct effects could
probably be described as an “investment in roulette” (Bowman and Asch, 1987).
In many cases, however, innovation could have a subtle, indirect effect on
variables affecting the rate of profit, and probably the path to it. In a study of 17
US pharmaceutical firms, Narin et al. (1987) found high correlations between an
estimated financial factor and specific patents denoting originality or quality only.  
Third, another area where authors disagree is over “reverse causation”, i.e. profit
rates affecting subsequent R&D. Most studies have taken such a possibility to be
remote, but an exception to this general view is provided by Grabowski (1968),
who investigated R&D expenditures relative to sales in 41 large US firms. Others
believe that, although profitability and liquidity may determine innovation in small
firms, these variables are not particularly relevant in large companies, who usually
produce enough internal funding to finance innovation (Acs and Isberg, 1991a;
Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994); whereas the R&D budget of small firms is more
subject to economic fluctuations (Kay, 1979). After a review of the literature on
this topic, Kamien and Schwartz (1975) concluded that “the empirical evidence
that either liquidity or profitability are conducive to innovative effort appears
slim”. These results have a methodological interest for our research, in which the
causal direction that is studied is the influence of innovation on profit, and not the
other way around.
3.3.2  Capital structure
The Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theorem concluded that the financial structure
of a firm was irrelevant to both its value and its operating decisions (Copeland and
Weston, 1992).  However, Acs and Isberg (1991b) found capital structure may be
a determinant of innovation: in large firms, innovation tends to be financed by
equity, and in small firms by debt. Santarelli (1991), who reaches similar
conclusions, explains that in large innovative firms, directors would increase
equity as a signalling device to attract new shareholders. In addition, indebted
organizations are not likely to promote projects involving additional risk, which is
often the case with new technology (Bowman and Asch, 1987). Moreover, the
development and sagacity of financial institutions influence innovation in
industrial firms (Dosi, 1990; Sweeting, 1991; Prakke, 1988).
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According to such theory, an increase in gearing would discourage innovation
while an increase in equity would stimulate it. These considerations are also
meaningful because firms based in different home countries deal with different
types of financial systems and divergent institutional arrangements. A number of
Japanese and French food and beverages firms, for instance, are able to internalise
finance because they are protected by large groups including banks. These firms
are more efficient regarding funding than independent firms (Galliano, 1991;
Galliano and Alcouffe, 1993;  Hoshi et al., 1991).
3.3.3  Size and Innovation
As will be seen in later chapters, firms from different countries have different
average size. European firms, for instance, tend to be smaller than US firms. How
will these situations affect innovation? Schumpeter came to believe that large
firms, with monopolistic market control, would be especially prone to innovate.
Results of empirical tests are contradictory, however. Audretsch and Acs (1991)
attribute these contradictions to different measures to quantify technological
change and the exclusion of small firms from the analyses. These authors found a
U-shaped relationship between firm size and innovative intensity, i.e. innovations
per employee, in a sample of innovative firms of different sizes. Based on that
standard, the smallest firms are the most innovative-intensive and the largest firms
produce the fewest innovations per employee. Audretsch and Acs admit, however,
that the innovative intensity of smaller firms is reduced if one includes non-
innovative firms in the sample. In other words, the orthodox results as in the later
Schumpeter are more accurate when both innovators and non-innovators are
represented. This methodological point is adopted in the present study: our
samples include both innovators and non-innovators. 
3.4  The importance of knowledge and users
Many studies have indicated a relative shift in recent decades from tangible capital
towards intangible capital, i.e. from physical capital formation towards human
capital formation or knowledge. Modern innovation theory has recently explored
the concept and use of knowledge in depth. According to Dosi (1988, p.224),
knowledge is a precondition for solving an innovation problem, and it has at least
three dimensions: it can be articulated versus tacit, public versus private, universal
versus specific. In our view the relevant knowledge for innovation in food and
beverages is most often tacit, cumulative and idiosyncratic. 
It has been recognized that different firms use different kinds of knowledge bases
with different degrees of specificity. This specificity may relate to the society
level, the industry level, or the firm level. At the level of the firm, the specificities
of the firm with respect to competencies, strategy, capital equipment and
organisation determine what kind of knowledge base is used. Depending on the
size of the firm, the knowledge base may even be specific to one or a few
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  6   For an elaboration see Lundvall (1992).
individuals within the firm. At this level knowledge in innovation is thus primarily
specific, tacit and private.
Although it is possible to make the distinction between different types of
knowledge bases, the division is of course to some extent academic rather than
practical. In practice the different types of knowledge are interrelated and
integrated in complex ways. Likewise, their development is not separate but
comes about through an interaction between firms and institutions. This
interaction mainly takes place in a national context even though some knowledge
is created abroad and transferred across borders through research institutions,
multinational firms, etc. Increasingly, knowledge bases are international rather
than rooted in a national context. But still there are debates about why national
borders matter as a framework for the creation of knowledge. These arguments are
mainly related to what facilitates interaction, like language, proximity in
geography and culture, and collaboration with research institutions, but also to
common standards and legislation, limited cross-border mobility of the labour
force and the national character of the technological infrastructure and policies.
All of these are important arguments why nation-states matter in technological
development and knowledge creation.6 
The discussion above indicates that technological knowledge should be seen as
systemic. Thus, the knowledge bases are highly dependent on some form of
institutionalization if they are to be stable. One could argue that firm-specific
technological knowledge may be more volatile. But even at the firm level,
innovating firms are likely to be dependent on what in recent innovation theory
has been labelled the innovation system. This goes along with their search for
new, necessary technological knowledge, with the assessment, implementation
and use of this knowledge in the firm, and with the need for external aid in the
innovation process. An additional argument only indirectly related to the creation
and use of technological knowledge is that firms are often dependent on the
financial system, the education and training system, the public procurement and
industrial policy, and legislation like standards, environmental regulation, etc. 
The innovation process is complex and the timing of innovation is extremely
difficult - and increasingly so because the “market window” is rarely open for very
long; the imitation process being fast because of the generally higher level of
information on competitors and because costs of breaking down entry barriers in
food and beverages are high. Therefore, the performance of an innovation system
is not solely dependent on knowledge creation and not on the single institution in
the system. Rather it is dependent on the systemic ability to learn - that is the
institutionalization of knowledge created through interaction between institutions
and firms and among firms. In other words, the evolution of knowledge-creating
and diffusion systems is essential to industrial development. The performance of
the innovation system is also dependent on the ability of the system to provide the
right kind of information and knowledge to firms at the right time. This ability
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will in turn affect the costs of innovation efforts at the firm level and the amount
of imitation at the level of society at large.
3.5  Implications for innovation measurement
From the above we hope to have made clear that the innovation process is
complex in several different ways. For example, the inputs to the process may
vary from institutionalized, planned basic research to on-the-spot, incremental
changes of product or process. The output from the process may likewise take
several forms and is in many cases difficult to locate precisely in time. We have
also discussed knowledge used in such processes and emphasized the many
different kinds of knowledge, including the powerful role of tacit (non-codified)
knowledge. 
The implication for innovation measurement is that a single measure is unlikely to
capture all the relevant aspects of the innovation process. One must therefore be
aware of the limitations of using only one indicator and we have in this study
supplemented CIS data with other indicators. Even when using several
supplementary indicators it is not possible to cover all of the innovation process.
In other words there are aspects of innovation on which we do not yet have
adequate indicators. Even on specific issues where e.g. CIS data are appropriate,
there are limitations to the measurement of innovation. 
4. Data sources and the industry
4.1  General information on the CIS
The background for the CIS project is a set of mostly independent surveys on
innovation carried out in the 1980s. The experience from these surveys resulted in
an OECD manual in 1992 (“OECD Proposed Guidelines for collecting and
interpreting data on technological innovation” - the Oslo manual) which is
intended to be a basis for more coherent future surveys. The manual is currently
being revised. Eurostat and DG-XIII developed the CIS in collaboration with
independent experts and the OECD, resulting in the final, harmonized
questionnaire in June 1992. The objective of the CIS is
 “to collect firm-level data on inputs to, and outputs of, the innovation process
across a wide range of industries and across Member States and regions, and to
use this data in high-quality analyses, which among others, will contribute to
the future development of policies for innovation and the diffusion of new
technologies at Community, Member States and regional level”.
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The CIS, or closely similar, approach is also implemented - or is planned to be
implemented - in some non-member states. This goes for Canada, USA, Norway,
Finland, Austria, Australia, and South Africa.
The database contains a large variety of variables on innovation in approximately
40,000 firms. Item-non-response has been estimated, weighting factors applied, and
logical checks conducted. In addition, a so-called micro-aggregation has been
undertaken. The purpose of this modification is to anonymise the data while retaining
the maximum of information. The method used for the micro-aggregation depends
upon the nature of the variable. The basic principle in the modification is that
observations are grouped by three and each observation is replaced with the cluster
arithmetic mean.
Table 4.1.1 gives a list of the groups of variables in the questionnaire. 
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     7  See the evaluation reports by Archibugi et al. (1994) for an in-depth assessment of the data quality as well as
the implementation in each member state.
     8  One country's evaluation reckons the time used by respondents to fill in the questionnaire to be on the average
120 minutes, ranging from 60 to 210 minutes.
Table 4.1.1: Variables in the CIS questionnaire
Variable group Examples of variables/sub-groups of variables Type
General information Number of employees, turnover in 1990 and 1992,
innovative vs. non-innovative
metric,
binary
Sources of information for
innovation
Internal sources, external/market sources, educational/
research establishment, generally available information.
ordinal
Objectives of innovation Replace products, extend products, new markets, lower
production costs
ordinal
Acquisition/transfer of
technology
Licences, consultants, purchase/sale of equipment, skilled
employees, R&D, communication with other enterprises; all
variables broken down on geographical bases
binary
Appropriability Patents, design, secrecy, lead-time advantages, complexity binary
R&D activity Expenditure on internal and external R&D, plans for R&D,
cooperation with different partners broken down on
geographical bases
binary,
metric
Factors hampering
innovation
Economic factors, enterprise factors ordinal
Costs of innovation Current expenditures, broken down into R&D, acquisition
of patents and licences, product design, trial production,
market analysis, capital expenditures
metric
Impact of innovation
activities
Distribution of sales by product stage, degree of change of
products, export sales, products new to the industry
metric
The questionnaire is aimed at enterprises within manufacturing and is generally sent
to a stratified sample of enterprises with relatively low cut-off points. The CIS was
implemented for the first time in the autumn of 1993 and asked for information on
innovation activities in the period 1990-92. As such the CIS may be seen as a pilot
project, and experience from the first implementation is valuable in relation to a future
survey. Use of the data for purposes of comparing across countries is still restricted to
some of the countries because of differences in sample, questions and implementation
methods in the member states.7 Some of the questions asked are quite new to the firms
and consequently answers on those questions are generally less precise. This goes in
particular for the questions on innovation costs and the distribution of sales according
to product life-cycle stages. These questions are also among those frequently left
blank by respondents.8 In the micro-aggregated database this item-non-response
problem is dealt with by means of estimations of the missing values. Different
estimation techniques have been used for different types of variables. Behind the
estimations lie assumptions about relationships between the variables in the CIS
dataset. It could therefore be questioned whether such estimations are necessarily
beneficial for the dataset. In a way a theoretical construct is imposed on the data,
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which were supposed to be neutral. On the other hand, the number of observations are
increased in this way. It has therefore been decided not to exclude the estimated
values from the database.
Even if there remains much to be done in terms of improving implementation of the
surveys, the CIS does have some advantages. The data are directly focused upon
innovation, and they are to a large extent comparable across countries, industries or
other types of aggregations. The number of observations is relatively large. In
addition, they are firm-level data, which makes it possible to link innovation to other
data on firms. 
However there are also weaknesses of the CIS data. For example much progress is
still needed with respect to coverage of the data. Some of the most important players
within certain industries are not in the database. This goes not only for the USA and
Japan, which is to some extent natural in a Community-based survey, but it also goes
for some of the major European countries, both those covered by the survey and those
not surveyed. Later in this report we shall provide evidence from patent data which
shows that in food and beverages Switzerland, France, the UK and Sweden are some
of the major countries in this market, whilst these countries are not covered
satisfactorily in the CIS. Another weakness is differences in the implementation of the
survey across countries. In spite of efforts to harmonize the questionnaire and
sampling, several of the member states did not follow the instructions, with the result
that some questions and even datasets are not comparable. So even if we regard the
cross-country comparability as one of the strengths of the CIS, we must also point to
the difficulties in comparisons across countries. Among the drawbacks it should also
be mentioned that the survey is rather biased towards product innovation, whereas
process innovation is treated in parts of the questionnaire only. The many variables in
the CIS provide many possibilities for interesting analyses. We do, though, have data
for only one year, which makes it difficult to draw robust causal conclusions as to
what is best practice in innovation. Many more weaknesses could be mentioned (the
focus upon manufacturing, the data covering just a recession period, etc.), but the
critique should not overshadow the fact that the CIS provides one of  the best data
sources for mapping the nature of the innovation process in manufacturing compared
to other data available.
The CIS is therefore an important data source in this study of the food and beverages
industry but in some sections other data sources are included as well. Thus for some
purposes we use patent statistics, as described in the next section.
4.2  Patent statistics
Since the CIS data do not allow us to inquire into the important topic of profitability
and innovation (discussed in theoretical terms in Chapter 3 above), we have used
alternative data sources for this purpose. 
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A sample has been constructed comprising 101 food and drink multinationals with
average worldwide sales of at least US$ 1 billion in 1988 (Appendix 6.1). This is
described in Section 6.3.3 below. As the relationship between economic and
technological variables may vary over different phases of the business cycle (Narin et
al., 1987) we analysed three subperiods: 1977-81, 1982-85 and 1986-89. The first is a
period of expansion, while the second is a period of crisis and the third witnessed
recovery in this industry. 
4.2.1  The Method for Measuring Innovative Output
We use the count of patented inventions, i.e. patents granted to the firm in the United
States, as a proxy for innovative output. We have analysed utility patents only in this
study - “design patents”, which involve minor changes in presentation or packaging,
are not included here. 
This method for measuring innovative output has certain drawbacks. Patent counts
give no information on the technical importance or the market value of innovations.
Not all inventions are patented. Many successful innovations are actually never
patented (Rosenberg, 1982). Some types of technology are more likely to be patented
than others (Acs and Audretsch, 1989). Likewise the propensity to patent differs
across industries. In particular, in the food and beverages industry, the downstream,
incremental innovations are not patented to the same extent as more upstream
industries. This result is found in the PACE study, which also finds a general
association between R&D intensities and propensities to patent. Furthermore, firms
from different countries have different propensities to patent their inventions
(Archibugi and Pianta, 1992; Scherer, 1989) and/or different propensities to patent in
foreign countries. 
Some of these objections lose their importance in homogeneous samples, such as that
in this study. Enterprises with similar sizes, businesses and so on, are likely to show
similar patenting behaviour (Branch, 1974). Multinational firms, like those in our
sample, are likely to globalize their strategy for protecting their intellectual property
and exhibit similar foreign patenting patterns (Archibugi and Pianta, 1992).
Nevertheless, comparisons between US and non-US firms should be treated with
some caution. The latter firms presumably patent their inventions in the US in
proportion to their business involvement in that country. On average, non-American
firms would expect to patent fewer inventions in the US than American firms of
similar size, because of the fact that the former firms enjoy smaller market shares in
the country. 
On the other hand, a number of empirical studies support the idea that patents reflect
with some accuracy other manifestations of technological change. Acs and Audretsch
(1989) found a strong association between direct measures of innovative activities and
the number of patented inventions at the 4-digit standard industrial classification
(SIC) level in US manufacturing. Bound et al. (1984) had previously established a
strong relationship between R&D expenditures and patenting activities at the firm
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level in the US. The association between R&D expenditure or patenting, on the one
hand, and significant innovations, on the other, seems to be clearly established over
longer periods of time. Cumulative curves of patents and innovations at the firm level
are more likely to be compatible over longer periods of time than on a year-to-year
basis (Achilladelis et al., 1990). The correlation between R&D spending and total
number of subsequent innovations is more clearly observed over the long run as well
(Mansfield, 1968). For these reasons, this research covers a period of 12 years.  
4.3  Identification of the industry
The Food and Beverages industry consists of nine subgroups at a 3-digit NACE level:
  15.1  Slaughtering, processing and preserving of meat and meat products
  15.2  Processing and preserving of fish and fish products
  15.3  Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables
  15.4  Manufacturing of oil and fat
  15.5  Manufacturing of dairy products 
  15.6  Manufacturing of starch and starch products
  15.7  Manufacturing of fodder
  15.8  Manufacturing of other food products
  15.9  Manufacturing of beverages
It could well be that innovation activity differs substantially across these sub-groups.
If that is the case, consideration should be given to using more disaggregated data than
the 2-digit data, which are what we have in the CIS dataset. 
Using the original Danish dataset we took a closer look at the degree of homogeneity
within the industry. Results for several variables were compared across sub-groups:
   1  Share of innovative firms
   2  Share of firms with R&D
   3  Share of firms with products new to the industry
   4  Average R&D intensity
   5  Average innovation-cost intensity
As we have access only to the Danish dataset, it is assumed that approximately the
same degree of difference would occur across subgroups in the other countries. It
could, of course, be questioned whether this assumption is realistic. Especially in this
industry an above-average degree of specialization is likely because certain areas of
production are dependent on geography and climate. On the other hand, a considerable
range of variables is included and Denmark is one of the larger food and beverages
producers.
Table 4.3.1: Selected variables distributed by subgroup in the Danish CIS dataset
Variable*: 1 2 3 4 5
Subgroup**:
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15.1 24 % 21 % 3 % 0.06 0.15
15.2 39 % 20 % 5 % 0.19 0.33
15.3 50 % 36 % 7 % 0.23 0.38
15.8 56 % 46 % 15 % 2.48 0.81
15.9 45 % 10 % 10 % 0 0.07
Notes: * Variables and sub-groups are as defined in the text above;
   ** The number of observations in sub-groups 15.4-7 is too low to be reliable.
The sub-branch 15.1 (Slaughtering, processing and preserving of meat and meat
products) appears somewhat behind the other sub-groups technologically. This also
goes for 15.2 (Processing and preserving of fish and fish products) but to a lesser
extent. At the other end of the spectrum we find 15.8 (Manufacturing of other food
products) which is particularly innovative. The results for the other sub-groups are
around the average. These results are broadly consonant with sub-sectoral data on
innovative variables more generally, across countries - see for example the patents
data in Section 7.3 below.
The pros and cons of further disaggregation can be summarized as a trade-off between
a better description of the diversity of the innovation process across branches, and
fewer observations in the calculations. The implication to be drawn from the above is
that further disaggregation of data is not really needed. Although we could detect
some differences across sub-branches, these differences were not so great as to
warrant a disaggregation which would reduce the number of observations in the
calculations and maybe blur some of the patterns in the results.
With respect to the countries included, we do not have enough observations in the
dataset to produce meaningful results for Luxembourg, France or the UK. When using
non-CIS data we shall include these countries and pay particular attention to results
from these analyses. In some of the other countries there are only a few observations
when the analysis is narrowed down, e.g. to sub-divisions of R&D-performing firms
or R&D-collaborating firms. Some of the analysis could be carried out without the
country dimension in order to keep the number of observations at a maximum, but for
reasons mentioned earlier the results here are divided into different countries. 
Throughout the study of this industry different methods of analysis have been used,
depending on the issue explored. As explained earlier, the analyses using the CIS data
are carried out for each country, which makes for some complexity of the exposition
of results. The intention is to keep the results as simple as possible in spite of the
country dimension. We shall therefore primarily report descriptive statistics in tables
and explain results from other types of tests verbally. Some of the results are however
reported in other forms. Generally only statistically significant results are commented
upon unless otherwise indicated.
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5. Trends in innovation in the industry
Traditionally the food-manufacturing industry has been regarded as rather minor in terms
of its role in technological and economic development. Students of both innovation
studies and economics have been more attracted to the “high-tech” industries, where the
role of science and technology has been more apparent. It is arguable that this has always
been something of an oversight: for example, the early stages of industrialization in a
number of European countries (including Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland) were
profoundly influenced by the technological and economic advance of food manufacturing
(von Tunzelmann, 1995a). There is even less good reason to support the neglect of the
industry nowadays, for reasons to be detailed below, but there is little sign as yet of any
widespread appreciation of this situation.
We shall argue in this overview that the food-processing industry may become one of the
major “carrier” industries of the current phase of industrialization, known to some
scholars as the “Fifth Kondratiev” (Freeman and Perez, 1988); though other industries
are likely to share this role. This “wave” has been sustained by dramatic technological
change in upstream industries, most notably electronics; more recently, areas like
biotechnology and advanced materials have emerged as high-tech fields with massive
opportunities in prospect. The role of the “carrier” industries has been less extensively
analysed. Their function was first elucidated by Rosenberg (1963) in studying the
machine-tool industry in America in the nineteenth century. The carrier industries were
downstream consumer-oriented industries which embodied the advances carried out
upstream in the machine-tool sector. In these industries, consumer demand confronted
the supply of technologies, and the latter - the types and capabilities of the machine tools
themselves - were changed both radically and incrementally to suit the needs of the
former. Typical carrier industries for machine tools in the nineteenth century were,
successively, clockmaking, sewing machines, bicycles, and eventually automobiles
(Rosenberg, 1963). From these downstream applications and modifications, the machine-
tool industry itself found it straightforward to extend those changes to a host of other
applications in less progressive downstream industries, adopting much the same
principles for different users (Rosenberg described this as “technological convergence”).
5.1  General Background
We consider that food processing and packaging may well act in similar vein as a carrier
industry in the foreseeable future. Of course we do not claim it will be the only carrier
industry; far from it. But the potential, in our view, has been largely ignored. One facet
of this has simply to do with sheer size. The upstream and high-tech industries are
characteristically of rather small size relative to the economies at large. This was true of
machine tools throughout the nineteenth century, and remains true of biotechnology etc.
today (though not true of electronics). Although their technological role is crucial, their
economic impact will not be so great until their advances are embodied in a wide range
of comparatively large downstream industries. The diffusion process involved has
typically taken a whole “Kondratiev cycle” to effect (von Tunzelmann, 1995a). An
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     9 Another view is that the location of processing has shifted from the household to the factory, e.g. through the kinds of
additional or improved packaging noted below, and thus rather artificially distorted the data.
implication is that the periods of technological ferment may not be ones of major
economic expansion, and this appears to be one important explanation for the
“productivity paradox” of slow economic and productivity growth since the 1970s in the
“Fifth Kondratiev”, notwithstanding the evidently dramatic transformation of industries
such as information technology in that recent period. On the basis of analogies with the
past, it will require a “Sixth Kondratiev” of massive downstream applications to induce
a macroeconomic effect of major proportions.
Let us now examine why the food and beverages industry would appear to possess some
of the attributes required of an important carrier industry in any forthcoming “Sixth
Kondratiev”. Clearly it has the size attribute, as shown in the data on the industry’s size
provided earlier in this Report (e.g. Table 2.1.1). Its rate of growth has been regarded as
more problematic. The consumption of food has traditionally been subject to “Engel’s
Law”, first elucidated in the 1880s; that as incomes go up, the share of food in total
expenditures goes down. However it has been shown by econometric analysis that, while
food consumption shows the expected pattern at any point of time in a country - that is,
the relative expenditures of wealthy individuals and families are much less than those of
the poorer - the pattern over time is not quite so distinctive. The decline in food
expenditures through time is less rapid than might be expected from the cross-sectional
data for a point of time (Deaton, 1975). It has been suggested by the econometricians that
the rising importance of processing is an important reason for this slower decline in share
over time.9 Thus the decline of agriculture relative to national income has been much
faster than that of food manufacturing - the value-added has been partially offsetting the
decline in share of the raw materials.
The case for food manufacturing as a carrier industry however rests on much more than
its mere size, significant as that may be. The old caricature of food processing as a rather
sleepy industry has been changing rather sharply. Even today, food manufacturing is
classified by innovation studies as a “supplier-dominated” industry, dependent on
technological changes in more dynamic upstream industries for any progress of its own
(Pavitt, 1984). In our view this image is no longer adequate.
On the side of the supply of technologies, the “supplier-dominated” perspective
underestimates the role that empirical advances within the industry have long played. The
major breakthroughs for the industry frequently arose out of needs generated within the
sector itself, rather than being the chance application of ideas developed elsewhere for
other purposes - examples include canning (at the beginning of the nineteenth century),
pasteurization (in the middle of that century), and refrigeration (late in that century). In
this sense, the “learning by doing” kind of technological change often received its initial
stimulus from inside the industry, though further developed upstream. Secondly,
“learning by using”, in terms of modifying and advancing the equipment supplied from
the mechanical engineering and other sectors, always remained a potent force. It is true
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that the latter can be compatible with the “supplier-dominated” view of the industry, but
recent advances go beyond that.
The major recent transformations of the industry can be summarised as follows. On the
supply side, there has been a substantial increase in the application of scientific as
opposed to empirical principles for systematic advance in the industry. More important
still, the range of scientific disciplines and technologies recruited to assist in the advance
of the industry has greatly widened in recent years. In the language of Schumpeter (1911),
progress has come above all from new combinations - combinations of sciences,
combinations of technologies, combinations of science and technology, and combinations
of these with wider changes in materials, industrial organization, markets, etc., in ways
that Schumpeter himself was at pains to stress. 
Even these changes are, however, overshadowed by those on the demand side. In the last
two decades or less, the balance of the industry has swung from being supply-driven to
being demand-driven. It is changing consumer tastes and requirements that have become
the major determinant of the industry’s expansion. This has rarely, if ever, been the case
before in regard to this industry, and it is the main reason for seeing it as prospectively
a major carrier industry into the future. These changes on the demand side have fed
rapidly back to changes on the supply side, for example in areas like food packaging. In
this way, the model of technological change has become far less “supplier-dominated”
than it ever was. In place of a kind of “linear” model of change dependent on upstream
developments (which at best can be accepted only with reservations, as we have argued
in Chapter 3 above), the relevant model of innovation is now much more like the
interactive model with feedbacks as developed by Kline and Rosenberg (1986). It is
difficult not to exaggerate the importance of this change.
5.2  Demand changes and product innovation
5.2.1 The context of demand
It is a widespread popular opinion that innovation in the food manufacturing industry
mainly takes the form of new product development. Analysis has, on the contrary, shown
that for much of the twentieth century this has not been the case. Instead, the leading
characteristic has been one of great stability in the product range confronting consumers
in a particular country. To explain this, we have to consider the oligopolistic structure
that has typified the manufacturing branches of food and drink, briefly described in
Chapter 2 above. The dominance of a smallish number of leading firms in many of the
main product lines dates back in the case of at least some of the sub-sectors (like beer-
brewing) to the early years of industrialization during the “First Kondratiev”. Such firms
were in the forefront of “the rise of the modern corporation” in the early twentieth century
(Hannah, 1976), with much resort to takeovers and mergers. 
The industry’s desire for stability through reliance on brand-naming strongly discouraged
product innovation, at least by the established oligopolistic firms. Once a brand name had
entered consumer consciousness to the desired degree, the manufacturers sought to
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change it as little as possible (Horrocks, 1991; e.g. for the case of Cadbury’s “Dairy
Milk” chocolate, introduced in 1905). Innovation in such products was thus limited
mainly to (a) improved processes for producing the same product, for which the firms
were often dependent on their equipment suppliers, and (b) ingredient changes that
preserved as much as possible of the product’s sensory appeal but allowed production
costs to be reduced (e.g. the replacement of cream with palm oil in ice cream by
Unilever). Radically new products arrived occasionally, for example margarine, but these
too tended to settle down to a cosy oligopoly dependent on brand image, after quite a
short development phase.
With the assumed stability of final consumer tastes, major changes often arose from other
sources of demand. Prominent among these was military demand, which emphasised first
the need to offset the inherent perishability of most foods, and second the gains of easy
portability. In response to Napoleon’s famous dictum that “An army marches on its
stomach”, the Frenchman, Nicolas Appert, experimented with the heat treatment of foods
during the Napoleonic Wars, finding that when combined with hermetic sealing it
provided a satisfactory means of extending the “shelf life” of those foods; these advances
led to canning, as the first really revolutionary change in food processing/packaging in
the industrial era. Other areas in which military demand pioneered include instant coffee
(the US forces responsible for developing much of the technology in World War II), the
microwave oven (a spin-off from trying to use very short-wave radio for early radar), and
plastic packaging (retort pouch systems from the 1940s).
As in a number of other industries, the impact of military demand on food processing and
packaging has been waning in the later years of the twentieth century. The NASA space
programme and similar mission-oriented public programmes had only a limited effect of
changing the nature of food products. The civilian economy and traditional final
consumers would now have to play the lead role in radical product change.
In the event, the role of final consumers over the past 15 or so years has radically altered
innovation in the industry, to an extent unimaginable under the notion of the brand-loyal
customers of the oligopolies. It is these who, en masse, have pushed the industry from
being supply-driven to being to a much greater degree demand-driven. Their radically
altered function has in turn been driven by broader socioeconomic and lifestyle changes,
such that it seems reasonable to predict that these changes are quasi-permanent, though
to date they have had very different degrees of impact in different countries. At the same
time, they retain much conservatism about the sensory evaluation of food (they like their
peas to be green, their yoghurt to be viscous, etc.), and industry’s problem is getting the
right blend of novelty and tradition.
There are some important examples of consumer tastes being influenced by the consumer
durables which the rising incomes of consumers have allowed them to afford, especially
as the costs of the appliances fell. Two of the most notable have been the diffusion across
households of fridge-freezers and more recently of microwave ovens, both of which have
had considerable impacts on the types of food consumed. Even these, however, also
reflect underlying changes in lifestyle which have helped make their diffusion especially
rapid in certain countries.
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     10 Advanced packaging and microwave ovens simplify the preparation of exotic foods; see below.
The major socioeconomic changes relevant to this issue have included:
a) Global competition between producers for market share, which has helped
restructure tastes (Coca-Cola, MacDonald’s, megabrand beers, etc.) and also
restructure the older national oligopolies. Competition from new industrialized
regions has undermined brand loyalties and provoked demand for novelty. The
Japanese food manufacturing industry, for example, has been characterised for
some decades by a high rate of product innovation, as has the North American
industry in certain branches. These have both competed and collaborated with
European producers.
b) Rising incomes and embourgeoisement of the social structure, which have
increased demands not only for the consumer durables mentioned above but also
for foodstuffs. As in other industries like automobiles, the rising incomes have
encouraged levelling-up of tastes but also some diversification of tastes - a desire
not just to “keep up with the Joneses” but to differentiate oneself from the
Joneses. This differentiation of product demand has extended to processed and
unprocessed foods in ways described below. It has paradoxically accompanied the
“globalization” of taste patterns just referred to, with a great expansion of
consumption of ethnically varied foods and meal structures, which the major
retail chains now cater for.10 
c) Rising employment of married woman in the workforce, albeit much of it on
a part-time basis. Apart from boosting family incomes, this has helped encourage
the interest in prepared or semi-prepared foods such as “ready meals”, where
demand has grown especially rapidly in the past decade. It has also altered
shopping habits, in conjunction with a fall in average household size and with the
household technologies noted above, towards once-weekly or similar behaviour
in giant supermarkets (single people shopping spend one-third of their budgets
on convenience foods). The retailers have been especially prominent in
innovating in areas such as chilled ready meals, led by Marks & Spencer in the
UK.
d) Increased pressure and stress in life, for adult males as well as females. This
has encouraged an interest in rapid consumption as well as rapid preparation of
foods. “Snacking” has also grown at unusually rapid rates in recent years, and
along with it a burgeoning of snack foods. New York is often identified as the
city where “grazing”, i.e. eating sporadically in an unstructured way, first
developed. Together with the preceding factors this has underlain a decline in
regular sit-down family meals based on intensive preparation.
e) Changes in the age distribution of populations, especially the trend towards
“greying” population profiles, have altered the composition of demand. There
have been relative increases in demands for health foods, mostly purchased from
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specialist shops, and research into foods appropriate for specific physiological
conditions, e.g. diabetics. Interest in vegetarianism has been growing, and by
1992 vegetarian foods constituted about 10% of frozen and chilled products
(Bond, 1992), since when the proportion has risen. Recently there has been much
concern with “functional foods”, i.e. everyday food and drink products which add
supplements that have direct purported physiological benefits, e.g. high fibre or
protein-enriched.
f) Partly as an offshoot of this increased pace and stress of life, there has been
increasing concern, especially in the wealthier countries, about personal health
and deleterious eating behaviour for people in all age groups. There has thus been
an enormous expansion in healthier foods, e.g. low-calorie, low-fat, low-
cholesterol or low-sodium foods, as discussed further below. It has also required
food manufacturing companies and government regulators to take much greater
account of food safety, e.g. microbial contamination. However this has taken
place in an environment in which consumers want much greater naturalness in
their foods, which has been expressed most vehemently in the campaigns against
chemical additives.
g) Thus environmental concerns have also strongly influenced the industry. In
addition to the above, a major area of public concern relates to packaging, and
especially the use of plastics such as PET.
It has been far from easy for the food manufacturing industry to comply with this range
of change in tastes. For example, manufacturers feel caught between the Scylla of
increasing the freshness and naturalness of foods by reducing additives and the Charybdis
of increased risk of food contamination by micro-organisms. Especially difficult, and a
major focus of research interest in the early 1990s, have been the organoleptic (i.e.
sensory etc.) implications of “healthier” foods. Removing the fat or salt, or adding the
fibre, etc., alters the taste, the aroma and the “mouthfeel” of the product. Manufacturers
often feel obliged to compensate for these perceived losses, and add back ingredients
which in a sense make the resulting product much more artificial than the original
“unhealthy” item.
5.2.2  New Products
Many of these determinants and constraints surface in detailing the kinds of product-
oriented innovation that have been conspicuous in the last few years.
a) More exotic foods. Spurred by the socioeconomic developments noted above,
and by consequences such as greater international travel (exposing people to a
much wider range of food styles), retailers in European and other countries have
scoured the world for both raw and processed foods that would appeal to a more
sophisticated consumer population. The common allusion to the breakdown of
Communism in eastern Europe as the “kiwi-fruit revolution” is just one example
of the permeation of new tastes and consumer aspirations. Brand names as well
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     11 Because of the (permitted) use of some local raw materials and standards, these local copies often differ from the product
in the country of origin.
as product types have become internationalized in terms of both production and
consumption, for example the widespread brewing of beer “under licence”.11 As
implied above, the most striking change has, however, been towards ready meals
that duplicate (as far as possible) ethnic dishes and meal patterns.
b) More prepared foods. For reasons given above, the amount of cooking and
similar preparation in the home has been declining, and the purchase of ready
meals off the shelf of supermarkets expanding. Analysis of new product
introductions into UK supermarkets in the early 1990s has demonstrated that the
fastest growth has been in frozen foods and especially in chilled foods and
“ambient products” (sauces etc.) (Bond, 1992). These have required process
changes and especially the maintenance of quality standards along lines discussed
below. An offshoot has been the rapid increase in numbers of microwaveable
foods - the microwave oven has limitations in regard to certain aspects of food
preparation, such as adequate browning and crisping, and this has been countered
by manufacturers in a variety of ways. Consumers have also been demanding
foods that taste fresher, and this has been met in part by altering supply chains,
for instance by in-supermarket baking of breads.
c) More casual foods. In conjunction with the lifestyle changes referred to above,
there has been a rapid growth in demand for snack-type foods. In practice, there
are large discrepancies from one country to the next in what are to be classified
as “snacks” (White, 1994), but the overall trend towards more casual eating
seems unmistakable. This has progressed fastest in the most industrialized
countries, led by North America, north-west Europe and Japan. The frequent
association of snacks with “junk food” has put pressure on producers to increase
the nutritional value of snacks and to reduce the unhealthier characteristics to
which they are particularly prone.
d) Healthier foods.  The demand for low-calorie and similar preparations that
reduced the intake of allegedly “bad” ingredients was promoted in the first
instance by concerns about physical appearance and especially obesity. In
southern European countries, this remains the most important element in taste
shifts, but in the above-mentioned industrial regions the changes have been more
extensive and “positive”. These involve both the reduction of a wider range of
“bad” constituents and the enhancement of allegedly “good” ones. Some of these
changes are of long standing - for instance, decaffeinated coffee was first
produced (by Hag) in Bremen in 1905, but consumption patterns have shifted
more rapidly towards them in recent times.
It should be pointed out that scientific knowledge of what is good or bad is notoriously
limited - for example, it has been shown that, while the relationship between blood-serum
cholesterol and heart disease is evident enough, that between dietary cholesterol and
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     12 In the early 1990s p.c. consumption of fibre in breakfast cereals was still well below that recorded for the 1950s, partly
because of a lower overall consumption of such foodstuffs.
blood-serum cholesterol - or heart disease - is much less clear. Manufacturers in areas
like sugar or butter of course have strong vested interests in asserting the healthiness of
their products, and competing claims abound. Most consumers now accept the
unhealthiness of tobacco, and this has led major manufacturers into quests for new
markets (developing countries etc.) or diversifying out of tobacco (e.g. Philip Morris
acquiring Jacobs Suchard). In regard to food products more narrowly, the main consumer
concerns have been reducing intake of calories and fats, and replacing fats with complex
carbohydrates (e.g. starch, fibre). Although there has been a marked shift in products such
as breakfast cereals towards high-fibre and similar enriched items, there has been no great
increase in per capita consumption. 12 A converse pattern seems to emerge for sugar,
consumption of which has fallen little despite the undoubtedly growing use of sugar
substitutes. Other items accepted as having health virtues have suffered from lengthy or
awkward preparation, such as rice, which in turn has led manufacturers to developing
rapid rehydration and “boil in the bag” varieties. Environmental concerns have also
promoted some interest in materials preparation, as for sales of “organic” produce, but
again growth has been rather slow, because of anxieties about safety and because of
relatively high prices.
Although the shift to “functional” foods has been rather general across the advanced
industrial countries, the products and health concerns have remained somewhat different.
In Japan, for example, a major public concern is with consumption of oligosaccharides,
which have been of little moment to European consumers (Hilliam, 1995). This has
allowed scope for a certain amount of global co-operation in borrowing specific processes
(such as the Japanese “surimi” process) and product types (e.g. oriental “puffed snacks”
and crackers), without jeopardising product market shares. There has been some
discussion suggesting that, by use of techniques to be elaborated upon below, functional
foods may evolve into “designer foods”, with more precise tailoring of a range of
attributes as well as nutritional content. 
It appears widely accepted, at least in Europe, that local markets remain quite strongly
differentiated, and that US and other manufacturers aiming to penetrate the European
market(s) have not fully comprehended the need for local product variation (Smith 1991).
This point is developed more fully in Chapter 7 below. 
5.2.3  New Materials (ingredients)
Similar factors to those mentioned for new products underpin the evolution of
ingredients, and of course it is often the change in ingredients which brings about the
change in product. For example, exotic meals require the addition of exotic spices and
flavourings. Even here, however, the “exotic” ingredients can be applied to a wider range
of foods and drinks. An example is provided by soft drinks, which have begun to
incorporate a broad range of flavours, such as new herbals, new fruits, and “sports
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drinks” (mostly based on dextrose). Even new tastes have been imported - the Japanese
have promulgated the “umami” taste, which they claim differs from the four classic
western tastes (sweet, sour, salty, and bitter), and which is associated with the presence
of glutamates. Moreover, the shift to new forms of household processing like microwave
ovens has had implications for the ingredients used - for example, it has been found that
waxy maize starches perform much better in microwave ovens, as compared with the
traditional starches that out-perform them in conventional ovens. Here we shall focus on
two main types of ingredient change.
a) The substitution of “natural” for “artificial” ingredients. Consumer demands
for natural rather than chemically based additives became intensified following
German regulations of the late 1970s and subsequently EC regulations requiring
the listing of such additives (“E-numbers”), not least because some of the
additives like the colouring tartrazine (E-102) were earning a bad press for
psychological or physical reactions, and some criticized as being potentially
carcinogenic. The return to more natural ingredients involved higher costs in
some cases, but this was not the only problem. 
i) Additives used as emulsifiers, stabilisers, antioxidants, etc. figured
conspicuously among the “E-numbers”, and though many were probably
relatively harmless, the publication of their presence alerted consumers
and dissuaded manufacturers from using them. Oxidation of food is the
main source of its perishability, and the more dubious chemical additives
were in part replaceable by “beneficial” antioxidants like ascorbic acid
(vitamin C), or proteins like glucose oxidase, or natural antioxidants like
some tocopherols (including vitamin E). Gelling is increasingly being
assisted by pectin, mostly obtained from apples, with the recent
development of high as well as low methoxyl pectins, and recently of
“instant” pectins.
ii) In regard to the more intrusive additives, influencing taste, colour, etc.,
the problems became more apparent. Many authentic flavours, e.g.
strawberry, are harmed by even the slightest amount of processing, so
substitutes have to be sought. Since additives produced from nature
(plants, fungi, etc.) were deemed to be more acceptable, manufacturers
thus searched for “nature-identical” additives. This included the
investigation and analysis of a range of exotic natural products. A
considerable difficulty is that there remain many differences in definitions
of what are “nature-identical” additives, and one of the objectives of EU
harmonization is to bring greater consistency into this area.
b) The development of ingredients to compensate for the loss of organoleptic
properties in “healthier” foods. The reduction or virtual removal of elements like
fats and sugar, as consumers increasingly demanded, was in itself relatively
straightforward. What was problematic was to replace the contributions these
elements made to the “mouthfeel” of the product. In some cases, like skimmed
milk, no attempt was made to reproduce such “mouthfeel” (as compared with
39
full-cream milk), and it was assumed that consumers would tolerate this. In most
cases, however, this was not thought to be so, and a major proportion of product-
oriented R&D in the industry as of recent times has gone into compensating for
the loss of fats and sugars. Flavour “enhancers” like maltol and ethyl maltol are
being used in the meantime for low-calorie foods, and hydrocolloids (food gums)
to mimic the texture of edible fats.
i) The reduction of fats has been particularly problematic, in view of the
range of attributes which fats add to the foods that naturally contain them.
Carbohydrates like the maltodextrins replaced some of the properties of
fats, as did emulsifiers, but efforts were made to bypass these too, either
using process innovations like vacuum drying, or developing enzymic
processes to obtain bulking agents. Protein alternatives are desirable for
reasons just given, e.g. the use of isolated soy proteins in reduced fat and
reduced cholesterol items, or whey protein concentrate from milk (and
very recently whey protein texturisers). 
ii) New substitutes for sugar were established in the chemical field.
Saccharin had a long history as a sweetener, but the taste was deemed
unsatisfactory in many uses. Cyclamates tasted better but on chemical
grounds failed to win regulatory approval in many countries, including
the USA and UK. Hence new “intense sweeteners” like aspartame found
a large market in products like sugar-free soft drinks, but they too were
challenged on chemical grounds, and in particular for their lack of bulk
(glucose syrup often had to be added); moreover aspartame as a protein
suffered some degradation through time. The sugar-based polyols (sugar
alcohols), like sorbitol, mannitol and xylitol, many originally derived
from natural sources, have been adopted instead in such items as no-sugar
chewing gum. Enzymic processes for converting starches into sweeteners
are being heavily researched, but products that replace all the functions
of sugar simultaneously are not yet in sight.
Overall, we might classify the changes as involving: (i) a shift from chemical additives
to the biopolymers (proteins and polysaccharides like starch); (ii) an associated upsurge
of interest in enzymic processes for modification, discussed below in relation to
biotechnology; (iii) the problems of meeting a diversity of functions (and particularly
their synergistic interactions) supplied by food in its “natural” state, especially when the
sources of those functions are wholly or partially removed; (iv) the role of legislation in
limiting the changes that are permissible, though the regulatory structure for novel foods
and ingredients remains rather chaotic.
5.2.4  Product Quality and Safety
A major shortcoming of removing additives and also the natural ingredients was of
endangering the quality of the product. The main objective in product quality for
manufacturers has been one of extending “shelf life”; an aim that as we saw above dates
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back to the development of canning two centuries ago, and indeed to the role of salt and
spices in still earlier times. As manufacturers see it, consumers are wanting food to taste
fresher and fresher, but with fewer and fewer of the constituents (preservatives etc.) that
have traditionally offered such possibilities. But it was not just the ingredients that posed
this dilemma - the same went for processes traditionally used to maintain food quality,
like heating or freezing. 
An important part of maintaining and (preferably) raising quality in food manufacturing
had to do with the raw materials; for example the closer control of fruits and vegetables
during growing, the reduction in animal stress prior to slaughter, and the development of
soft wheats (rather than processing hard wheats) for biscuits. By and large these fall
outside our concern, except in the sense that the whole food chain was in question. In
countries like the UK, it is the large retailers (supermarket chains) that have taken control
of the product chain, as purveyors of the fast-growing ready meals noted above. Marks
& Spencer et al. exercise rigid (some would say ruthless) control over at least their
domestic suppliers. To some degree, this change has been at the expense of closer links
between manufacturers and growers (Raven et al., 1995).
Within the food-manufacturing segment itself, advance has come from the whole range
of possibilities, e.g. in beverages from a combination of changes in materials, processes
and packaging, which have increased the stability of the product. These are dealt with
individually elsewhere, but this is an appropriate point to focus upon instrumentation as
a key field for monitoring product quality. Metrology - the science of measurement - has
had to evolve in the context of rising awareness of the roles of chemistry, physics,
biology, etc. in determining product quality performance. A major problem has been the
difficulty of measuring many of the attributes of food quality that one would ideally wish
to monitor. The rheological properties of foods (texture, viscosity, etc.) and especially the
sensory attributes remain very awkward to measure by objective means.
An important and growing function has been to gauge the quality of the raw materials.
Testing wheat quality was one of the first functions assigned to specialist R&D
laboratories in the USA a century ago (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989), and more recently
the kinds of measures used have been augmented, e.g. using instruments to measure the
extensibility of wheat in order to assess its hardness. Regulatory requirements have also
been stepped up in regard to the quality of materials, e.g. EU regulations that require
starches used in non-food applications to be 97% “food-grade” quality.
Application of instruments to food processing has raised even bigger problems. Testing
in R&D laboratories, even if set up “in-house” within manufacturing firms, has
customarily been time-consuming, skill-demanding, and only moderate in its accuracy.
The normal procedure has been to take samples from a given product at the relevant
processing stage, remove it to the lab, test it using “wet chemistry” methods by qualified
scientists, then decide on its acceptability; by which time the offending item may long
since have left the factory. Conversely, if (to meet regulatory standards or whatever) the
results of the tests have to be awaited, there will be a long delay in production
throughput. This is simply one way in which time is of the essence in modern food
processing.
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     13 Examples include electrophoresis for protein analysis, Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) for determining the quantities
of liquid present etc., Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (NIR) and other types of vibrational spectroscopy for measuring moisture and
also protein etc. (and alcoholic content of wine in France), plasma emission spectrometry for detecting minerals.
Time is not the only problem. The sample is not necessarily valid for the whole product
from which it has been removed - in particular, the concern with most irregularly shaped
foods is that information is required about what is taking place at the centre of the item
(whether the centre has been adequately frozen, cooked, etc.), but this is difficult to
discover without disfiguring the item in question. The despatch to the lab may also alter
the sample’s characteristics. Hence the main quest has been to develop methods of testing
that are i) more reliable, and ii) applicable “on-line” and in real time (i.e. while
continuous processes are actually taking place). The latter in turn requires procedures that
can be used, and reliably, by relatively unskilled operatives on the production line;
moreover it requires equipment that is not too cumbersome and is sturdy enough to be
used on the factory floor. Many of the changes in instrumentation and quality assessment
that have taken place in recent years fall into these categories; though there is still some
way to go before on-line real-time evaluation becomes a reality in most branches of the
industry. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly apparent that monitoring must be
continuous; for example, the temperature of frozen or chilled products must be tracked
the whole time (“full history”) if product quality and safety is not to be risked, including
more careful handling during retailing.
Advanced instrumentation itself has replaced some of the wet chemistry procedures, with
all their shortcomings. Many have been adapted from first use in biomedical
applications13: even more recent developments include X-ray fluorescence (e.g. to assess
presence of salt or ash), ultrasoft X-rays (e.g. to detect meat contamination), and DNA
assays based on monoclonal antibodies (for microbial detection, and increasingly for
assessing texture, appearance etc. via the presence of biopolymers). These instruments
are by no means cheap, though they are becoming economic for use in food-processing
plants with sufficient scale (i.e. throughput levels). Their main advantages over wet
chemistry are higher speed, increasing user-friendliness (ability to be used by semi-skilled
operatives), lack of environmental risk, and accuracy; though these problems have by no
means yet been fully solved. Interpreting the spectra from, say, Near-Infrared
Spectroscopy (NIR) remains quite an art, despite the growing availability of computer
processing of the output; and the now-popular combination of chromatography and
spectroscopy for analysis, apart from being somewhat expensive in equipment, still
requires some sample preparation (via centrifuges, filters, etc.). In addition, it is being
realised that scientific predictions are of little use, because of generally being carried out
under “optimal” conditions - hence mathematical modelling is trying to incorporate a
wider and wider range of variables of the kinds actually encountered under production
conditions.
As implied above, many of the most critical characteristics of food still by and large lie
beyond the capability of instruments; above all the organoleptic properties, for which
panels of alleged experts remain the overwhelmingly dominant method of assessment.
Attempts are under way to supplement these rather subjective procedures, e.g.
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physiological monitoring of the panellists themselves (electromyography), or the use of
gas sensors as an “electronic nose”, or optoelectronic means of assessing colour, or
machine-vision methods (using lasers etc.) for sorting and for analysing high-speed
motion; but most of these are understandably in their infancy. Greater rigour in panel
assessment has been sought, for example through “quantitative descriptive analysis”
(QDA) or the application of expert systems etc. Here too it is being found that analysis
has to be continuous rather than one-off or intermittent, and of course this is very labour-
intensive. Equally it has been shown that there is a large amount of discrepancy in
judgements between different countries, which no doubt include objective discrepancies
in what is being looked for as well as subjective discrepancies in panel quality. EU
harmonization programmes have been initiated in such areas, especially the FLAIR
(Food-Linked Agro-Industrial Research) programme which ran from 1989 to 1993, and
a European Sensory Network was established in 1989 (indeed the latter helped
demonstrate the cross-country differences just mentioned - an issue we shall come back
to later). Additionally, there have been attempts to award European accreditation to
laboratories meeting acceptable standards in their testing, as it is granted that in practice
measurements vary quite widely between different labs.
Supranational and national regulatory bodies also exist to oversee any attempts to pass
poor-quality food and drink off as being of good quality. Since time immemorial, the
industry generally has tempted its producers and distributors into adulteration (e.g.
Hobsbawm, 1957). The original Food and Drugs Acts in the UK (1875) were passed to
try to counter fraudulent practices of such kind. The industry - like many others - is often
to be found replying that its members stand too much to lose from cheating, especially
the large oligopolistic concerns, and has tried self-regulation by detailing “Good
Manufacturing Practice” (GMP). It is however obvious from the much-publicized court
cases that the practice has far from disappeared, though it may well be diminishing.
Wines and fruit juices (a high proportion of the latter advertised as 100% pure but in fact
variously containing extra water, sugar, “extenders” like pulpwash, colours, acids, etc.)
have figured prominently here. New technologies give opportunists a broader range of
potential tricks of the trade, but equally they give the regulators greater powers of
detection. It has been argued that the situation is best seen as one of an on-going
evolutionary race between adulterators and regulators (Hall, 1992).
Quality assurance standards like ISO 9000, BS 5750 and EN 29000 have been of some
use in focusing attention upon quality issues (also EN 45000 for good laboratory
practice), but have been nowhere near adequate to meet the main concerns directed by
the public against the industry. This is most evident in safety standards, and especially
the dangers of microbial or other contamination of foodstuffs. To meet these - and indeed
the wider range of issues - a major objective for the 1990s has been to identify and
respond to specific aspects of the production process that could possibly create hazards,
and these are known as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP). There is
general agreement that imposition of such criteria calls into question much more of the
food manufacturing process than do the orthodox quality control standards, for example
insisting upon assessing the slowest heating or cooling points. The EU has programmes
to elucidate HACCP standards, but it is quite apparent that just their identification, much
less their harmonization, is extremely onerous. Nevertheless, the industry has to think in
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terms of gearing its processes and products to HACCP within the foreseeable future. This
will necessarily involve more accurate and much faster on-line methods and instruments.
As with quality testing more generally, the objective in safety assessment is to establish
real-time evaluation, and combined with production control (e.g. on continuous
processes). Traditional microbiological tests to detect e.g. listeria or salmonella are
notoriously slow, taking up to several weeks to produce results, because of the sequence
of stages of sample pre-enrichment, enrichment and plating out that have to be
undertaken before biochemical testing. The accuracy of the results seems acceptable; the
problem is that the procedures are time-consuming, costly, and sample-specific.
Developments in instrumentation have cut the time required to a number of days (less
than one week), but the time lapse is still far too long for practical effectiveness.
Currently much favoured are identification methods emanating from genetic engineering,
like DNA “fingerprinting” or nucleic acid probes; progress is rapid but many problems
remain. Of particular interest has been the utilization of the “Polymerase Chain Reaction”
(PCR) for DNA enrichment, as developed in the USA jointly by Cetus (from the
biotechnology side) and Perkin-Elmer (from the instruments side), which drastically
reduces the enrichment stage. Equivalent if less dramatic advances have been taking
place in identifying non-microbiological contaminations e.g. by heavy metals or by
foreign bodies like glass splinters (including dealing with outbreaks of tampering).
These advances in techniques and accompanying regulatory changes were partly a
response to safety scares in the late 1980s. The suggested solutions ranged from the
simple to the complex. Much could be done by improving hygiene criteria for the
equipment - designing the machinery for hygienic operation as well as making
maintenance (cleaning) more straightforward. At the other extreme, evidently the
adequacy of food science and technology was much less than the industry and others
believed. The BSE scares have made this all too plain, along with the costs the industry
will bear if it transgresses. A conclusion that many drew is that approaches to food
quality and safety had to become much more multidisciplinary, not only because of the
complexity of the food products but also because of the complexity of the problems they
raised.
5.3  Supply changes and process innovation
5.3.1  Scientific advance
This multifaceted approach to the problems encountered by the food industry has been
revealed in its recruitment of a much more diversified body of sciences. The industry had
a long tradition of solving its problems - or at least partially solving them - by empirical
means, with the science (if any) following after, e.g. pasteurization-microbiology,
refrigeration-cryology. Attempts were indeed made from a relatively early stage to
increase the scientific content of food production, but apart from isolated areas such as
those just referred to, these by and large earned a poor reputation. Food science (or
“domestic science”) was seen as a substitute for the “hard” sciences like physics for
women to study; with the implications that it would not be over-taxing of their
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supposedly tenderer intellects, and that it would prepare them for married life in the
home. Many secondary schools in the UK set up such courses, and at least one university
college (King’s College for Women) was founded for these purposes (Dyhouse, 1981, pp
167/9). The subject was heavily criticized from its inception both for its content and for
its motives, but to this day science in the food area carries certain connotations of these
kinds, which has probably hindered its progress. Most now however accept that, far from
being relatively “soft” and easy, the science required for such applications is in fact for
the most part very demanding, not least because of the multidisciplinary standpoints
involved. The more that science is applied, the more it becomes evident just how little
science has so far achieved.
a) Mathematics. Predictive modelling in areas like microbiological and other
contamination has been going on for over 60 years, e.g. predicting the lethality
of bacteria, or the impact of radioactive fallout. The poor performance of these
models in practice, as shown up in outbreaks of food poisoning, or in the gross
under-estimate of some of the consequences of Chernobyl, have (as mentioned
above) induced the development of models encompassing a much wider range of
variables, as empirical analysis and the findings of other sciences show them to
play their part. These much more complex models require not only more
demanding analysis in the mathematics (e.g. computational fluid dynamics), but
resort to simulation and the adoption of multivariate statistical procedures.
b) Computer science. For real-time analysis, the interpretation of data such as the
Fourier transforms used in NIR spectroscopy etc. requires very fast computing
power. Naturally, the availability of high-speed workstations at comparatively
low cost has greatly facilitated the adoption of such instrumentation in the past
decade or so, and the instruments and computers can readily be networked.
Problems of the user interface have also been much diminished. Databases are
currently under development, though much needs to be done to network these.
The biggest difficulty nowadays in most cases - as in many other areas of
computer application - lies in the software. Gradually the software needed to
maintain quality standards along the food chain is emerging, but the “bottleneck”
is a constrictive one. User software has been identified as the greatest single cost
in developing process control systems (Womersley, 1991). Expert systems have
been proposed, and a number developed for factory-level use. The main focus
now is however upon the rival approach of neural networks (Wallin, 1995); the
reasons being that practical data arising out of food processing are inherently
somewhat “fuzzy”, and that systems which allow the programmes to “learn” have
enormous advantages where even the underlying principles remain rather
obscure.
c) Physics. The increasing use of advanced instruments, and the growing
awareness of the complexity of the relevant physical processes and modifications,
have promoted interest in more formal development of the physics of food
manufacturing. The basic processes like heating and cooling are greatly
dependent on such understanding and on advancing it. Optics and sonics are both
being adopted in highly imaginative ways to deal with some of the industry’s
45
     14 Greater specificity of enzyme use in recent applications include lactase in milk, alpha-amylase in bread, lipases in fats and
oils, phospholipases for emulsifiers, and widespread use of proteinases e.g. for cheese ripening, soup flavouring and meat
tenderising (Law, 1990). 
     15 In the past, the main use of enzymes has been for degradation (hydrolysis, e.g. hydrolysing proteins into peptides), but a
much wider range of applications now seems attainable, especially in low-water environments (e.g. for producing emulsifiers
or conducting biotransformations) where enzymic methods consume much less energy etc. than chemical ones, and can produce
more intractable problems. New areas like irradiation of food to destroy bacteria
have been developed, but their use remains costly and rather controversial.
d) Chemistry. Chemists have traditionally dominated scientific recruitment into
the food-processing industries. If anything their importance rose as recently as the
1970s, when consumer pressure for reliable food first began to be exerted. As
implied above, this pressure moved away from chemicals during the 1980s, and
with that went some loss of faith in what chemists could do (coupled with the
growing need for filling other scientific gaps). However, important chemical
advances continue to arise, for instance there remain many adherents to chemical
processes for modifying proteins (relying on safe reagents). Moreover the
chemical industry and especially the pharmaceutical industry appears to be the
model of organization that many in the food industry implicitly aspire to. Many
of the instruments and techniques it employs were “borrowed” from earlier use
in these industries.
e) Biotechnology. The shift away from wet chemistry has mostly been to the gain
of biological approaches. Food and drink was of course the major area of
application of biological technologies from ancient history (baking, brewing,
etc.). But as in areas like pharmaceuticals, though even more powerfully, it is the
potential of latest-generation biotechnologies that have attracted most research.
Enzymic methods are being sought to replace chemical additives of virtually all
kinds, and this is an industry which habitually uses many of them. The first
enzyme products from genetically engineered organisms entered the market in
1989/90, based on work done at MIT etc. The implication is that biological
approaches are likely to be much safer, although current regulatory standards in
some countries (those that adopt the “positive list” approach of what they will
approve, rather than the “negative list” one of what they disapprove of) often run
counter to this presumption. Protein engineering, which has been at the leading
edge of recent applications of genetic engineering, has thus proved especially
attractive a prospect e.g. in replacing purification techniques, though much
remains to be understood of the basic biotechnology itself. 
The use of proteins in food goes well beyond their nutritional value, for example
to incorporate their roles in thickening, water- and fat-binding, gelation, foaming,
emulsification, colouring and taste.14 The consumer take-up of bio-engineered
foods like mycoprotein has however been disappointing to some. For the time
being, it looks as though the main uses will be for ingredients and their
modification (including improved starter cultures), and for product quality and
safety assessment (using the DNA assays as outlined above).15 Some proteins
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more targeted products. 
themselves can be used for rapid microbiological diagnostics (e.g. lectins). The
shift to “healthier” foods described previously is a major stimulus to research and
development in this area: it is biotechnology that is being mostly considered to
resolve the inherent conflict between the naturalness and the maintenance of
freshness of foods. The particular role of biotechnology is further isolated in other
sections of this Report, e.g. in the discussion of patenting in Section 6.3.
Other areas of current scientific focus are likely to prove significant for the food industry,
like optoelectronics. In the meantime, we can however expect that such expertise will
mainly be sought from outside the industry. Within the sector, the issue is often seen as
one of choosing which scientific approach will be adopted for a particular problem,
where the choice is either/or. For example, the modification of milk to produce
“healthier” butter can be undertaken by physical means, by chemical means, by
biotechnological means (now much researched), or by dietary means (changing what is
fed to the cows - this seems the simplest and arguably the best). In the longer term, the
overriding concern is likely to be with bringing together the results of such heterogeneous
scientific advance into developments that are of concern in production. This highlights
the importance of the “transfer sciences”, to which recent work in innovation studies has
called special attention (OECD, 1992). It also highlights the need for improved networks
of communication, as the complexity of demands becomes more and more apparent. The
past record in terms of, for example, links between nutritionists and toxicologists, has
been distressingly poor.
5.3.2  Processes
The processes employed in manufacturing food and drink thus aim to coalesce this
multiplicity of scientific advance with the rapidly growing importance and change in final
demand demonstrated above. Both heating and cooling have been profoundly
transformed by these new requirements.
Some of these changes have been drawn directly from the demand-side technologies
themselves; for example there is growing use of microwave heating in industry-scale
operations, including its use for pasteurization (at moderate levels of heat) and tempering
(raising the temperature of frozen food without thawing). The familiar domestic
advantage of microwaving for rapid treatment is essentially duplicated for industrial
purposes, though this requires greater care in the handling of the process in view of its
being very rapid. Industrial-use microwaving also has to take particular care about the
lack of penetration depth of microwaves into food substances.
a) Cooking
On the side of cooking, the main objectives have been to shorten the process and increase
its flexibility (adaptability to different products). The industry has long opted for heat
exchangers as the most cost-effective and rapid means of heating in the context of
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     16 There has also been recent interest in ohmic heating, with the production of equipment by firms like APV. 
     17 For instance, sausages are increasingly being produced by co-extrusion of the filling ("dough") and the casing, using
collagen paste. 
continuous processing, and developments continue regularly in regard to all the major
types of heat exchanger (plate, tubular, scraped-surface, etc.), each of which has
distinctive advantages or disadvantages for particular types of product. High-temperature
short-time (HTST) processing has been sought, in the wake of success in extending shelf-
life with UHT (ultra high temperature) processes and products, like long-life milk.16 As
with microwaves, process control has to be intensified, to get the right balance between
too short a time (which would fail to destroy bacteria) and too long a time (which would
harm the product quality), and equivalently the right balance of temperature. Because
most foods are non-Newtonian in their flow properties, the knowledge of rheological
behaviour under conditions of, say, UHT processing is still very limited.
The changes in demands for cereals, snacks, etc. have helped prompt a radical change in
method from rotary cookers to extruders. Extrusion cooking, originally using a single
screw within a barrel, raises the shear imparted by the equipment, with substantial effects
on cooking time and textural quality. Extrusion cooking can be conducted much faster
than rotary steam pressure ovens (pass-through time is typically 30-90 seconds), and
continuous rather than batch processing is much facilitated. The extruder barrel can
conduct a range of processes such as grinding, mixing, compressing, heating, cooking,
sterilizing, deodorizing, shaping, texturizing, drying and cutting. Subsequent
modifications such as extending barrel length have increased its range of advantages;
furthermore the disadvantage of shorter shelf-life of many early products is being
overcome by use of different ingredients. The most important development within this
field has, however, been the shift from single-screw to twin-screw extruders, which not
only double the capacity in unit time, but allow straightforward co-extrusion, for items
that require combinations of major ingredients - as is true of many of the new product
types alluded to above.17 Thus extrusion cooking gives rise to economies of scale, though
in the recent sense of greater throughput rather than greater size of operation (von
Tunzelmann, 1995b) - extrusion cooking generally economizes on space instead of taking
up more of it. This allows its combination with economies of scope, in the sense of
flexibility in regard to the items being cooked - extruders can be converted extremely
rapidly from cooking, say, filled, coated and dual-texture breakfast cereals to snacks
(Davies, 1990) - and in the sense also of combining substances for co-extrusion (Jones,
1990, 1991). Very specific tailoring of the cooking process to the desired product can be
undertaken, allowing gains in terms of texture, flavour, etc.; following which the
extruders can quickly be re-programmed for quite different products. The issue arises not
just in cooking but in other phases of the production process, e.g. the use of high-speed
mixing (multiprocessors have been developed for complex products), or accelerated
drying (spray drying, fluidized bed systems, or freeze drying). The industry has been
criticized for devoting too much attention to high speed and not enough to high flexibility
(e.g. Kaye, 1992), and such equipment can help effect a better compromise; though this
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may also require changes in the product lines themselves, like greater modularity (e.g.
Greeves, 1990; also ECE, 1991, pp 59/60, for packaging machinery).
b) Freezing
On the side of freezing, the basic techniques of contact freezing have been understood
since Birdseye’s work in 1928. The basic objectives parallel those for heating -
economies of time and space, reliability and (less problematic here) flexibility. The shift
in demand from frozen to chilled products has increased awareness of the need for
accurate information on i) the extent of penetration of chilling or freezing into the food
product (typically rather irregularly shaped) and ii) monitoring temperature through the
whole process up to final sale. A considerable difficulty is that freezing processes are
inherently nonlinear. It was established at a fairly early stage that rapid freezing generally
did much less harm to the product than slow freezing (blast freezing); although it later
emerged that there are some exceptions and the issue remains much debated, e.g. for
meats. Additives (cryoprotectants) may have to be employed to slow down some of the
more disruptive aspects of the process. Very rapid freezing techniques (cryogenics), using
liquid nitrogen, have been employed for certain purposes, particularly for “crust freezing”
(to maintain surface colour), and recently the range of uses has greatly expanded
(Tomlins, 1995). Freezing systems have customarily been developed on technological
criteria, especially to optimize the performance of the evaporator, and only recently has
there been a switch of emphasis to optimizing for the product itself (Bailey, 1993).
c) Production integration
Aside from the processes employed at these key stages, there are important issues that
arise in connection with the overall integration of production. One concerns extraction
and separation. Supercritical gases/fluids, generally carbon dioxide, are now becoming
more widely used for extracting certain ingredients, in place of traditional liquid solvent
extraction and distillation, e.g. for seed oils, fats, spices, drugs and medicinal herbs;
though the capital costs remain high. It is becoming increasingly common to separate as
much as possible at the beginning of the process, and re-combine the elements as late as
possible before final despatch. This applies not just to the obvious constituents, but to
aromas etc., which as noted above are often highly sensitive to any processing. The
“spinning cone” method, as now used in low-alcohol wines for example, adopts this
approach. In beer-brewing, many large companies have developed a bland “base beer”
for process efficiency, to which elements like bitterness, hop aroma, colour and foam are
added late in processing. 
Flow through the whole process is central to continuity and to automation. While
beverages are generally straightforward to handle, certain types of particulate foods are
often difficult, though their flowability has to be maintained. Distributed PLCs
(programmable logic controllers), replacing relays, were employed in the 1970s and ’80s
for such purposes, but their power was not adequate to meet many needs. They have been
overtaken by modern microprocessors and computerization. The adoption of IT in food
processing has however fallen below expectations, not least because so many operations
remain “art” rather than “science” (“fingertip feeling”). The stumbling block in many
areas of automation has been the instrumentation for on-line quality control, and
especially the lack of adequate sensors to assess such “difficult” products. This is slowly
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     18 An extreme example is the Italian cake, Panetonni, which takes about 24 hours to cool in air and 4 minutes under vacuum.
being met, but the requirements are arguably rising almost as rapidly (e.g. the sensors
crucially required for HTST processing). As noted above, equipment originally developed
for quite different purposes is being imaginatively applied to food processing needs, for
instance both low-intensity and high-intensity ultrasonics (though here too sensors remain
a problem), and machine-vision systems. There is growing use of vacuum processing for
cooking, cooling, thawing etc., to raise speeds and reduce damage. 18 The Japanese
however lead in application of high pressures, e.g. for preservation (Earnshaw, 1992;
Galazka and Ledward, 1995). The automation of transfer functions using AGVs
(automatic guided vehicles, e.g. with laser tracking) or similar is becoming popular.
Essentially, it can be said that technology in the industry is being driven by systems that
cope with variety (Poley, 1993). As with the scientific developments, the technologies
increasingly need to be integrated with one another, especially as the production systems
become more strongly integrated in the interests of altering consumer demand. Reflecting
the overall shift of emphasis in the industry from supply to demand factors, efforts are
under way to shift the orientation of automation from the machinery to the product.
5.3.3  Packaging
In the early 1970s, “tin” cans and glass bottles and jars remained the standard forms of
packaging for food and drink. Since those days, when packaging was largely an
afterthought, the packaging processes and products have been radically transformed.
These changes were part and parcel of the changes in products and processes higher up
the food chain, as described above, and indeed they often had to be developed in
conjunction with one another.
Most significant in this respect were the forms of packaging adopted for the chilled foods
and ready meals. These had to allow for the heterogeneity of such products (trays with
several compartments, sachets, etc.), and also for the conditions under which they would
be prepared in the home. Plastics and seals that could be heated in ovens without
themselves deforming or adversely affecting the food they contained, and subsequently
those usable with microwave ovens, became the subject of considerable research.
Crystallized PET (polyethylene terephthalate) has been developed for the trays (ordinary
PET cannot withstand the temperatures encountered in an oven). For microwaving there
was the additional problem of browning or crisping the cooked food in the short time it
was in the oven, as mentioned before. Recent solutions have focused on the properties
of “smart” materials, in this case susceptor packaging that would itself react to the heat
treatment and thereby improve the nature of the cooked product. While progress here has
been rather impressive, there remain doubts about susceptor packages, including the
possibility of toxic effects.
More generally, progress had two main objectives: i) developing aseptic packaging, to
improve safety standards; ii) developing controlled or modified atmosphere packaging
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(CAP and MAP), to offset declining quality during extended shelf-life. Aseptic
packaging, which involves separate sterilization of product and packaging, attracted
considerable interest from the industry; but it has been claimed that consumers have
shown less interest, and that it has failed to repay the investments in it (Kaye, 1992). On
the other hand, for reasons already given, the industry at large may lose from any lack of
commitment to high safety standards. CA and especially MA packaging, on the other
hand, appear to have been quite successful. These cover a range of situations. CA
packaging restricts the changes that can take place within the container. The main
problem is oxidation, the most common source of food perishability. Although it is
technically possible to block out all the oxygen (by vacuum packaging and perfect
sealing), it is usually inadvisable to do so, because products like meat respire and change
in other ways while on the supermarket shelf. CA packaging therefore aims to allow in
just enough oxygen (etc.) to offset these changes. MA packaging can be regarded as a
form of CA, in which conditions in the package are initially altered to suit the character
of the product and its perishability - a typical solution is a mixture of carbon dioxide to
inhibit microbial action, nitrogen to limit oxidation, and sometimes oxygen to retain
colour e.g. of red meat. MAP can be combined with “active” packaging in which
additives are included in the packaging film (laminated PET susceptors) or within the
container to enhance freshness. As noted, various forms of these are now widely used in
chilled ready meals etc., although it has been claimed that their use for storage of certain
vegetables etc. is unnecessary and costly (Saráy, 1994).
These developments in turn rest on advances in i) materials used for the seals, ii) methods
of sealing and filling. The materials involved are mostly laminates containing two to four
layers of suitable polymers (polypropylene etc.) or aluminium, each designed to provide
a high barrier against the outer or inner environment (gas, water, etc.), and surface
coatings are commonly applied as well. Naturally the most suitable polymers etc. vary
according to the nature of the product, and R&D work here is often of a high level of
sophistication. The problems do not however end with obtaining and producing suitable
materials. The forming (of the material shapes), filling and sealing are usually done in
single complex machines, known as form-fill-seal machines (FFS), which require very
high precision and advanced microprocessor controls. Filling is much more precise than
for cans or jars because the seal area must not be spattered with the product. Sealing,
usually with adhesives, can be variously hot or cold; the latter being much faster though
raising other difficulties. The packaging as well as the products have shifted from being
supply-driven (reduced costs, faster speeds, etc.) to being more market-driven, with
attempts to catch the consumer’s eye in one way or another, so that advances have been
continuous. Closures have attracted particular attention - tear-strips, tear-strings, corner
separations, etc.
For liquids, there have been other changes running concurrently with these in the past two
decades or so. The two-piece “tin” (i.e. tinplate) can has partly given way to other types
of metal, particularly aluminium. The glass bottle has given way to both cartons (Tetra-
Pak etc.) and plastics, particularly PET. These carried advantages in terms of lighter
weight, less fragility (than glass), storage convenience (rectangular shapes etc.) and
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     19 Recent developments include such items as bag-in-the-box, which incorporates food as well as drink packaging technology
(automatic filling, coextrusions, etc.), and usually a foldable tap closure.
permitted the development of user-friendly closures (ring-pulls, twist-off plastics,
reclosable carton lids, etc.).19 
On the other hand, there has been rising public resistance to excessive packaging,
affecting both food and drinks containers. There has been concern about the
environmental effects of production processes for packaging such as PET
(petrochemicals). There have also been demands both for more recyclable materials (and
facilities) and for less wasteful packaging. Regulatory standards will undoubtedly bear
more heavily on manufacturers in these terms, with the EU programme designed to set
targets for reduction to be achieved by 2003 (15% reduction in packaging and 60%
increase in recycling). Even more problematic are regulations concerning “migration”
between package and product. Manufacturers have long been concerned about the
“scalping” of flavours by the packaging; regulators tend to be more concerned with the
migration of substances from the packaging (including printing inks) into the product,
with possibly harmful effects on the consumer. The closer the packaging to avoid
oxidation, the more likely such migration must be. Some of the newer materials are at a
disadvantage in this respect, for example there is more migration from PET bottles than
from glass. The EU programme for harmonization of migration standards is accordingly
being developed over the years 1993 to 1997. 
Packaging is thus a good illustration of four of the main themes pervading this survey of
recent innovation in the food manufacturing industry: i) the need for adequate
instrumentation for monitoring quality and safety (infrared spectroscopy and gas
chromatography are now used for analysing packaging); ii) the need for conjoint
development of product and package; iii) the rising importance of consumer “voice”; and
iv) the rising importance of regulatory standards and their harmonization.
5.4  Summary
We can thus summarise the patterns of recent innovation according to such headings. The
most striking observation is the radical nature of both product and process innovation in
the industry over the past twenty years or so. While this has frequently been pointed out
in regard to the “high-tech” industries, for example in the long-wave literature, it has
much less often been noted for pervading a range of industries usually regarded as being
rather “low-tech”. Of course there is a high degree of dependence on those developments
in high-tech areas, like information technology, biotechnology and advanced materials
as demonstrated above; but there is much more to pervasiveness than the simple
“supplier-dominated” view of such industries would suggest. In particular, we may draw
attention to the great variety of technological impulses which “suppliers” are being called
on to deliver to these “users” - the range of scientific disciplines and technological fields -
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and still more to the complexity of integrating these through indigenous efforts within the
“user” industry such as food processing. 
These supply-side impetuses are if anything being overshadowed by changes on the
demand side, exerted through consumer behaviour (including the effects of
“globalization” of tastes and products), through public opinion, and through intensifying
regulatory standards (in regard to health, safety, environment, etc.), which are of course
partly by way of response to public opinion. The shift of emphasis from technology to
product is altering the structure of process change in the sense of how automation is
developed, and also altering the nature of competition and collaboration in the industry.
The interactions between the supply-side elements (different technologies etc.) and
especially between the demand side and the supply side are likely to prove the key
determinant of national and supranational success in innovation in the industry.
6. Features of innovation at the firm level
The focus in this Chapter is upon three sub-themes, all of them studied at the firm level.
First leader and laggard firms within the industry are characterised. Subsequently the role
of firm strategies is investigated. Finally the relationship between innovation and
profitability is explored in much greater detail. The first thing to clarify in a study of
success factors is to define what is meant by “success”. Two criteria are employed in this
study. As the study is on innovation, the share of innovative products in total turnover
is taken as one indicator of success, and the growth in turnover from 1990 to 1992 is the
other one. It could, of course, be discussed whether other indicators - both economic and
non-economic - should be chosen. Ideally the success indicator should be compared to
the objectives of the firm. What is an indicator of success for one firm is not necessarily
a success criterion for another. It is however likely that firms would regard growth in
turnover as being an indicator of success. It should first be mentioned that the share of
new products in sales does not capture improvements in process development. It could
also be questioned whether the two indicators are interrelated or perhaps in some cases
contradictory. A growth in turnover of a firm may actually reduce the share of innovative
products in its total sales if the growth in sales has taken place in older products. With
regard to the second indicator, the time period that it is possible to investigate could be
said to be rather short for assessing success. It could also be argued that different
countries experienced different levels of overall macroeconomic behaviour during the
period 1990-92. This will obviously have an impact on turnover growth. These
reservations could be expanded. For now they serve as illustrations that the choice of
criteria for “success” is far from trivial. The criteria chosen here are respectively related
to innovation activity and purely economic, and they are both in the CIS database for
most countries. However a few countries, i.e. Norway, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, do
not list 1990 turnover. This prevents us from using the growth of turnover as a success
criterion. In these cases the share of innovative products in turnover is used. In
conclusion it can be said that the success criteria chosen are imperfect, but when using
the CIS data they are the best that we have got.
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Leaders and laggards have been calculated separately for each country: the best
performing third of firms being the leaders and the worst third being the laggards. The
remaining third is not shown in the tables, which explains why the total may differ from
the range between leaders and laggards. For both measures of success - especially the
second one - many reservations need to be made. This is however the best approximation
offered by the CIS microaggregated dataset.
When exploring the relationship between innovation and profitability we need data on
economic performance over time at a firm level. The CIS data are not adequate for this
purpose. Using other kinds of data for innovativeness we compensate for this inadequacy
in that Section (6.3) by focusing on firm-level data from their accounts. 
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6.1  Identification of leaders and laggards7.1.  Identification of leads
and laggards
The purpose of this section is to investigate whether leaders and laggards within the
industry share common characteristics. This investigation is undertaken for a number of
possible dimensions, as shown in Table 6.1.1 overleaf. These dimensions will be
commented upon in turn before summarising what are the characteristics of leaders and
laggards.
a)Growth in turnover
The table shows rather large differences between leaders and laggards in turnover growth
in each country. In most cases laggards experience on the average a negative growth
(decline) in turnover of around 15% whereas leaders grow at a rate of 45-60% in the
same period. Even within the groups there are substantial differences. Coefficients of
variation range from 49 for leaders to -204 for laggards. Coefficients of variation for the
totals vary between 202 and 270. It should be expected that substantial differences
between leaders and laggards would emerge because the two groups are defined by
ranking that variable. The countries share common characteristics in terms of total
growth in turnover, averaged across them. For the countries where a growth rate can be
computed, it stands out that the firms in the different countries have a total growth of
17% +/- 2%. It should be expected that growth rates are relatively similar across the
countries, partly because of increasing internationalization of the markets, and partly
because of the relatively stable demand in times of upswings and downswings of the
economy, as previously explained in Chapter 2. This expectation is largely fulfilled.
Across countries leaders show approximately the same growth rates, except for Greece,
and the same goes for laggards (although laggards in the Netherlands apparently do rather
better).
b) Export shares
Results from export shares are difficult to relate to the performance criteria. There are
cases of both leaders and laggards having the largest share, and only the Belgian case
shows a clear, positive difference between the share of leaders and that of laggards. On
the contrary, Norwegian laggards have export shares substantially above those of leaders.
Between countries we see large differences in the absolute level of shares. These
differences largely reflect the size of the home market. Thus Spain, Italy and Germany
have small export shares whereas Denmark, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands have
large export shares. Small export shares in Portugal and Greece are more difficult to
explain. At first sight they may be explained by the geographically isolated position of
these countries and the specialization of producers which is influenced by specific local
tastes. However, Portuguese food and beverages producers, especially, are rather export-
oriented. It may be surmised that the adverse macroeconomic conditions of this period,
which probably affected all European trade patterns, partly account for the seemingly
poorer performance of large exporters in these years.
c)Turnover per employee
The turnover per employee is an inaccurate proxy for productivity in firms. It may
nevertheless provide some indication for a hypothesis that leaders would tend to have
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higher turnover per full-time employee than laggards. The results however do not
confirm this 
Table 6.1.1: Characteristics of leaders and laggards
Countries Ranking Growth
in
turnover,
%
Export
share %
Turnover
per
employee
(KECU)
Innovation
cost
intensity
Share of
unchange
d
products
R&D
intensity
Belgium Total 19 36 306 ** 62 12
Leaders 60 45 431 ** 51 9
Laggards -16 32 258 ** 71 16
Denmark Total 17 44 181 13 62 22
Leaders 52 42 206 16 64 19
Laggards -16 42 137 11 51 13
Germany Total n.a. 11# 169 66 57 8.6*
Leaders n.a. 7# 116 142 14 22.7*
Laggards n.a. 11 # 213 23 91 2.4 *
Greece Total -2 12& 129 2.4# n.a. 8
Leaders 14 20*& 157 4.0*# n.a. 1.3*
Laggards -23 6*& 82 1.2*# n.a. 0.8*
Ireland Total 15 33 258 28 74 14
Leaders 44 38 278 27 66 22
Laggards -11 34 206 16 83 11
Italy Total 16 10 438 26 81 22
Leaders 54 10 327 20 79 2.1*
Laggards -15 10 713* 26 81 19
Netherlands Total 16 35 323 21 68 2.3 §
Leaders 45 36 311 45 69 5.2§
Laggards -8 31 338 11 69 1.0§
Norway Total n.a. 23 284 18 60 19
Leaders n.a. 14 338 22 35 3.2*
Laggards n.a. 34 257 21 91 16
Portugal Total n.a. 16& 305 0.9& 64 **
Leaders n.a. 10& 105 0.9*& 26 **
Laggards n.a. 20& 636* 1.5*& 97 **
Spain Total n.a. 8 183 30 61 1.0&
Leaders n.a. 11 186 44 23 1.4 &
Laggards n.a. 6 158 22 92 0.7*&
Notes: Calculated from CIS data.
#Only partly comparable
&Not comparable
§Results for R&D in the Netherlands tend to be overestimated because of differences in
formulation of the questionnaire
*Less reliable data because of low number of observations or outliers
**Non-meaningful data because of low number of observations.
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     20  A correlation analysis between growth in turnover and share of unchanged products gives the same picture:
correlation coefficients are generally low, in many cases insignificant, with the sign varying from country to country.
d) Innovation-cost intensity
Innovation-cost intensity - namely, current expenditures on innovation as a percentage
of turnover - is one of the questions most frequently left blank by respondents. Many
have had difficulties answering it, which makes for less reliable results. In addition, the
data from some of the countries are not comparable. Of those which seem reliable we see
that firms in  the majority of countries - the execption being Italy - spend more on
innovation if they are leaders compared to expenditures of laggards. The overall
unweighted average intensity of expenditures in the countries is between 2-3%, with the
Danish food and beverages industry being somewhat behind and the German industry
somewhat ahead.
e) Share of unchanged products
The share of unchanged products in sales is one measure of innovativeness. The residual
of the percentages in the table is the share of sales which are products new to the firm.
There is no clear picture from the results.20 The very clear differences between leaders
and laggards in Germany, Portugal, Spain and Norway should not be taken as an
indication of a relationship between growth in turnover and share of unchanged products.
These differences can be explained by the special success criterion chosen for these
countries. Of the remaining countries, Belgium and Ireland show better innovation
performance by firms growing faster, whereas the Danish case shows the opposite, and
there are differences between the two groups in the Netherlands and Italy. In other words,
even if the evidence here is rather fragile, there seem to be indications that even firms
who are somewhat behind technologically and perhaps experience negative growth rates
are able to renew a large share of their product range. The results show that 20-40% of
products change to some degree over the three-year period. This seems at first glance to
reflect a major period of turbulence in the industry in terms of how fast the whole range
of products changes. However, it must be remembered that the innovative products in the
CIS data relate to the firm level. Therefore, it is possible - and likely - that a substantial
part of the products new to the firm are imitations rather than products new to the
industry. 
Italy apparently has the least innovative food and beverages industry. This result is
emphasized by the fact that it is also the country with the smallest share of innovative
firms (cf. Table 2.1.2). The Irish food-processing industry is also in the lower part of the
innovation spectrum. At the other end we find once more Germany, where products new
to the firms account for about half of the sales.
f) R&D intensities
There are fewer observations in each cell when the focus is narrowed down to R&D-
performing firms. The results with regard to R&D intensities is therefore less reliable.
But the overall picture - with Belgium as the only exception - is of a very clear difference
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between leaders and laggards. Leaders are above laggards in close to all cases. In relating
R&D intensities to other characteristics one can find relationships that are not easily
explained. For example, Denmark is low in innovation-cost intensity but high in R&D
intensity. Conversely, Ireland is high in innovation-cost intensity but low in R&D
intensity. It could be that such differences relate to differences in the composition of
innovation expenditures. In some countries innovation may require a high proportion of
R&D compared to other countries. 
g) Summarizing leaders and laggards
Leaders are - compared to laggards within the industry - technologically advanced in
terms of their expenditures on both R&D and other innovation-related expenditures. This
could perhaps result in a higher turnover per employee but not necessarily in higher
shares of innovative products in sales. One hypothesis might be that the relatively
technologically advanced leaders emphasize process innovations, in which case this will
precisely show up in turnover per employee but not in the share of innovative products
(however this is not supported by Table 6.2.1 below). The reverse causation factor could
apply, with firms perhaps increasing their R&D expenditures as a result of high growth
in turnover. It has been shown, though, that generally the share of R&D in turnover is
rather constant, regardless of business cycles. So far as exports are concerned, it is not
the status as leader or laggard that determines the export share of the firms but rather the
size, geographical context and specialization of the home market.
The diversity of leaders and laggards is large both within the groups and between the
groups. This goes in particular for the background variables, whereas the variables
related to innovation show greater similarities among firms and between groups of firms.
6.2  Strategies7.2.  Strategies
Knowledge of strategies is valuable for the identification of appropriate policies because
the emphases placed by firms on different objectives for their innovation activities to a
large degree reflect the competitive environment in which they operate. Analysis of
objectives for innovation may therefore indicate whether policies should mainly be
directed towards supporting cost reduction (or other process-related activities) or product
development. 
As previously discussed, the traditionally held view of the food and beverages industry
is that it is heavily process-oriented. In Table 6.2.1 below we show the means of the
answers to the question in the CIS on different objectives of innovation, using an ordinal
Likert scale. We would normally not use means for ordinal data as there may be
discontinuous jumps in perceptions by the respondents as to how he/she should answer
one of the 5 possible assessments. The usual way to treat ordinal data is to calculate the
number of firms responding either “crucial” or “very significant”, relative to the total
number of responses to the question. This “high-scores method” is used in subsequent
analysis of the ordinal data. In this table we use the means in order to keep the maximum
number of observations and because we group the questions into sub-categories. The 18
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objectives listed in the questionnaire are grouped into three, covering product, process
and marketing innovations.
6.2.1  Differences in objectives
The results show that product development objectives are as important as process
development. In fact, there are remarkable similarities between the two. Results from the
comparison of objectives indicates that product innovations and process innovations to
a large degree go hand-in-hand in this industry. Only in Germany and Italy do we find
significant differences between the two groups of objectives - in Germany product
development being more important than process development, and vice versa in Italy.
Table 6.2.1:Mean ordinal scores by type of innovation
Country Ranking Product
development
Process
development
Marketing
development
Belgium Total 3.3 3.3 4.0
Leaders 3.4 3.5 4.3
Laggards 3.1 3.2 4.0
Denmark Total 3.4 3.4 3.6
Leaders 3.6 3.5 3.9
Laggards 3.3 3.2 3.4
Germany Total 3.4 2.9 4.6
Leaders 3.3 3.0 4.8
Laggards 3.1 2.7 4.4
Ireland Total 3.4 3.3 4.0
Leaders 3.5 3.1 4.1
Laggards 3.4 3.3 3.9
Italy Total 2.7 3.1 4.0
Leaders 2.8 3.2 3.9
Laggards 2.6 3.2 4.1
Netherlands Total 3.3 3.0 4.1
Leaders 3.3 3.1 4.3
Laggards 3.3 3.1 4.0
Norway Total 2.8 2.9 3.9
Leaders 2.6 2.9 3.9
Laggards 2.9 3.1 4.1
Spain Total 2.5 3.2 4.6
Leaders 2.6 3.3 4.9
Laggards 2.6 3.1 4.3
Note: Calculated from CIS (Greece not comparable)
The levels of priorities are approximately similar across countries. Firms in Italy, Norway
and Spain tend to focus less on product development compared to firms in other
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countries. With respect to process-innovation objectives there are smaller differences
across countries. Marketing development is very important to firms in Germany and
Spain, but not to firms in Denmark to the same extent.
Even more important than product- and process-related objectives are those objectives
aimed at creating new markets. The importance attached to this objective is markedly
higher than the importance of the other two groups. This is a further indication -
supporting the findings in Chapters 2 and 5 - that this industry is particularly oriented
towards the demand side, i.e. towards the users. In Section 7.1 we shall explore this issue
further.
6.2.2  Differences between leaders and laggards
In all countries but Norway, and partly Italy, it seems as if leaders attached more
importance to all three kinds of strategy. As with many other aspects of strategy one can
only speculate as to the explanation of this result. Could it be that leaders are generally
more conscious about choice of strategy? In any case, the gap between leaders and
laggards is not striking, and results indicate at first sight that innovation objectives and
success criteria chosen in this study are not strongly related. Although quantitative data
have their limitations in terms of how far one can explore certain issues - and strategy is
perhaps one of the more difficult - this preliminary conclusion requires some further
examination. 
This inquiry is undertaken in three steps. First, a correlation analysis is undertaken
between the growth in turnover or share of innovative products in sales, and all the 18
possible innovation objectives. Results from this analysis are presented in Table 6.2.2
overleaf. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the correlation coefficients are generally low and
insignificant. Across different innovation goals the magnitudes of the coefficient change,
and the signs of the coefficient change according to which country is in question. Thus
it is difficult to detect any clear pattern from these results. 
 
Second, we try another success criterion. Assuming that firms without financial
difficulties arising out of pursuing their innovation goals have had some success to be in
such a position, we test for the relationship between financial resources as a barrier to
innovation and the different innovation objectives. Both types of data are ordinal,
unweighted data, and therefore we choose Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients to
compare all the objectives and three different but related financial barriers to innovation.
These barriers are:
i) lack of appropriate sources of finance
ii) innovation costs too high
iii) pay-off period for innovation too long
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If innovation strategies are to be of significant importance for the financial success - here
the approximation of absence of financial constraint on innovation is used - we would
expect certain innovation strategies to be related to this lack of financial barrier to
innovation. If certain strategies are related to all three barriers this can be taken as a
strong indication. However, again we find no patterns in the results. Signs of coefficients
vary both between different objectives and between the above three barriers. Across
countries we see no pattern in the results either. Furthermore, coefficients are low and
in many cases insignificant.
Table 6.2.2:Correlation between innovation objectives and success criteria
Objective Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Norway Spain
1 98 89 -96 81 19 -78 -36 -123
2 55 72 151 99 64 -56 -36 -131
3 78 -91 137 0.194* 29 -126 0.383* -161
4 114 29 -135 -59 39 36 -4 -169
5 38 224 -100 82 0.097* 77 185 -63
6 39 -82 -133 179 27 -102 -131 na
7 69 3 9 70 -48 -17 na na
8 9 11 -23 -15 -74 -20 na na
9 -28 na 142 27 -37 -91 -231 na
10 165 -2 -72 123 58 26 72 -58
11 19 235 -110 38 65 -59 79 -121
12 -7 186 -0.236* 63 24 -41 35 4
13 78 81 -210 -66 79 16 23 -92
14 31 134 na 97 -3 -107 -83 -37
15 147 75 na 109 51 7 13 na
16 25 144 -129 74 45 16 -53 9
17 131 104 -0.238* 42 0.091* 111 -58 na
18 184 137 -118 -18 488 72 41 -102
Notes: All values represent Pearson’s correlation coefficient. 
* denotes significance at 5% level.
Objectives:
1 - replace products being phased out
2 - extend product range within main product field
3 - extend product range outside main product field
4 - increasing or maintaining market share
5 - create new markets nationally
6 - create new markets within the EU
7 - create new markets in North America
8 - create new markets in Japan
9 - create new markets in other countries
10- improve production flexibility
Lower production costs by:
11 - reducing the share of wage costs
12 - reducing materials consumption
13 - reducing energy consumption
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14 - reducing design costs
15 - reducing production lead-times
16 - reducing environmental damage
17 - improving product quality
18 - improving working conditions/safety
Third, we divide strategies into offensive, defensive, dependent and imitative strategies
(cf. Section 4.2.4) and subsequently compute the two different performance measures for
these groups. 
Table 6.2.3. shows main results from these calculations.  The data are mean growth in
turnover from 1990-92 for the first 5 countries and share of innovative products in
turnover for Germany and Norway. In brackets the number of firms in each category  is
listed. It is not possible to group all the firms in each country equally according to the
four types of strategies if the strategies are to be consistently comparable across
countries. Therefore, in some cases not all of the innovative firms in a country are placed
in one of the groups and in other cases there are firms which could be placed equally well
in two groups. 
Table 6.2.3: Success criteria distributed according to different strategies, Percentages
Strategy -> Offensive Defensive Dependent Imitative
Country Variable
Belgium Growth turn-
over
12
(N=20)
23
(N=33)
18
(N=17)
27
(N=25)
Denmark Growth turn-
over
25
(N=14)
26
(N=14)
28
(N=19)
24
(N=13)
Ireland Growth turn-
over
21
(N=32)
23
(N=35)
11
(N=12)
9 
(N=13)
Italy Growth turn-
over
Not com-
parable
21
(N=97)
21
(N=71)
20
(N=117)
Netherlan
ds
Growth turn-
over
15
(N=40)
17
(N=38)
15
(N=30)
16
(N=67)
Germany Share of
innovative
products
41
(N=15)
46
(N=38)
49
(N=30)
42
(N=54)
Norway Share of
innovative
products
28
(N=14)
30
(N=16)
40
(N=14)
41
(N=19)
Calculated from CIS
Greece, Portugal, Spain not comparable
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     21  Size of firm does not seem to play an important role in choice of strategy either (based on both frequency
analysis and correlation analysis).
Standard deviations vary between 22 and 46. 
There are several dimensions in this table. First, the four strategies show no clear pattern
with respect to which one is the most successful. The offensive strategy is in no case the
most successful but is not far from the average execpt in the case of Belgium. As the
success criterion used refers to the same period as the innovation objectives and as the
offensive strategy presumably has the longest time-lag between strategy and success, it
is not surprisingly that this strategy does not come out as the most successful. Of the
remaining strategies they are ranked the most successful in two cases each.
Second, within some of the countries there are clear differences between the success of
the strategies (Belgium, Ireland) whereas the other countries show only small differences
in the outcome of pursuing one of the 4 innovation strategies.
Third, the distribution of firms according to the 4 strategies is interesting. Apparently the
imitative strategy is the one most frequently used - at least in the majority of the countries
(Italy, Netherlands, Germany, Norway). Within some of the countries there are quite
clear differences between the number of firms grouped in the different categories. For
example, most Irish firms use an offensive or defensive strategy whereas the majority of
firms in Netherlands and Germany pursue imitative strategies.
The general conclusion from the various attempts to investigate this issue is that results
are rather blurred with respect to differences between leaders and laggards.21 This leads
us to conclude that, on the basis of the present data, we cannot identify significant
differences in strategies between leaders and laggards. It may well be that some
relationships exist, but we have not been able to identify them with quantitative methods
and the present data. What we do find is a remarkable emphasis on goals of creating new
markets, which encourages us to go further in investigating the importance of the
relationships between users and producers, and on an even higher level of aggregation
the importance of the national innovation system. That investigation will be presented
in Chapter 7. Before moving to that chapter we explore another issue at the firm level,
namely the relationship between profitability and innovation.
6.3  The relationship between innovation and profitability
6.3.1  Introduction: an inverse relationship?
Economic explanations of innovation and diffusion rest heavily on the search for profits.
It has been explained in Chapter 3 above that innovations are likely to be associated with
the desire to obtain higher profits. According to the theory, new products and processes
generate monopolistic rents for a period, until competitors are able to imitate them and
erode the rents. In view of the prospective importance of this relationship, it is explored
at some length in this section of the report. A second reason for going into this matter in
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some detail is that we can include the UK and France in the analysis - two important
countries that we were unable to analyze adequately with CIS data.
Although most empirical studies have confirmed the hypothesis of relationships between
innovation and profitability, it is unclear whether these hold in every industry. Most
studies have investigated high-tech industries, where there is more likelihood of new
technology creating monopolistic conditions for the innovators. However traditional
industries, amongst which we can count food and beverages (food-processing),
incorporate a great deal of both internal innovations and those produced by other
industries (Rama, 1996; and Chapter 5 above).  Extraordinary gains may be short-lived
because new products and processes are comparatively easy to imitate (OECD, 1988).
Modest technological change is often more common than “creative destruction” in such
industries. Unlike in high-tech industries, non-innovators might also regularly obtain
monopolistic gains, through differentiation of products, advertising or control of natural
resources; in other words, firms might made high profits with strategies other than
innovation. To conclude, the association between innovativeness and profitability in
food-processing is likely to be more tenuous than in high-tech industries.
The issue nevertheless may be crucial. If manufacturers fail to find reasons to innovate
like high profits or similar advantages, public policies for technology are likely to be of
limited commercial value.  
Previous research does not provide enough evidence on traditional industries with low
R&D intensities (R&D expenditures relative to sales). Branch (1974), for instance,
deliberately excludes the food-processing industry from his analysis of innovation and
performance because he does not expect to find any association between these variables.
The few studies that do tackle the problem reach contradictory results, probably owing
to differing samples and methods (Geroski et al., 1993;  Rama, 1994).     
In similar vein, a case study on the Danish firms in the CIS sample shows seemingly
inverse results with respect to the relationship between innovation and profitability.
Using the original CIS dataset and combining it with official accounts reported at the
firm level, we have measured the profitability of firms in the Danish food-processing
industry. (This possibility of combining CIS data with such other material at the firm
level is only possible for Norway and Denmark). Two measures of profitability were
used:
i) return on equity, and
ii) pretax results relative to total assets.
Firms were divided into the groups of innovators and non-innovators in 1990-1992. The
time-lag between innovation and economic performance is of course uncertain and may
vary among firms. In this analysis the 1994 accounts have been used.
Table 6.3.1 : Danish innovator and non-innovator firms and profitability
A) percentage return on equity
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No. Mean Std. Devn.
All 70 12.6 18.5
Innovative 41 11.2 17.1
Non-innovative 29 14.4 20.1
B) pretax returns as percentage of total assets
No. Mean Std. Devn.
All 70 7.9 10.2
Innovative 41 6.7 10.7
Non-innovative 29 9.6 9.3
By either measure, the hypothesis of a positive link is rejected. Indeed, the means for the
non-innovating group lie substantially above those for the innovators. 
6.3.2  Objectives of the analysis
This section aims to identify structural differences between large innovative and non-
innovative firms in the international food-processing industry. It also investigates how
performance and strategy, such as methods of financing growth, are associated with
innovativeness at the firm level. In this respect, the previous analysis of innovation
strategy in Section 6.2 is extended to include financial strategy. The study focuses on a
group of the world’s largest firms in food-processing, with special emphasis on European
firms.
The core issues are:  
a) whether factors such as size, branch of industry, or home country affect how
innovation and profitability are associated;  
b) whether firm strategies influence the path to profitability through innovativeness
for the firm: e.g. by less innovative firms needing to balance their technological
inadequacy with financial strategies which may involve less independence, greater
risk and so on.
A number of difficulties should be borne in mind when assessing the results of this study.
a) Innovation is just one among many factors that might lead to high profits in the
food-processing firm. Financial and marketing strategies are also obviously
influential. To incorporate these would require the examination of a great number of
interrelated variables, which would additionally make it difficult to design clear-cut
experiments.
b) This section of the Report analyses only internal innovations, i.e. innovations
patented by large food-processing firms in our sample. This is a drawback because
external innovations, i.e. innovations produced by suppliers and other firms at the 2-
digit industry level, are vital (Scherer, 1989; Rama, 1996; and Chapter 5 above) and
highly favourable to obtaining profits in this industry, including those achieved by
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non-patentors (Rama, 1994). Nor does the sample (owing to data unavailability)
include patents produced by specialized firms performing R&D under contract from
food and drink firms, a pattern which appears to be common in biotechnology
(Chesnais and Walsh, 1994). The important issue of the “innovation system” in this
industry is dealt with in Chapter 7.
c) Another area where authors disagree is over reverse causation, i.e. the situation in
which profits affect subsequent R&D. This possibility is thought to be remote in
large firms, where finance of R&D does not appear to be a serious constraint, and in
which R&D is usually funded from internal sources (Acs and Isberg, 1991a;
Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). The R&D budget of small firms may be more
subject to economic fluctuations (Kay, 1979). After a review of the literature on this
topic, Kamien and Schwartz (1975) concluded that “the empirical evidence that
either liquidity or profitability are conducive to innovative effort appears slim”. In
this part of the Report, the causal direction to be studied is the influence of
innovation on profit, not the other way around.
6.3.3  Data and sources
The sample includes 101 food and drink multinationals, from a variety of home
countries, with worldwide sales of at least US$ 1 billion in 1988 (see Appendix 6.1). All
are processors; a number of them also include agri-businesses, restaurants or retail
concerns among their holdings. In all cases the sales value of processed foodstuffs is
what is relevant. Firms with non-food sales greater than 50% of their global sales were
excluded. Drink firms include soft drinks, beer and alcoholic beverages. The data were
selected from AGRODATA, a database covering the world’s largest food and drink firms
(Padilla et al., 1983; IAM, 1990). 
The patent data were collected by the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the
University of Sussex. This database provides information on patents granted in the
United States, collated at the firm level. The sample of firms includes both patentors and
non-patentors, judged by this criterion. The merits and limitations of patents data as the
measure of innovation have been discussed previously in Chapter 4.
The period analysed is 1977-88. Though sales data for the 1990s are not yet available,
this period probably reflects the current situation. Technological trends change relatively
slowly owing to conservative consumers and prudent public policy in this industry
(OECD, 1988). For reasons already described, namely the possibility of variation over
the business cycle, the whole period has been divided into three sub-periods, the first
being a period of expansion, the second one of crisis, and the third witnessing recovery.
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Table 6.3.2: Definition of the Variables
Variable Description
Economic Variables
Assets
Capital Intensity
Employment
Fixed Assets
Gearing
Industry
Margins
Own Capital
Product Diversification
Profits
Rotation of Capital
Sales
Technological Variables
Biotechnology
Diversification
Experience
Food
Innovative intensity
No. of Patents
Global assets in current US$
Fixed Assets / Number of Employees
Total number of employees
Global fixed assets in current US$
(Long-Term Debt + Short-Term Debt) / Own Capital
Firms are classified by the subsector in which they concentrate most of
their sales. There are three subsectors:
1) Agri-businesses and basic food (sugar, grain milling, meat,      
aviculture, fisheries and animal feed); 
2) Highly-processed food; 
3) Beverages (soft-drinks, beer and alcoholic drinks)
Net post-tax Profits / Sales
Total shareholders’ equity in current US$
Number of food and drink products produced by the firm (4-digit level).
Net post-tax Profits / Own Capital
Global Sales/Own Capital
Global sales in current US$
Percentage of biotechnological patents to total number of patents issued
to the firm
No. of technological fields other than food and biotechnology in which
the firm is active (measured at the two-digit level)
Percentage of patents issued in 1969-76
Percentage of food patents to total number of patents issued to the firm
Number of patents per billion-dollar of sales
Number of patents granted to the firm in the US
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6.3.4 Country and time patterns
Before undertaking the formal analyses, we shall discuss a few aspects relating to
differences across countries and evolution over time, for such variables as size, profit,
fixed assets and capital structure, and for the variables used to assess technology levels.
The information provided in Tables 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 overleaf (based on the definitions of
variables listed in Table 6.3.2) allows us to draw some broad conclusions about
economic and technological features of the industry. Economic features of the firms in
this fairly comprehensive sample of very large firms have changed rather quickly, as seen
in Table 6.3.3. On average, firms grew larger, increased their expenditures in the means
of production, and performed better as time progressed. Though they obtained more
equity, gearing also increased. There was a considerable and quite rapid substitution of
labour by capital. Table 6.3.4 shows that the total number of patents per firm increased,
as did the percentage of biotechnological patents in the total. However, patenting grew
more slowly than sales, assets and so on. Therefore firms became less innovation-
intensive, i.e. the annual number of patents per billion dollar of sales tended to drop.
Thus technological behaviour, by this measure, remained more stable than did economic
behaviour.  
6.3.4.1  Economic features
Size 
The average size per firm, measured by global annual sales, increased from US$ 2.8 bn
in 1977-81 to US$ 3.6 bn in 1982-85 and to US$ 5.2 bn in 1986-89. Though their sales
had been above those of the average large food and drink firm in 1977-81, European
firms grew less rapidly than the others and suffered more in this respect from the crisis
of the early 1980s. After recovery, their average sales fell below and remained lower than
those of the non-European firms. Average assets experienced a similar evolution (see
Table 6.3.3).
Some food-processors were more successful than others in growing in size. The
variability of size of the average firm increased over that period, as shown by the
standard deviation of the variable (column 4 of Table 6.3.3, for sales). The distribution
of sizes actually became more and more skewed towards very large firms. The rise in the
numbers of giant firms was a consequence of both the expansion of existing food
enterprises and the entry of giant non-food corporations, such as some tobacco
companies, into the food and drink market. The standard deviation of the sizes of
European firms also increased significantly in the later 1980s (column 7 of Table 6.3.3).
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Table 6.3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Economic Data (1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89)
VARIABLES PERIOD Total Mean Std. Dev. 
     
Total* Mean* Std. Dev.*
Assets
Fixed Assets
Own Capital
Long-term Debt
Short-term Debt
Sales
Net Profit
Net Cash Flow
No of Employees
Profit (%)
Margins (%)
Cashflow/Assets
Gearing
Capital Intensity
Capital Rotation
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
 79
 97
 97
78
 94
 96
78
 97
 97
78
 95
 96
78
 94
 96
 82
101
101
81
 96
 97
78
 94
 96
 81
 99
 99
78
 95
 94
81
 96
 96
78
 94
 96
78
 94
 96
 78
 94
 96
78
 97
 96
1644
2222
3682
807
1211
2059
733
908
1370
374
622
1141
541
718
1174
2800
3608
5196
103
138
252
169
229
391
34503
33900
36667
13.4
12.8
16.7
3.2
3.5
4.3
10.6
10.8
12.2
1.78
2.08
2.27
35.3
48.6
75.7
6.0
7.0
6.0
1841
2844
4321
840
1700
2686
868
1126
1560
470
1127
1726
617
827
1352
2936
4216
5825
134
216
337
196
301
469
47468
44468
46844
6.2
7.4
9.9
2.0
3.7
3.1
4.4
9.6
17.5
2.06
2.34
2.14
59.7
61.6
74.6
5.3
6.7
4.8
28
39
40
28
38
39
28
39
39
28
38
39
28
38
39
30
42
42
29
39
39
28
38
39
30
40
41
28
39
38
29
39
38
28
38
39
28
38
39
28
38
39
28
39
39
1915
1672
3352
894
792
1608
850
747
1370
388
359
850
670
596
1193
3055
2784
4379
98
98
261
173
168
375
43643
33117
35253
12.5
12.9
18.5
3.2
3.7
4.8
10.1
11.2
15.3
1.50
2.09
2.15
26.6
28.1
50.5
5.5
7.4
6.1
2527
2432
4373
990
1034
2036
1111
1139
1723
595
530
1300
881
827
1666
4077
3772
5441
140
148
346
233
242
467
67914
51946
54096
6.2
7.3
10.1
1.8
4.4
3.1
5.3
14.6
27.2
1.12
1.71
1.69
18.6
14.6
30.4
4.9
6.4
4.7
Note:  All monetary variables expressed in US$m.
* European firms only
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Table 6.3.4: Descriptive Statistics of Technological Data (1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89)
VARIABLES PERIOD Total Mean Std. Dev. Total* Mean* Std.Dev.*
No. of Patents
Diversification
Experience
Biotechnology
Food
Innovative intensity
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
1977-81
1982-85
1986-89
82
101
101
82
101
101
82
101
101
63
76
79
63
76
79
82
101
101
5.8862
6.3218
7.0677
1.9628
1.8160
1.9299
34.566
32.196
32.196
5.4952
4.2005
7.7676
30.613
39.130
34.296
.18209
.12270
.09314
15.838
18.420
18.903
2.5729
2.7023
2.5211
24.746
25.107
25.107
12.149
11.004
20.202
29.472
38.417
34.834
.30934
.20855
.14718
30
42
42
30
42
42
30
42
42
20
29
30
20
29
30
30
42
42
5.0933
4.0040
4.6944
1.4500
1.0952
1.3433
33.709
30.653
30.653
5.3415
3.6931
7.5483
22.004
45.095
35.240
.15227
.08453
.05520
15.185
13.433
15.297
2.5728
2.1871
2.3682
26.790
27.200
27.200
12.812
9.9372
25.323
24.187
44.053
39.135
.36136
.17312
.09901
Note: Variables are defined in Table 6.3.2.
* European firms only
Differences in origins of capital and the types of subsector involved contribute to
explaining differences in firm size. US firms, which are on average the largest, enjoyed
rapid increases in the scale of output. European firms, which are smaller on average,
enjoyed less dynamic growth; moreover they developed relatively late, showing sharp
rises in sales only after 1985. Finally, Japanese firms, which are the smallest in the
sample, exhibited steady if unspectacular growth from the very start.
Although firms in all subsectors showed good performances, firms producing high value-
added foodstuffs were the most successful in growing in size (the industry boundaries are
defined in Table 6.3.2). The success of this group, the average sales of which increased
from US$ 3.5 bn in 1977-81 to US$ 5.5 bn in 1986-89, was a result of changes in
lifestyles and costly mass-media campaigns (see also Chapter 5 above). The size of firms
processing basic food and agri-businesses increased from US$ 2.1 bn to US$ 5.1 bn.
Finally, the size of the average beverage firm grew from US$ 2.4 bn to US$ 4.6 bn over
the same period.  
Employment
Another measure of the size of an enterprise is employment. Average employment grew
slowly throughout the period investigated in this section. The rather slight increases in
the number of workers under conditions of a booming demand may be explained by a
substitution of labour by capital. This process was much more intense in European
enterprises as the number of employees fell sharply throughout the period. The shift
towards large firms that was seen in the sales and assets data are much less marked in
terms of employment data.
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Fixed assets   
In the sample, investment grew with sales. The fixed assets of the average large firm rose
from US$ 0.8 bn in 1977-81 to US$ 1.2 bn in 1982-85 and US$ 2.1 bn in 1986-89.  The
evolution was less steady in European firms, with the big increase limited to the later
1980s.  
Profitability  
The statistical analysis confirms the view that the rate of profit of food-processing firms
was relatively immune to the crises. The average rate of profit, i.e. the net profit/own
capital ratio, declined only slightly from 13.4% in 1977-81 to 12.8% in 1982-85, to climb
quickly to 16.7% over the second half of the 1980s. Margins, i.e. the net profits/sales
ratio, were more resilient to the crisis. European firms were even more successful: their
profits rose slightly during the crisis and their recovery was more vigorous (Table 6.3.3).
As could be expected, given the evolution of the demand, profits were especially strong
in highly-processed foods (rising from 13.3% to 18.0%) while gains were smaller in
beverages (from 13.6% to 16.3%) and basic food as well as agri-businesses (from 13.4%
to 17.0%).  
The profit measure separates out capital payments and adjusts the cash surplus or deficit
so as to match up revenues with costs. This measure also includes costs incurred but not
yet paid and the benefits obtained from sales invoiced but not yet received. For these
reasons, the profit measure may be somewhat manipulated. More importantly in
international comparisons, it can be affected by different taxation or accounting systems.
This problem, however, affects international comparisons of single-nation firms to a
greater extent than those of multinationals based in different home countries. Part of the
revenue of multinationals is subject to different accounting methods and taxation systems
in a variety of host countries. This circumstance presumably smoothes the home-country
bias and thus justifies the use of the profit measure in international comparisons. To
check this point we calculated a measure of profitability based on cash flow, i.e. cash
flow/assets.  As shown by Table 6.3.3, the results are similar. The cash-flow measure
also points to continuous increases in profitability in all types of firms, not just in the
European ones. It confirms, moreover, that the latter have performed better than average
in these terms after 1982.
The portion of firms enjoying very high profit rates, defined as more than 20%, increased
notably, from only 9% of the total number of firms in 1977-81 to nearly 30% in 1986-89
(these results are not displayed in the Tables given here).  However, most firms remained
in the medium-profit bracket, with rates of profit from 11% to 20%. Japanese firms were
an exception because their profits were consistently rather low, i.e. 10% or less, and the
proportion of firms getting low returns increased from 75% to 93% of the total number
of Japanese firms. A cross-classification of firms by cash flow/assets and country
confirms that returns are lower in most Japanese firms.
Equity and debt  
The statistical analysis confirms the view that the resources available to firms expanded
significantly. New investors gave a boost to the amount of own capital per firm, although
debt also grew. The average amount of equity more than doubled in all firms from 1977-
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81 to 1986-89; it also grew in European firms, after a drop up to the mid-1980s (Table
6.3.3).
Even though the cost of capital was high throughout these years, debt also played a major
role in the financing of development. Average long-term debt more than tripled from
1977-81 to 1986-89. Increases in short-term debt were also significant. European firms
kept debt more in check although it grew fast towards the end of the period.  
As a result of these developments, the financial structure of firms changed and debt
became more and more vital. The table thus shows gearing increasing quickly over this
period in both European and non-European firms.
Cash Flow  
The ratio of net cash-flow to assets and the average availability of cash per firm rose
sharply.  The performance of European firms was noteworthy.  
Capital to Labour Ratio  
The statistical analysis confirms the opinion that capital intensity has increased in this
international industry. The evolution of the capital/labour ratio, i.e. the ratio of fixed
assets to number of employees, suggests a quick incorporation of technology embodied
in new capital goods. The move towards processes based on the intensive use of capital
is also pronounced among European firms in the later 1980s, even if they remained less
capital-intensive than other firms (Table 6.3.3).
6.3.4.2  Technological features
Number of patents  
The total number of patents issued to all firms increased, on average, from 5.9 a year in
1977-81 to 7.1 in 1986-89. By contrast, in European firms, the average dropped from 5.1
a year to 4.7 over the same period (Table 6.3.4).
At first sight, the economic re-organization of this international industry has induced no
marked moves in the technological position of firms. Firms have tended to concentrate
in intermediate strata, with most having 2-3 patents issued a year. The extremes, i.e.
groups with very low patenting (under 2 a year), or very high patenting (above 10 a year),
lost importance as proportions of the total number of firms (data not displayed).  
The gap between US firms and other firms has tended to close. In 1977-81, patenting
involvement of US firms was notable by comparison with other firms; though one has
to allow for the fact that the USA is the “home country” for US firms, so one would
expect higher patenting levels, cet. par. Only 3% of US firms had, on average, under 2
patents a year. By contrast, from 31% to 44% of non-American firms did so over the
same period. This situation has changed. Over time, the portion of firms less involved
with patenting increased among US firms and decreased among non-US firms. Increases
in patenting activity were especially noticeable among Japanese firms. The proportion
of firms with under 2 patents a year dropped from 31% to only 18% of the total number
of Japanese firms over the period. The proportion of firms with under 2 a year fell a little
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from one-third to under 29% of European firms. This change could denote, although to
a much lesser degree, some increase in patenting activity in European firms as well.
However, the percentage of lesser patentors remained quite high among European
processors by the end of the 1980s, if compared with both Americans and Japanese. One
cannot completely exclude the possibility - even if these firms have long had business
experience in the US - that what has increased is, in fact, their foreign patenting rather
than their innovative output in total. 
Biotechnology
The share of biotechnological patents on the total number of patents per firm grew both
in the average firm worldwide and in the European one. Yet, in both cases, there was a
reduction of the percentage of biotechnological patents over 1982-85 (Table 6.3.4). As
will be suggested below, during the crisis firms may have withdrawn from the more
peripheral activities, such as biotechnology, to concentrate on food technology.  
Food  
The share of food patents in the total number of patents increased in the average firm,
and especially in the European firms which became much more specialized after 1982
(Table 6.3.4). In both cases, food technology was remarkably strengthened over 1982-85,
probably as a consequence of concentration in core businesses throughout the crisis.
Diversification  
The level of diversification into technological fields other than food and biotechnology
is rather low throughout the period, especially in European firms; the general pattern (as
demonstrated elsewhere in this Report) is towards a reduction of diversification (see also
von Tunzelmann, 1996).
Innovative intensity 
This variable shows the number of patents issued to a firm per billion dollars of sales.
Technological intensity has decreased sharply. It was reduced to less than one-half of its
initial value (1977-81) in all firms by the final period (1986-89), and to less than one-
third in European firms over the period; although in the latter case the number of
included firms rose and this may account for part of the decline. The variable is analyzed
at length in Section 6.3.5.2 below.
6.3.4.3  Conclusions
1. The evolution of innovation has not reflected the more rapid economic changes
experienced by firms during the 1980s. Moreover, innovative intensity of firms has
dropped in spite of increases in equity and profitability, which the theory associates with
high levels of innovativeness. Factors driving competition in this industry seem to be
market size, fixed assets and capital intensity rather than innovativeness. Contrary to the
assumptions of Utterback and Suárez (1991), exacerbation of competition has not led to
rapid technological change, unless relatively stable patenting behaviour conceals other
forms of incorporation of technology.  
Some possible explanations for the apparent stability of innovation are:
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a) Firms have preferred to aim at massive adoption of external innovations,
notably in capital goods, rather than on patenting of their own innovations. This
interpretation is suggested by the rapid growth of fixed assets, the slow growth
of employment and the increased capital-labour ratio.
b) Production of internal innovations increased but appropriation regimes
changed. Food-processing firms have preferred to finance R&D contracts with
specialized firms rather than to conduct in-house research. According to Aghion
and Tirole (1994), when intellectual inputs (relative to capital inputs) dominate,
as in biotechnology, research will often be carried out by independent units.
c) Firms have relatively stable R&D expenditures. One of the objectives of their
expansion has been precisely that of spreading these fixed costs over a broader
base (Connor and Schiek, 1996). If this interpretation were correct, a fall in
innovative intensity would denote success by the firm in spreading its costs.
2. Some changes experienced by firms are, in principle, favourable to innovation while
others are adverse. Average size and availability of internal funds, which are thought to
encourage growth in R&D expenditures, have increased. Yet gearing, which is believed
to discourage R&D, has also increased.  
6.3.5  Leaders and laggards
This section investigates the evolution of patenting activity in the world’s largest food-
processing firms, as the group already studied above. The inquiry is pertinent to the
pattern of technological change in this industry. Even if the contribution of smaller firms
and universities happens to be significant for innovation more broadly, large
multinational firms play a crucial role in the production of patented innovations in this
industry (Rama, 1996). There are thus good reasons to study the largest patentors in
greater detail. 
Second, we investigate whether innovative firms display any particular characteristics in
terms of size, profits, comparative profitability, subsectoral membership, or home
country.
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Table 6.3.5: Food and Drink Firms Classified According to Patenting Activity and
Assets
(1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89; percentages of column totals)
No of patents per firm Non-patentor  3 >3   10 >10 Total
1977 - 1981
< US$ 1 b
US$ 1.1 b - 2.0 b
US$ 2.1 b - 4.0 b
> US$ 4.0 b
70.6 %
17.6
11.8
0.0
52.6 %
34.2
10.5
2.6
27.3 %
36.4
27.3
9.1
15.4 %
23.1
38.5
23.1
46.8 %
29.1
17.7
6.3
1982 - 85
< US$ 1 b
US$ 1.1 b - 2.0 b
US$ 2.1 b - 4.0 b
> US$ 4.0 b
58.3 %
12.5
25.0
4.2
53.2 %
31.9
8.5
6.4
14.3 %
7.1
50.0
28.6
8.3 %
16.7
16.7
58.3
43.3 %
21.6
19.6
15.5
1986 - 89
< US$ 1 b
US$ 1.1 b - 2.0 b
US$ 2.1 b - 4.0 b
> US$ 4.0 b
42.9 %
23.8
28.6
4.8
29.2 %
29.2
16.7
25.0
0.0 %
26.7
46.7
26.7
0.0 %
0.0
15.4
84.6
23.7 %
23.7
23.7
28.9
Significance levels: 1977-81 1982-85 1986-89
No. of observations 79 97 97
DF 9 9 9
Pearson Chi-square 20.40 43.41 37.65
P-value 0.0156 0.0000 0.0000
Table 6.3.6: Food and Drink Firms Classified According to Patenting Activity and
Sales
(1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89; percentages of column totals)
No of patents per firm Non-patentor  3 >3   10 >10 Total
1977 - 1981
< US$ 1.5 b
US$ 1.6 b - 3.6 b
US$ 3.7 b - 6.0 b
> US$ 6.0 b
68.4 %
5.3
26.3
0.0
43.6 %
53.8
2.6
0.0
18.2 %
45.5
27.3
9.1
15.4 %
15.4
38.5
30.8
41.5 %
35.4
17.1
6.1
1982 - 85
< US$ 1.5 b
US$ 1.6 b - 3.6 b
US$ 3.7 b - 6.0 b
> US$ 6.0 b
32.0 %
32.0
20.0
16.0
44.0 %
42.0
10.0
4.0
14.3 %
21.4
35.7
28.6
0.0 %
33.3
8.3
58.3
31.7 %
35.6
15.8
16.8
1986 - 89
< US$ 1.5 b
US$ 1.6 b - 3.6 b
US$ 3.7 b - 6.0 b
> US$ 6.0 b
18.2 %
50.0
22.7
9.1
20.0 %
44.0
14.0
22.0
6.7 %
26.7
40.0
26.7
0.0 %
7.1
21.4
71.4
14.9 %
37.6
20.8
26.7
Significance levels: 1977-81 1982-85 1986-89
No. of observations 82 101 101
DF 9 9 9
Pearson Chi-square 43.95 32.60 26.44
P-value 0.0000 0.0002 0.0017
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6.3.5.1  The Most Important Patentors 
a)  Number of Patents Granted and Size 
As could be expected, patented innovation tends to be produced predominantly by large
firms. Tables 6.3.5 and 6.3.6 display the distribution of firms according to different levels
of patenting activity, measured respectively by their assets and sales as alternative
indicators of the size of the enterprise. Levels of patenting are defined by the average
number of patents granted to the firm per year, based on the 4-year totals.
Most non-patentors are included among the smaller of these large firms in the opening
period (1977-81), which remains true thereafter, although their share tends to decline
later while the medium-sized increase their share of non-patenting. The latter is especially
true when we use sales to measure the size of the firm. By contrast, heavy patentors, i.e.
firms with more than 10 patents per year, are likely to be very large, and moreover tend
to concentrate even more in the larger-size categories over time.
The Pearson chi-squared statistics at the bottom of each of these tables are used to test
for independence between the row and the column variables. In both tables, the test
allows the rejection of the hypothesis of independence between size and average number
of patents per firm, with significant probability values (mostly under the 1% level) in
each sub-period. It may reasonably be concluded that the number of patents issued to a
firm and its size are strongly interrelated.
b) Number of Patents Granted and Profitability 
Firms that produce a great number of patents tend to be profitable. Table 6.3.7 contains
data of the cross-classification of firms into three profit levels and four patent levels. The
chi-squared test, which allows rejection of the hypothesis of independence between the
number of patents and the rate of profit, is significant at under the 10% level, except in
1986-89.  
A refinement of this result is presented in Table 6.3.8, where we calculate a new variable
measuring the rate of return over and above the average, called “comparative
profitability” (Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988). This variable is the difference between the
firm’s profit and average profit rates in the subsector within which the firm concentrates
most of its sales. Firms were cross-classified into the previous four patent categories and
into two levels of comparative profitability, depending on whether they made profits
higher or lower than the average. Then we tested the homogeneity of the proportion for
different levels of patenting activity. The null hypothesis of independence of the variables
could be rejected at under the 10% level for 1977-81, 1982-85 and 1986-89. This
suggests that the number of patents granted to a firm are interrelated with its comparative
profitability.  
Although heavy patentors are likely to be highly profitable, conversely, it is interesting
to note that a surprisingly large share of highly profitable companies are low patentors
or even non-patentors (see Table 6.3.9, which calculates percentages of the row rather
than 
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Table 6.3.7: Food and Drink Firms Classified According to Patenting Activity and
Profit* (1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89; percentages of column totals)
No of patents per firm Non-patentor  3 >3   10 >10 Total
1977 - 1981
  10%
11% - 20%
> 20%
31.3 %
43.8
25.0
34.2 %
60.5
5.3
27.3 %
72.7
0.0
7.7 %
84.6
7.7
28.2 %
62.8
9.0
1982 - 85
  10%
11% - 20%
> 20%
43.5 %
43.5
13.0
39.1 %
52.2
8.7
28.6 %
71.4
0.0
8.3 %
50.0
41.7
34.7 %
52.6
12.6
1986 - 89
  10%
11% - 20%
> 20%
35.0 %
45.0
20.0
26.1 %
50.0
23.9
33.3 %
26.7
40.0
7.7 %
38.5
53.8
26.6 %
43.6
29.8
* Net profit/own capital
Significance levels: 1977-81 1982-85 1986-89
No. of observations 78 95 94
DF 6 6 6
Pearson Chi-square 10.77 14.99 8.27
P-value 0.0958 0.0203 0.2189
Table 6.3.8: Food and Drink Firms Classified According to Patenting Activity and
Comparative Profitability* (1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89; percentages of
column totals)
No of patents per
firm
Non-patentor  3 >3   10 >10 Total
1977 - 1981
Below Average
Above Average
75.0
25.0
65.8
34.2
54.5
45.5
23.1
76.9
59.0
41.0
1982 - 85
Below Average
Above Average
60.9
39.1
63.0
37.0
35.7
64.3
16.7
83.3
52.6
47.4
1986 - 89
Below Average
Above  Average
70.0
30.0
69.6
30.4
53.3
46.7
30.8
69.2
61.7
38.3
* Net profit/own capital (as compared with sub-sector averages)
Significance levels: 1977-81 1982-85 1986-89
No. of observations 78 95 94
DF 3 3 3
Pearson Chi-square 9.44 10.46 7.50
P-value 0.0240 0.0150 0.0577
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Table 6.3.9: Food and Drink Firms Classified According to Patenting Activity and
Profit* (1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89; percentages of row totals)
No of patents per
firm
Non-patentor  3 >3   10 >10 Total
1977 - 1981
  10%
11% - 20%
> 20%
TOTAL
22.7 %
14.3
57.1
20.5
59.1 %
46.9
28.6
48.7
13.6 %
16.3
0.0
14.1
4.5 %
22.4
14.3
16.7
100 %
100
100
100
1982 - 85
  10%
11% - 20%
> 20%
TOTAL
30.0 %
20.0
25.0
24.2
54.5 %
48.0
33.3
48.4
12.1 %
20.0
0.0
14.7
3.0 %
12.0
41.7
12.6
100 %
100
100
100
1986 - 89
  10%
11% - 20%
> 20%
TOTAL
28.0 %
22.0
14.3
21.3
48.0 %
56.1
39.3
48.9
20.0 %
9.8
21.4
16.0
4.0 %
12.2
25.0
13.8
100 %
100
100
100
* Net profit/own capital
Significance levels: 1977-81 1982-85 1986-89
No. of observations 78 95 94
DF 6 6 6
Pearson Chi-square 10.77 14.99 8.27
P-value 0.0958 0.0203 0.2189
column totals). This is especially noteworthy in 1977-81: for instance, 57% of highly
profitable firms were non-patentors. Towards the end of the 1980s, the proportion of
highly profitable firms with under 3 patents granted a year tends to drop but remains
considerable. This latter evolution probably indicates that innovation is becoming more
important to competition than it used to be. In short, while firms holding a great number
of patents are likely to be highly profitable, the reverse is not always true. Highly
profitable businesses are not necessarily major patentors.
c) Number of Patents Granted, Countries and Industries
With which industries and countries are the principal patentors associated? The analysis
of the combined effects of country and industry contributes to minimizing the possibility
of a home-country bias, a possibility alluded to in Section 6.3.4.2. However, in what
follows, comparisons between US and non-US firms should be treated with a degree of
caution, in the light of such possible biases.  
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Table 6.3.10: Cross-classification of Food and Drink Firms by Average Number of
Patents, Industry and Home-Country (1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89; percentages of
column totals)
Industry Home Country Non-patentor   3 >3   10 > 10 Total
1977-1981
Basic Food and 
    Agri-businesses 
Highly-processed Food
Beverages
US
Eur
Jap
Other
US
Eur
Jap
Other
US
Eur
Jap
Other
TOTAL
5.3 %
5.3
15.8
5.3
0.0
36.8
0.0
15.8
0.0
10.5
5.3
0.0
100
12.8 %
12.8
7.7
0.0
23.1
12.8
2.6
2.6
0.0
12.8
5.1
7.7
100
9.1 %
9.1
0.0
9.1
27.3
0.0
18.2
0.0
18.2
9.1
0.0
0.0
100
23.1 %
0.0
0.0
0.0
38.5
23.1
7.7
0.0
7.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
100
12.2
8.5
7.3
2.4
20.7
18.3
4.9
4.9
3.7
9.8
3.7
3.7
100
1982-1985
Basic Food and 
    Agri-businesses 
Highly-processed Food
Beverages
US
Eur
Jap
Other
US
Eur
Jap
Other
US
Eur
Jap
Other
TOTAL
4.0 %
12.0
12.0
0.0
8.0
36.0
8.0
16.0
0.0
4.0
0.0
0.0
100
10.0 %
8.0
4.0
4.0
12.0
26.0
6.0
2.0
2.0
16.0
4.0
6.0
100
28.6 %
0.0
7.1
0.0
50.0
0.0
7.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
7.1
0.0
100
8.3 %
8.3
0.0
0.0
33.3
25.0
8.3
0.0
16.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
100
10.9
7.9
5.9
2.0
18.8
24.8
6.9
5.0
3.0
8.9
3.0
3.0
100
1986-1989
Basic Food and 
    Agri-businesses 
Highly-processed Food
Beverages
US
Eur
Jap
Other
US
Eur
Jap
Other
US
Eur
Jap
Other
TOTAL
13.6 %
13.6
13.6
4.5
4.5
31.8
0.0
4.5
0.0
9.1
0.0
4.5
100
8.0 %
8.0
4.0
2.0
18.0
28.0
4.0
8.0
0.0
14.0
2.0
4.0
100
20.0 %
0.0
6.7
0.0
26.7
6.7
26.7
0.0
6.7
0.0
6.7
0.0
100
7.1 %
7.1
0.0
0.0
35.7
21.4
7.1
0.0
14.3
0.0
7.1
0.0
100
10.9
7.9
5.9
2.0
18.8
24.8
6.9
5.0
3.0
8.9
3.0
3.0
100
Significance levels: 1977-81 1982-85 1986-89
No. of observations 82 101 101
DF 33 33 33
Pearson Chi-square 51.49 55.99 45.75
P-value 0.0212 0.0075 0.0690
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Table 6.3.10 - which classifies the firms by industry and country, on the one hand, and
by number of patents, on the other - shows that a large share of heavy patentors (between
33% and 39% in each period) is persistently to be found among US manufacturers of
highly-processed food. European processors of this type of food are also well represented
(21% to 25%), although to a lesser extent; while data on non-patentors in the same table
show that a surprisingly large share of non-patentors (31% to 37%) are European
manufacturers of such highly-processed foods, even though that share declines over time
(i.e. from the latter to the former percentage). This reduction, however, could be
attributable to increased propensities to patent in the USA, e.g. through setting up more
businesses in that country.
The combined effects of industry and country are interrelated with the average number
of patents per year, according to the statistics displayed at the bottom of Table 6.3.10.
The results of the chi-squared and G2 tests are statistically significant at under the 10%
level. An alternative approach analyzing row rather than column totals and percentages
shows clear differences in the patenting behaviour of European firms and their
competitors, by industry (data not displayed here).
The number of patents is a useful indicator of sectoral patterns of innovation but does not
provide an accurate measure of innovativeness at the firm level because it may be
influenced by firm size. Therefore, many studies deflate the number of patents by sales,
assets or employment to obtain a more reliable indicator of relative firm innovativeness
(Branch, 1974). We shall focus on this interpretation in the following paragraphs.
6.3.5.2 Innovative intensity
a) Innovative intensity and Size
When patents are deflated by sales, innovative intensity reflects the number of patents per
unit of output, in this case billion dollars of sales. We classify firms by three levels of
innovative intensity, derived from a histogram: non-patentors, firms with fewer than 2.4
patents per billion-dollar sales per annum, and firms with more than 2.4 patents per
billion-dollar sales per annum. Table 6.3.11 contains a cross-classification of firms into
these levels of innovative intensity and the four levels of asset values adopted previously
(in Table 6.3.5). Table 6.3.12 replaces the latter with the four levels of sales values also
used above (in Table 6.3.6).
By reading across the columns, it can be seen that “non-intensive” firms, i.e. non-
patentors and firms with fewer than 2.4 annual patents per billion-dollar sales, tend to be
smaller in this sample. Conversely, “intensive” firms, i.e. firms with higher patenting
rates, tend to be giant businesses. However the differences are not overwhelming, and the
evidence does not support the hypothesis of interrelation between size and innovative
intensity. The results of the Pearson chi-squared test (at the bottom of these Tables) are
not statistically significant, except in 1977-81.  
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Table 6.3.11: Food and Drink Firms Classified According to Innovative Intensity* and
Assets (1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89; percentages of column totals)
Innovative Intensity Non-patentor Low-intensity High-intensity Total
1977 - 1981
< US$ 1b
US$ 1.1 b - 2.0 b
US$ 2.1 b - 4.0 b
> US$ 4.0 b
70.6 %
17.6
11.8
0.0
41.3 %
30.4
21.7
6.5
37.5 %
37.5
12.5
12.5
46.8 %
29.1
17.7
6.3
1982 - 85
< US$ 1b
US$ 1.1 b - 2.0 b
US$ 2.1 b - 4.0 b
> US$ 4.0 b
58.3 %
12.5
25.0
4.2
39.0 %
25.4
20.3
15.3
35.7 %
21.4
7.1
35.7
43.3 %
21.6
19.6
15.5
1986 - 89
< US$ 1b
US$ 1.1 b - 2.0 b
US$ 2.1 b - 4.0 b
> US$ 4.0 b
42.9 %
23.8
28.6
4.8
21.9 %
21.9
23.4
32.8
0.0 %
33.3
16.7
50.0
23.7 %
23.7
23.7
28.9
* No of patents/sales x 1000; low intensity < 2.4 patents p.a.; high intensity > 2.4 p.a.
Significance levels: 1977-81 1982-85 1986-89
No. of observations 79 97 97
DF 6 6 6
Pearson Chi-square 6.88 10.19 13.63
P-value 0.3326 0.1170 0.0340
Table 6.3.12: Food and Drink Firms Classified According to Innovative Intensity and
Sales (1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89; percentages of column totals)
Innovative Intensity Non-patentor Low-intensity High-intensity Total
1977 - 1981
< US$ 1.5 b
US$ 1.6 b - 3.6 b
US$ 3.7 b - 6.0 b
> US$ 6.0 b
68.4 %
5.3
26.3
0.0
31.9 %
51.1
10.6
6.4
37.5 %
25.0
25.0
12.5
41.5 %
35.4
17.1
6.1
1982 - 85
< US$ 1.5 b
US$ 1.6 b - 3.6 b
US$ 3.7 b - 6.0 b
> US$ 6.0 b
32.0 %
32.0
20.0
16.0
31.1 %
37.7
18.0
13.1
33.3 %
33.3
0.0
33.3
31.7 %
35.6
15.8
16.8
1986 - 89
< US$ 1.5 b
US$ 1.6 b - 3.6 b
US$ 3.7 b - 6.0 b
> US$ 6.0 b
18.2
50.0
22.7
9.1
14.9
34.3
20.9
29.9
8.3
33.3
16.7
41.7
14.9
37.9
20.8
26.7
Significance levels: 1977-81 1982-85 1986-89
No. of observations 79 97 97
DF 6 6 6
Pearson Chi-square 17.97 5.98 5.60
P-value 0.0063 0.4255 0.4695
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b) Innovative intensity and Profitability
Table 6.3.13 classifies the firms by the three innovative levels and by the three levels of
profit used previously in Table 6.3.7. The chi-squared statistic at the bottom of the table
indicates that innovative intensity and rate of profit are unrelated (though results are
nearly statistically significant at the 10% level in 1977-81). Innovative intensity is also
unrelated to profitability above the norm, except in 1977-81 (Table 6.3.14).
c) Innovative intensity, Countries and Industries
An important question is whether the weaker position of European firms suggested by the
analysis of patents is an effect of their having a smaller size than the US firms. We can
return to the cross-tabulations of Table 6.3.10 as an approximation to the categories of
innovative intensity used here. The situation regarding non-patentors has already been
described. US manufacturers of highly-processed food and US manufacturers of basic
food as well as agri-businesses stand out among the highly-intensive firms in 1977-81.
However, the situation evolved. In 1986-89, the enterprises standing out among the
intensive firms tend to be Japanese as well as US processors of highly-processed food.
By contrast, European manufacturers of highly-processed food stand out among less-
intensive firms. The Pearson chi-squared and the G2 tests based on the definitions of
intensity used here show innovativeness is interrelated with industry/country, with the
results being statistically significant at about the 10% level or less. 
Examination of the row totals shows that firms have tended to concentrate in the
intermediate stratum of “low intensity”. This situation reflects both rapid increases in
sales and relative stability of the average number of patents issued to firms throughout
the period.  This trend also shows up in European firms.
d) Sub-sectoral differences
a) Basic Food and Agri-businesses. The proportion of highly intensive firms falls while
that of low-intensive firms remains rather stable and that of non-patentors drops among
both US and European firms. Among Japanese firms, the shares of non-patentors and
less-intensive firms remain stable but the proportion of highly-intensive firms rises.
However this increase may simply reflect more patenting in the US, following greater
business involvement of Japanese firms in this country at the end of the 1980s. 
b)  Highly-processed Food. The proportion of non-patentors and less-intensive firms rose
while that of highly intensive firms fell among US firms. The share of non-patentors and
highly-intensive firms decreased but that of low-intensive firms increased among
European processors.
c) Beverages. By the end of the 1980s, European firms were not represented in the
intensive group.
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6.3.13: Food and Drink Firms Classified According to Innovative Intensity and Profit*
(1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89; percentages of column totals)
Innovative Intensity Non-patentor Low-intensity High-intensity Total
1977 - 1981
  10%
11% - 20%
> 20%
31.3 %
43.8
25.0
26.1 %
67.4
6.5
31.3 %
68.8
0.0
28.2 %
62.8
9.0
1982 - 85
  10%
11% - 20%
> 20%
43.5 %
43.5
13.0
32.2 %
59.3
8.5
30.8 %
38.5
30.8
34.7 %
52.6
12.6
1986 - 89
  10%
11% - 20%
> 20%
35.0 %
45.0
20.0
21.0 %
48.4
30.6
41.7 %
16.7
41.7
26.6 %
43.6
29.8
* Net Profit/own capital
Significance levels: 1977-81 1982-85 1986-89
No. of observations 78 95 94
DF 4 4 4
Pearson Chi-square 7.67 6.23 5.85
P-value 0.1044 0.1824 0.2105
Table 6.3.14: Food and Drink Firms Classified According to Innovative Intensity and 
Comparative Profitability* (1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89)
Innovative Intensity Non-patentor Low-intensity High-intensity Total
1977 - 1981
Below Average
Above Average
75.0 %
25.0
60.9 %
39.1
37.5 %
62.5
59.0 %
41.0
1982 - 85
Below Average
Above Average
60.9 %
39.1
54.2 %
45.8
30.8 %
69.2
52.6 %
47.4
1986 - 89
Below Average
Above Average
70.0 %
30.0
59.7 %
40.3
58.3 %
41.7
61.7 %
38.3
* Net profit/own capital of the firm (relative to sub-sector average)
Significance levels: 1977-81 1982-85 1986-89
No. of observations 78 95 94
DF 2 2 2
Pearson Chi-square 4.82 3.18 0.75
P-value 0.0900 0.2040 0.6880
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Table 6.3.15: Cross-classification of Food and Drink Firms by Innovative Intensity*,
Industry and Home-Country (1977-81, 1982-85, 1986-89; percentages of column totals)
Industry Home Country Non-patentor Low-intensity High-intensity Total
1977-1981
Basic Food and 
    Agri-businesses 
Highly-processed 
    Food
Beverages
US
Eur
Jap
Other
US
Eur
Jap
Other
US
Eur
Jap
Other
TOTAL
5.3 %
5.3
15.8
5.3
0.0
36.8
0.0
15.8
0.0
10.5
5.3
0.0
100
10.6 %
8.5
6.4
2.1
25.5
12.8
2.1
2.1
6.4
12.8
4.3
6.4
100
25.0 %
12.5
0.0
0.0
31.3
12.5
18.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100
12.2 %
8.5
7.3
2.4
20.7
18.3
4.9
4.9
3.7
9.8
3.7
3.7
100
1982-1985
Basic Food and 
    Agri-businesses 
 
Highly-processed 
    Food
Beverages
US
Eur
Jap
Other
US
Eur
Jap
Other
US
Eur
Jap
Other
TOTAL
4.0 %
12.0
12.0
0.0
8.0
36.0
8.0
16.0
0.0
4.0
0.0
0.0
100
13.1 %
6.6
3.3
3.3
23.0
19.7
3.3
1.6
3.3
13.1
4.9
4.9
100
13.3 %
6.7
6.7
0.0
20.0
26.7
20.0
0.0
6.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
100
10.9 %
7.9
5.9
2.0
18.8
24.8
6.9
5.0
3.0
8.9
3.0
3.0
100
1986-1989
Basic Food and 
    Agri-businesses 
Highly-processed 
    Food
Beverages
US
Eur
Jap
Other
US
Eur
Jap
Other
US
Eur
Jap
Other
TOTAL
13.6 %
13.6
13.6
4.5
4.5
31.8
0.0
4.5
0.0
9.1
0.0
4.5
100
10.4 %
6.0
3.0
1.5
22.4
25.4
4.5
6.0
3.0
10.4
4.5
3.0
100
8.3 %
8.3
8.3
0.0
25.0
8.3
33.3
0.0
8.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
100
10.9 %
7.9
5.9
2.0
18.8
24.8
6.9
5.0
3.0
8.9
3.0
3.0
100
* No of patents/sales x 1000; low intensity < 2.4 patents p.a.; high intensity > 2.4 p.a.
Significance levels: 1977-81 1982-85 1986-89
No. of observations 82 101 101
DF 22 22 22
Pearson Chi-square 38.97 31.58 30.70
P-value 0.0142 0.0848 0.1025
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6.3.5.3  Home Country and Firm Size
Another way to minimize the home-country bias in international comparisons of
innovativeness is to combine the home-country and the firm-size effects. Here, we
compare the mean innovative intensity of nine groups: small US firms, small European
firms, small Other country firms, medium US firms, medium European firms, medium
Other country firms, large US firms, large European firms and large Other country firms
(Other countries include Japan). Size levels are defined as follows: up to US$ 1.5b global
sales (small firms); from US$ 1.5b to US$ 3.6b (medium-sized firms); and greater than
US$ 3.6b (large firms). The tabulations are set out in Table 6.3.15, measured as
percentages of the column totals for each sub-period.
The null hypothesis to be tested with an analysis of variance (ANOVA) is that the mean
intensity is the same for the nine groups. The results are shown separately for each sub-
period in the panels of Table 6.3.16.
a) In 1977-81, US firms exhibit higher average intensity for the three size levels
(panel A). This means that large US firms show higher innovative intensity than
large European firms, medium US firms higher than medium European firms, and
so on. Moreover, medium and even small US firms show higher average intensity
than large European firms. From this Table it is not possible to establish how far
this difference is due to the USA being the country of patenting, but in our view
it also suggests a greater degree of innovativeness among the US firms (compare
also with the results on Relative Technological Advantage computed elsewhere
in this Report). The Two-way ANOVA (below the panel) reveals significant
differences in innovativeness among the means of the country groups at under the
5% level, but not among the size groups. This lack of significant interaction
indicates that differences between countries are about the same at each size level.
The greatest differences in innovative intensity are between, on the one hand,
large US firms and, on the other, medium and small European firms. This
situation is unfavourable to these medium and small European firms because they
will be encountering affiliates of the large, highly innovative US firms in their
own home markets.
b) In 1982-85, the interpretation of results is similar (panel B). However, the gap
between large US firms and medium European firms has tended to close.  
c) In 1986-89, large and medium US firms still exhibit higher average intensity
than similar firms from other countries (panel C). Small European firms could
have become more intensive than small US and Other country firms. The
possibility cannot be excluded that the cause was an increase in foreign patenting
of small European firms, following greater involvement in the USA, rather than
any domestic increase in innovativeness. The ANOVA test reveals significant
differences due to country and to the interaction of country as well as size.
Differences in size, however, remain statistically insignificant.
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Table 6.3.16: Two-way Analysis of Variance of Average Innovative Intensity* grouped 
by type of firm
                                                              A) 1977-81
Summary Statistics: Mean Std. Dev. S.E.Mean Maximum Minimum Cases
Small:       US .128 .106 .037 .380 .058 8
               Europe .090 .081 .022 .364 .058 14
               Other .115 .068 .020 .282 .058 11
Medium:   US .115 .071 .020 .319 .060 12
               Europe .085 .033 .011 .169 .061 9
               Other .099 .071 .025 .266 .058 8
Large:      US .162 .070 .022 .351 .109 10
               Europe .094 .049 .020 .182 .058 6
               Other .058 .000 .000 .058 .058 3
All .109 .072** .008 .380 .058 81
* Analysed in logarithmic form
**Robust S.D. = 0.063
SOURCE SUM OF
SQUARES
DF MEAN
SQUARE
F VALUE PROBABILITY
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
  SIZE 0.0019 2 0.0009 0.19 0.8302
  COUNTRY 0.0348 2 0.0174 3.44 0.0374
  INTERACTION 0.0158 4 0.0040 0.78 0.5407
  ERROR 0.3640 72 0.0051
BROWN-FORSYTHE TEST*:
  SIZE 2,    45 0.20 0.8202
  COUNTRY 2,    44 3.88 0.0280
  INTERACTION 4,    43 1.34 0.2716
LEVENE TEST**:
  SIZE 2,    72 1.55 0.2195
  COUNTRY 2,    72 1.10 0.3373
  INTERACTION 4,    72 0.55 0.6980
* For equality of means; variances not assumed to be equal
** For equality of variances
B) 1982-85
Summary Statistics: Mean Std. Dev. S.E.Mean Maximum Minimum Cases
Small:       US .037 .029 .012 .069 .000 6
               Europe .027 .035 .008 .118 .000 18
               Other .074 .090 .032 .234 .000 8
Medium:   US .050 .067 .024 .181 .000 8
               Europe .034 .075 .018 .292 .000 17
               Other .049 .079 .024 .279 .000 11
Large:      US .075 .082 .019 .291 .000 19
               Europe .035 .056 .021 .138 .000 7
               Other .001 .002 .001 .005 .000 7
All .044 .067** .007 .292 .000 101
* Analysed in logarithmic form
**Robust S.D. = 0.059
SOURCE SUM OF
SQUARES
DF MEAN
SQUARE
F VALUE PROBABILITY
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE**:
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  SIZE 0.0024 2 0.0012 0.79 0.4594
  COUNTRY 0.0077 2 0.0038 2.56 0.0853
  INTERACTION 0.0092 4 0.0023 1.53 0.2055
  ERROR 0.0926 62 0.0015
WELCH TEST*: 8,    19 6.53 0.0004
BROWN-FORSYTHE TEST*:
  SIZE 2,    15 0.52 0.6035
  COUNTRY 2,    14 1.86 0.1917
  INTERACTION 4,    15 1.31 0.3117
* For equality of means; variances not assumed to be equal
** With 15% trimming
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C) 1986-89
Summary Statistics: Mean Std. Dev. S.E.Mean Maximum Minimum Cases
Small:       US .013 .022 .013 .038 .000 3
               Europe .015 .016 .005 .055 .000 10
               Other .112 .145 .102 .215 .010 2
Medium:   US .021 .018 .007 .044 .000 8
               Europe .015 .020 .019 .250 .000 16
               Other .050 .072 .024 .279 .000 14
Large:      US .060 .055 .012 .231 .000 22
               Europe .033 .053 .013 .183 .000 16
               Other .021 .029 .009 .088 .000 10
All .035 .051** .005 .250 .000 101
* Analysed in logarithmic form
**Robust S.D. = 0.045
SOURCE SUM OF
SQUARES
DF MEAN
SQUARE
F VALUE PROBABILITY
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE**:
  SIZE 0.0030 2 0.0015 1.26 0.2918
  COUNTRY 0.0110 2 0.0055 4.62 0.0135
  INTERACTION 0.0162 4 0.0041 3.41 0.0139
  ERROR 0.0734 62 0.0012
WELCH TEST*: 8,    17 1.25 0.3899
* For equality of means; variances not assumed to be equal
** With 15% trimming
6.3.5.4  Conclusions
1. The most important sources for total numbers of patented innovations are very large,
profitable firms, which obtain above-average gains.  
2. Innovative intensity is little related to size, profits or profitability above the norm. By
contrast, it is significantly related to the industry and the home country in which the firm
is based. Firms from European countries have tended to show some improvement over
time but may still be lagging, particularly in certain subsectors.
6.3.6  Innovative intensity and Profitability
The preceding Section suggested that innovativeness and profitability were unrelated in
this industry. This Section further explores the relationship of both variables. In doing so,
it demonstrates that this apparent lack of association conceals, in fact, different roles for
innovation in different types of firms within this industry.
6.3.6.1  The Framework and the Hypotheses
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Salais and Storper (1992), among others, have called our attention to the differences in
industrial structures and performance among nations revealed by studies of comparative
industrialisation. Such authors believe that countries and firms do not converge
necessarily towards the same level of profitability; neither do they use the same
combination of products, organization and resources - such as fixed capital, circulating
capital, credit and labour - to obtain high profit. By contrast with orthodox economic
theory, in these authors’ views diversity would not necessarily be a failure to adopt best
practices. In short, different rationalities for profitability could be observed within the
same industry and even among countries.
In some cases, divergent paths to profitability are associated with different home
countries. Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) found country-wide factors were more
discriminating than firm- or industry-specific factors in a study on the persistence of
profit in three European countries. Coriat (1990), who compares the US and Germany,
concludes that paths to the achievement of profit are different in the two countries.
Other authors focus on the different paths to profitability used by groups of firms,
independently of their home country. Our approach in this Chapter of the Report is drawn
partly from that of Porter (1980), in which industries are formed by “strategic groups”
following the same or a similar strategy. Differences in strategy may imply differences
in product mix, scale, technology, capital requirements and other sources of entry
barriers.  Groups are not equivalent to market segment. Firms in different groups often
show differences in profitability but not always. One of Porter’s hypotheses is that firms
which are good at some types of strategy are often less efficient at others: firms achieving
a low-cost position, for instance, are likely to be less efficient at technological
development.
Therefore, the first idea we develop in this Section is that there are a multiplicity of profit
maximizing strategies in the food-processing industry. We shall also study whether paths
to profitability are influenced by home countries or by the presence of strategic groups
within this industry (or by both). As shown in the last Section, highly profitable firms
may or may not be great patentors of innovations. Therefore we shall test the hypothesis
that innovativeness plays divergent roles in different strategic groups. In other words, we
assume two groups may eventually obtain similar levels of profit, one via innovativeness
and the other via alternative strategies: While the rate of profit might be similar, the
method used to achieve it might not be.   
The test of these hypotheses follows three steps:  
a) A linear regression between profitability (as the dependent variable) and
innovativeness as well as other independent variables, by home-country; 
b) a cluster analysis identifying different strategic groups in this industry; 
c) a cross-tabulation of strategic groups with a variable indicating the home
country of the firm and a series of ANOVA tests which establish the extent of
differences in profitability among groups.
6.3.6.2  The Regression Analysis
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We shall test here whether the same set of variables, including innovativeness, explain
profit in firms based in different home countries. We shall also test the hypothesis that
the sign and level of association of innovativeness as well as profitability are distinct in
firms based in different home countries.
We use a least-squares linear regression equation between the dependent variable, profit,
and the following independent variables: assets, capital structure or gearing, and
innovative intensity. The equality of regression lines across groups of countries is tested
for, i.e. whether the regression equations for different countries are the same. 
Although a number of authors utilise a lagged variable to measure the impact of
innovativeness on profit (Branch, 1974; Grabowski, 1968), others measure both variables
in the same year (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Acs and Isberg, 1991b). We have
therefore used both measures of innovativeness. A set of equations analyses the effects
of innovative intensity in period t-1 on profit in period t (Table 6.3.18). Another studies
the influence of innovative intensity in period t on profit in period t (Table 6.3.19).  
The distribution of the variables is log-normal. That of the residuals of the technological
variable is normal and does not suggest a significant non-linear association with profit.
There is no evidence of multicollinearity among the variables. 
The general results seem to confirm a lack of association between innovativeness and
profitability (Table 6.3.17). The analysis by home country, however, shows a different
picture. For the final years 1986-89, according to the F statistic and the multiple R2
(bottom of Tables 6.3.18 and 6.3.19), the model explains a significant share of the
variance of the profitability of US and, especially, Other country firms for both
specifications of the technological variable. However, the model fits the data of European
firms poorly. This means the combined effects of size, capital structure and
innovativeness are insufficient to explain the variance of profit in European firms. This
conclusion implies that profit is not explained by the same set of variables for firms based
in different home countries. As suggested by Lecraw (1983), multinationals from
different home countries operate abroad based on different competitive advantages they
have developed as a response to the availability of funding, technology and so on in their
home market.    
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Table 6.3.17: Regression Results for Profit Equations, All Firms, 1982-85 and 1986-89
1982-85 1986-89
Variable Lagged
Innovation
Intensity*
Non-lagged
Innovation
Intensity
Lagged
Innovation
Intensity**
Non-lagged
Innovation
Intensity
Intercept
Log Assets
Log Gearing
Log Innovative   
Intensity   
0.1032
0.0025
(0.37)
-0.0544
(-2.83)
0.0471
(1.66)
0.0921
0.0036
(0.54)
-0.0360
(-1.86)
0.0393
(0.93)
0.0358
0.0115
(1.11)
0.0307
(1.15)
0.0281
(0.44)
0.0242
0.0149
(0.16)
0.0295
(0.11)
-0.0339
(-0.05)
No. of Cases
F-Ratio
Multiple R2
78
4.27
0.148
93
2.04
0.064
94
1.08
0.035
94
1.07
0.035
(t statistics below coefficients)
* i.e. for 1977-81
** i.e. for 1982-85
Table 6.3.18: Regression Results for Profit Equations, by Country (1982-85 and 
1986-89), with Lagged Variable for Innovative Intensity
VARIABLE 1982-85 1986-89
US Europe Other US Europe Other
Intercept
Log Assets
Log Gearing
Log Inn. Intensity
(non lagged)
0.1109
0.0004
(-0.04)
-0.0457
(-0.92)
0.0720*
(1.92)
0.2970
-0.0396**
(-2.58)
-0.0970**
(-3.16)
0.3860**
(2.45)
0.0481
0.0176*
(1.95)
-0.0644**
(-4.35)
-0.0583
(-1.52)
-0.0253
0.0098
(0.73)
0.1851**
(4.22)
-0.0092
(-0.12)
0.1707
-0.0174
(-0.69)
0.0084
(0.14)
0.1840
(0.53)
-0.0005
0.0283**
(2.80)
-0.0716**
(-4.91)
-0.1164**
(-2.68)
No. of Cases
F Statistics
Multiple R2
48
1.42
0.088
10
4.28*
0.681
20
7.79**
0.594
50
6.98*
0.313
19
0.21
0.040
25
9.21**
0.568
(t statistics below coefficients)
* Significant at between 5% and 10% levels
** Significant at 5% level or less.
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Table 6.3.19: Regression Results for Profit Equations, by Country (1982-85 and 
1986-89), with Non-Lagged Variable for Innovative Intensity
VARIABLE 1982-85 1986-89
US Europe Other US Europe Other
Intercept
Log Assets
Log Gearing
Log Inn. Intensity
(non lagged)
0.0807
0.0039
(0.39)
-0.0174
(-0.37)
0.0997*
(1.73)
0.2043
-0.0227
(-0.94)
-0.0489
(-1.05)
0.2266
(0.70)
0.0479
0.0173**
(2.23)
-0.0665**
(-4.71)
-0.0673**
(-2.06)
-0.0314
0.0114
(0.87)
0.1853**
(4.37)
-0.0412
(-0.37)
0.2060
-0.0256
(-0.94)
0.0025
(0.04)
0.3759
(0.85)
-0.0020
0.0280**
(2.65)
-0.0679**
(-3.75)
-0.1109**
(-2.19)
No. of Cases
F Statistics
Multiple R2
51
1.58
0.092
19
0.55
0.099
23
8.65*
0.577
50
7.04**
0.315
19
0.36
0.067
25
7.85**
0.529
(t statistics below coefficients)
*  Significant at between 5% and 10% levels
** Significant at 5% level or less.
In both US and Other country firms the sign and significance of the technological
coefficient remain unchanged when we modify the specification of the technological
variable (lagged or non-lagged). In US firms, the sign of the technological coefficient is
positive and significant during the 1982-85 crisis; however, it is negative, although not
statistically significant, over the 1986-89 recovery period. The result for the second
period would seem to contradict the theory put forward in Section 6.3.2 above, i.e. of a
positive association between innovativeness and profit. It is consistent, however, with the
notion of a trade-off between innovativeness and profit developed by Kamien and
Schwartz (1975) as well as by Branch (1974). A possible explanation is that R&D
became less crucial to US firms owing to the anticipation of high profits over 1986-89.
Directors would be less prone to spend money on R&D when the firm is already
performing well (or success is predicted). In addition, high profits usually coincide with
periods of heavy demand during which engineers and scientists are likely to be shifted
from the firm laboratories to the industrial plant, a situation tending to reduce innovations
by unit value of sales (Branch, 1974). The significant coefficient for gearing in the US
firms for this period suggest the primacy of financial determinants of profitability.
The negative and significant sign of the technological coefficient in Other country firms
also confirms these authors’ point of view. According to them, when the firm predicts
lower performance than its competitors, it is likely to embark on R&D projects generating
new products and processes (this also constitutes the assumption underlying “search”
behaviour in the non-neoclassical model of Nelson and Winter, 1974). As seen in Section
6.3.3, Other country firms - especially Japanese ones - actually got lower returns than
their competitors over the period studied here.   
Finally, in European firms, the sign of the technological coefficient is positive but
insignificant. Geroski et al. (1993) also found a negative association between innovation
and profit in British food-processing firms. 
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6.3.6.3  The Cluster Analysis
Even though the regression analysis gives some interesting insights into divergences
between firms based in different home countries, it does not supply a general explanation
for the association of innovativeness and profit in this industry.
We shall now attempt to establish a more global explanation based on Porter’s strategic-
group construct. The previous discussion suggested that the relationship between
innovativeness and profit depended on a number of trade-offs and interrelated factors.
Therefore it is necessary to study the mutual association among a great number of
structural characteristics and strategies. The underlying premise is that firms are not
homogeneous within industries (Bush and Sinclair, 1991). We assume, by contrast, that
each cluster would be a coherent combination of technological and financial strategies
as well as practices of resource use (Salais and Storper, 1992). These models have, in our
view, implications for the pattern of competition in the food-processing industry at large.
To study the underlying structure of a great mass of data, including profit and
innovativeness data, we use the K-means cluster analysis, which is an interdependent
multivariate method that classifies each firm into the cluster whose centre is closest in
Euclidean distance to the firm (the centre of the cluster is defined as the mean of the cases
in the cluster). This technique groups cases which are very similar in a variety of
characteristics. Since the variables are measured in different units, we use the variance
to standardize our data and give equal weight to each variable.  
The model comprises both economic and technological variables: assets*, profits,
margins*, rotation*, gearing*, number of patents*, innovative intensity, food,
biotechnology, diversification, and experience (starred variables are measured as their
logarithms, for variables that are lognormally distributed).  
These variables - which have been defined in Table 6.3.2 - denote strategic options
regarding the type of financial resources, the type and level of technology, the use of
production factors, and so on.  The reasons for selecting this set are the following:
Sales Large size may bring economies of scale in production, R&D and distribution.
Scale is an important element to building entry or mobility barriers and a determinant of
bargaining power of the firm vis-à-vis suppliers as well as retailers (Porter, 1980).  
Margins Low margins suggest low sales prices or high costs (or both). It is a
decomposition of the profit rate so it helps to describe how profits arise.
Profits  This is a measure of the rate of return on investment.
Gearing This shows the leverage of the firm. It provides a measure of the funds
contributed by creditors relative to investors. A high level of gearing increases risk and
the profitability-versus-risk trade-off is a crucial consideration for the firm. Moreover,
low gearing increases the value of the firm though, on the contrary, high gearing raises
the cost of equity. According to the signalling theory, capital structure may be used by
managers to send signals to the public about the future performance of the firm, signs that
cannot be imitated by unsuccessful firms because such firms do not have enough cash
flow to back this strategy (Copeland and Weston, 1992). In general, managers prefer
internal funds supplemented by loans because this structure gives the firm more certainty
and independence (Bowman and Asch, 1987).
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Rotation of Capital The sales to capital ratio is a measure of both the level of firm
activity and efficient utilization of own capital. A low rate means the firm is not
generating a sufficient volume of business, given its level of investment.
Capital Intensity  This measures the use of capital relative to labour.
Number of patents A great number of patents suggest the firm owns important intangible
assets.
Biotechnology, food and diversification These variables point to capabilities and
specialization options in the technological field. In addition, biotechnology indicates
expertise in technologically advanced products, as a generic technology applicable to
numerous fields within food-processing, animal and plant genetics; this characteristic
may promote product diversification and vertical integration. Diversification may reduce
dependence on suppliers of technology.
Experience One school of thought sees knowledge as accumulative. In this light, early
patentors would show technological advantages vis-à-vis less experienced firms. Another
perceives technological change as a basically discontinuous process. This perspective
would produce a “dinosaur” syndrome among early patentors, who may be frozen into
old technology, putting a brake on production of current technology in these firms.
We obtain three clusters which are shown in Tables 6.3.20 to 6.3.22. As indicated by the
F-ratios, the technological variables, with the exception of biotechnology, are rather
important determinants of cluster formation. The cluster profiles are easier to assess by
first ordering the variables according to their F-ratio. This provides an insight into how
strategic groups compete in food-processing.
The strategic groups with the highest levels of innovativeness persistently display the
highest average profit rates in 1977-81 (column 1 of Table 6.3.20), 1982-85 (column 2
of Table 6.3.21) and 1986-89 (column 2 of Table 6.3.22). Throughout 1977-81, and
especially the 1982-85 crisis, these groups moreover show the lowest standard deviation
of profits, a feature often interpreted as an indicator of lower risk (Telser, 1988). More
importantly, these groups are the only ones to display profits above the norm. Innovative
firms tend to display larger sizes, significant intangible assets and higher degrees of
diversification into non-food technologies.
Data on the least innovative groups are shown in the third columns of each of these
Tables. These firms are persistently the most specialized in food technology, the least
diversified into non-food technology and the least experienced. They consistently exhibit
the lowest rates of profits and margins. They demonstrate efficient use of capital, as
evidenced by the highest rates of rotation, and great potential to secure external funding.
Capital intensity, on the contrary, is rather low.
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Table 6.3.20: Cluster Analysis, 1977-81
Variables Cluster 1* Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Grand Mean F-Ratio P-value
Economic variables
Log Sales
Profit
Log Margin
Log Rotation
Log Capital Intensity
Log Gearing
Technological variables
Log no of Patents
Innovative intensity
Biotechnology
Food
Diversification
Experience
4.5780
(0.3378)
0.1522
(0.0385)
0.0172
(0.0007)
0.6067
(0.1392)
1.3416
(0.2730)
0.4707
(0.0616)
1.1783
(0.3141
0.4862
(0.4231)
0.0678
(0.1228)
0.2893
(0.2239)
5.6548
(2.4503)
44.1376
(16.2654)
   4.2537
  (0.3084)
   0.1205
  (0.0935)
   0.0058
  (0.0033)
   0.9580
  (0.1874)
   1.3454
  (0.2582)
   0.6317
  (0.1521)
   0.2258
  (0.2314)
   0.0688
  (0.0984)
   0.0728
  (0.1407)
   0.3724
  (0.3739)
   0.6885
  (0.7946)
  29.0085
 (24.4460)
   4.1641
  (0.3286)
   0.1325
  (0.0445)
   0.0182
  (0.0074)
   0.4895
  (0.1796)
   1.4172
  (0.2634)
   0.4336
  (0.0911)
   0.2252
  (0.1898)
   0.0863
  (0.1990)
   0.0320
  (0.1069)
   0.2752
  (0.2917)
   0.7147
  (0.6759)
  33.9209
 (27.7622)
4.3002
0.1343
0.0140
0.6613
1.3760
0.5003
0.4725
0.1843
0.0550
0.3061
1.9870
34.9928
10.92
1.46
33.02
49.25
0.74
24.36
122.36
19.68
0.74
0.59
98.54
2.33
0.000
0.238
0.000
0.000
0.483
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.481
0.555
0.000
0.104
N 21 26 34
Notes: Figures in Clusters columns represent Cluster Means, with Standard Deviations below in parentheses
* = Most innovative-intense cluster.
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Table 6.3.21: Cluster Analysis, 1982-85
Variables Cluster 1 Cluster 2* Cluster 3 Grand Mean F-Ratio P-value
Economic variables
Log Sales
Log Profit
Log Margin
Log Rotation
Log Capital Intensity
Log Gearing
Technological variables
Log no of Patents
Innovative intensity
Biotechnology
Food
Diversification
Experience
4.3437
(0.3196)
0.0868
(0.0227)
0.0284
(0.0118)
0.4663
(0.1793)
1.6247
(0.3174)
0.3322
(0.0907)
0.3501
(0.3045)
0.0875
(0.1109)
0.0628
(0.1422)
0.2817
(0.3203)
1.1500
(1.1263)
37.8090
(28.7795)
   4.8121
  (0.3682)
   0.1025
  (0.0193)
   0.0298
  (0.0113)
   0.6255
  (0.2049)
   1.5207
  (0.2933)
   0.4129
  (0.0868)
   1.3043
  (0.3909)
   0.4240
  (0.3213)
   0.0501
  (0.1105)
   0.2169
  (0.1648)
   6.8148
  (2.5848)
  38.4756
 (12.9068)
   4.2329
  (0.3033)
   0.0857
  (0.0300)
   0.0204
  (0.0163)
   0.9764
  (0.2592)
   1.4400
  (0.3472)
   0.5465
  (0.1876)
   0.1308
  (0.1309)
   0.0301
  (0.0369)
   0.0127
  (0.0464)
   0.6334
  (0.4397)
   0.3512
  (0.3907)
  24.9255
 (23.5175)
4.3815
0.0893
0.0252
0.7167
1.5262
0.4377
0.4298
0.1239
0.0420
0.3913
1.8342
32.5179
20.83
2.97
4.50
53.89
3.04
22.41
124.66
43.28
1.59
10.66
159.73
3.51
0.000
0.056
0.014
0.000
0.053
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.212
0.000
0.000
0.034
N 40 18 42
Notes: Figures in Clusters columns represent Cluster Means, with Standard Deviations below in parentheses
* = Most innovative-intense cluster.
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Table 6.3.22: Cluster Analysis, 1986-89
Variables Cluster 1 Cluster 2* Cluster 3 Grand Mean F-Ratio P-value
Economic variables
Log Sales
Log Profit
Log Margin
Log Rotation
Log Capital Intensity
Log Gearing
Technological variables
Log no of Patents
Innovative intensity
Biotechnology
Food
Diversification
Experience
4.5655
(0.2954)
0.9664
(0.0217)
0.0245
(0.0120)
0.7144
(0.1571)
1.7251
(0.3379)
0.4233
(0.0995)
0.3772
(0.2951)
0.0522
(0.585)
0.0812
(0.2169)
0.3298
(0.3431)
1.2283
(1.0933)
43.8515
(24.8921)
4.8925
(0.3684)
0.1011
(0.0295)
0.0233
(0.0123)
0.7263
(0.1117)
1.8900
(0.3534)
0.4997
(0.1127)
1.3561
(0.3804)
0.3261
(0.2065)
0.0474
(0.0735)
0.2188
(0.1803)
6.4583
(2.4449)
30.0083
(16.8095)
4.3891
(0.2731)
0.0742
(0.0258)
0.0089
(0.0067)
1.0181
(0.1931)
1.6685
(0.3209)
0.6184
(0.2156)
0.1934
(0.2115)
0.0316
(0.0504)
0.0949
(0.2444)
0.4564
(0.4212)
0.6157
(0.8026)
19.2908
(22.0280)
4.5609
0.0897
0.0188
0.8272
1.7336
0.5079
0.4872
0.0941
0.0777
0.3430
1.9492
32.5179
16.68
9.26
23.24
36.93
2.54
15.66
105.33
59.67
0.29
2.54
123.71
12.03
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.085
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.750
0.086
0.000
0.000
N 46 18 36
Notes: Figures in Clusters columns represent Cluster Means, with Standard Deviations below in parentheses
* = Most innovative-intense cluster.
6.3.6.4  The Analysis of Variance
The results of a One-way ANOVA test indicate divergences in comparative profitability
are statistically significant at under the 10% level among the three strategic groups in
each period (Table 6.3.23), with the sharpest differences being recorded in the final sub-
period (1986-89).  The results are robust to changes in the specification of the variable:
similar results are obtained when we calculate the ANOVA for the logarithm of profits
(Table 6.3.24).
Where are profit differences? A Tukey-Cramer test indicates that the mean groups differ
significantly (p < 0.005) in 1977-81 and 1982-85. In 1986-89, the least innovative group
differs significantly (p < 0.001) from the other two groups; though the latter two do not
do so by themselves. One-way ANOVA in Table 6.3.23, testing the null hypothesis that
comparative profits (i.e. profits higher or lower than average in the sub-sector) are similar
in all groups, clarifies this question: only the most innovative group obtains profits above
the norm. Although, in absolute terms, the performance of the other group is rather good,
profits are slightly below the average of the sub-sectors in which the firms in this group
compete.
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Table 6.3.23: ANOVA of Comparative Profitability* grouped by Cluster
Summary Statistics: Mean Std. Dev. Robust SD S.E.Mean Maximum Minimum Cases
A) 1977-81
  Cluster 1** .018 .038 .008 .076 -.064 21
  Cluster 2 -.014 .093 .019 .175 -.235 23
  Cluster 3 -.002 .045 .008 .113 -.106 34
  All .000 .062 .058 .007 .175 -.235 78
B) 1982-85
  Cluster 1 -.009 .065 .011 .244 -.227 36
  Cluster 2** .036 .055 .013 .128 -.082 18
  Cluster 3 -.008 .084 .013 .303 -.216 41
  All -.000 .074 .065 .008 .303 -.227 95
C) 1986-89
  Cluster 1 -.003 .064 .010 .165 -.140 43
  Cluster 2** .010 .087 .022 .210 -.130 16
  Cluster 3 -.006 .071 .013 .107 -.249 30
  All -.022 .077 .077 .008 .210 -.249 89
* Net profit/own capital of the firm minus sub-sector average
** Most innovative cluster
SOURCE SUM OF SQU-
ARES
DF MEAN
SQUARE
F VALUE PROBABILITY
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
  1977-81++
    CLUSTER 0.0125 2 0.0063 2.55 0.0880
    ERROR 0.1268 52 0.0025
  1982-85
    CLUSTER 0.0296 2 0.0148 2.82 0.0650
    ERROR 0.4835 92 0.0053
  1986-89
    CLUSTER 0.0907 2 0.0453 8.94 0.0003
    ERROR 0.4358 86 0.0051
WELCH TEST*:
  1977-81 2,   28 3.11 0.0601
  1982-85 2,   52 4.27 0.0192
  1986-89 2,   37 8.54 0.0009
BROWN-FORSYTHE TEST*:
  1977-81 2,    29 2.33 0.1154
  1982-85 2,    87 3.25 0.0434
  1986-89 2,    44 7.69 0.0014
LEVENE TEST**:
  1982-85 2,    92 1.47 0.2363
  1986-89 2,    86 0.75 0.2363
++ With 15% trimming
* For equality of means; variances not assumed to be equal
** For equality of variances
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Table 6.3.24: ANOVA of Profit* grouped by Cluster
                                                           
Summary Statistics: Mean Std. Dev. Robust SD S.E.Mean Maximum Minimum Cases
A) 1977-81
  Cluster 1** .152 .039 .008 .212 .070 21
  Cluster 2 .121 .094 .020 .310 -.100 23
  Cluster 3 .133 .045 .008 .248 .029 34
  All .134 .062 .058 .007 .310 -.100 78
B) 1982-85
  Cluster 1 .087 .023 .004 .164 .003 36
  Cluster 2** .103 .019 .005 .134 .062 18
  Cluster 3 .086 .030 .005 .187 .000 41
  All .089 .026 .023 .003 .187 .000 95
C) 1986-89
  Cluster 1 .096 .022 .003 .150 .049 43
  Cluster 2** .101 .029 .007 .167 .053 16
  Cluster 3 .074 .026 .005 .130 .000 30
  All .090 .027 .027 .003 .167 .000 89
* Log of profit
** Most innovative cluster
SOURCE SUM OF
SQUARES
DF MEAN
SQUARE
F VALUE PROBABILITY
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
  1977-81++
    CLUSTER 0.0124 2 0.0062 2.52 0.0907
    ERROR 0.1272 52 0.0025
  1982-85
    CLUSTER 0.0039 2 0.0020 2.97 0.0561
    ERROR 0.0604 92 0.0007
  1986-89
    CLUSTER 0.0113 2 0.0056 9.26 0.0002
    ERROR 0.0523 86 0.0006
WELCH TEST*:
  1977-81 2,   28 2.97 0.0678
  1982-85 2,   52 4.39 0.0173
  1986-89 2,   37 8.45 0.0009
BROWN-FORSYTHE TEST*:
  1977-81 2,    30 2.29 0.1184
  1982-85 2,    87 3.34 0.0365
  1986-89 2,    47 8.04 0.0010
LEVENE TEST**:
  1982-85 2,    92 1.53 0.2214
  1986-89 2,    86 0.69 0.5052
++ With 15% trimming
* For equality of means; variances not assumed to be equal
** For equality of variances
It seems that its technological background helps this innovative group to make substantial
enough profits. This result would confirm Geroski et al. (1993) in that the benefits of
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innovation seem to be permanent. Failure to generate current technology, however,
hampers this group’s potential for extraordinary gains. This half-way position regarding
profit concurs somewhat with both those who believe old technology generates a
“dinosaur” syndrome (Dosi, 1990) and those who think technology has long-run positive,
indirect effects (Geroski et al., 1993). This group actually performs better than that which
is both weakly innovative and technologically inexperienced (columns 1 and 3 of Table
6.3.24). 
The comparison of the two higher-profit groups (with only the most innovative of them
achieving extraordinary gains) illustrates how firms use different types of resources and
divergent technological competencies to do well (columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.3.22). The
most innovative group probably produces standard products with important economies
of scale and low shares of labour in value-added. This interpretation is suggested by high
level of rotation (which is facilitated by production of a few generic items), considerable
capital per worker and smaller margins (by comparison with the other group). The other
group (column 1 of Table 6.3.22) is likely to produce speciality products necessitating
the use of skilled labour. The range of products is probably wide, and thus routinization
of production is rather difficult; margins are substantial but the use of capital is less
efficient, probably owing to the nature of the business.
A cross-tabulation of the clusters against a variable indicating the home country of the
firm discloses that only 10%-12% of the European companies in our sample appear in the
most innovative clusters. On the other hand, European firms are doing well, as was
shown in Section 6.3.4. This result, together with insignificant association between
innovativeness and profit, is rather enigmatic. A possible cause for good performance is
that large European firms balance their low levels of internal innovation with exceptional
absorption of external innovation. Previous research suggests, in fact, that innovativeness
of national food-processing industries, i.e. the ratio of the number of foreign patents
issued to firms at the two-digit industry level, their suppliers and public centres of
research to the value-added of each industry, is noteworthy in the EU. Moreover, the
positive effect of these spillovers of knowledge on the performance of large food
manufacturing firms has been proved elsewhere (Rama, 1994).
On the other hand, the bulk of Japanese firms (50%-62%) compete with the lowest
innovative levels, the lowest profits and the highest gearing (although Ajinomoto and
others are highly innovative). These firms are well placed to attract external finance
because they are often part of large Japanese industrial-financial groups. Abundant loans
help them to finance development and counterbalance moderate innovativeness as well
as technological inexperience. As indicated in Section 6.3.4, financial considerations
have been crucial in this industry. Yet this is probably a transitory strategy in the
expansion of Japanese food-processing firms. As seen in Sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5, a
portion of these firms is becoming highly innovative. The regression results suggested,
moreover, that this strategy is a response to the low profits earned on the part of these
firms.
The bulk of firms in innovative, highly profitable clusters is made up of: the world’s
largest firms (Nestlé and Unilever), the largest producers of soft-drinks (Coca-Cola and
Pepsico) and the largest US grain-processors (Ralston Purina, Quaker Oats, etc.). After
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1982, however, a number of the latter firms have shifted to other types of strategy.
Coversely, after this date, some large conglomerates (RJR Nabisco, Philip Morris, etc.)
have adopted this model to operate in the food-manufacturing market. 
6.3.6.5  Conclusions from Hypothesis Testing
The empirical tests supported our hypotheses to some extent. Paths to profitability are
certainly influenced by country factors. In addition, the association of innovativeness and
profit varies according to differences in home countries. While the association inclines
to be positive in European firms, it is negative in firms based in new source countries.
The latter try to balance their expected low profits with increases in innovativeness. In
US firms, the relationship changes throughout the period, tending to be negative when
high profits are anticipated.  
Even if we identified several strategic groups within this industry, we proved only part
of our hypothesis regarding different profit-maximizing strategies. Although it is true that
two of these groups achieved similar absolute profit rates with divergent levels of
innovativeness, only the most innovative made profits above the norm. The other group
is not a good example of low innovativeness: as it is an important early patentor, its good
performance could be, in part, a result of earlier experience even though firms in this
group are unable to produce current technology to similar extents. Weakly innovative and
technologically inexperienced groups are actually the least profitable.
6.3.7  Conclusions
1. In terms of the number of patents, innovation tends to be produced by giant, highly
profitable firms with earnings above the norm. This implies that national food-processing
industries formed by these types of enterprises - rather than by smaller, less successful
concerns - are likely to lead world R&D in this field, to signal the direction of
technological search and to have substantial influence upon the technical interface
between this industry and its suppliers. This is an important consideration for home
countries where firms are lesser patentors, because followers are likely to imitate
innovation produced in the world’s leading centres for food-processing technology; this
technology, however, risks being less adaptable to conditions in their home countries in
terms of natural resources and so on. This strategy therefore risks causing increases in
imports of agricultural products, equipment, etc., and hence minimizing the beneficial
effects of food processors’ demand on the rest of the national food-chain. In this industry,
there is some indication that US firms producing highly-processed food could play a
significant role as technological leaders.
2. Heavy patentors tend to be profitable firms but the reverse is not always true. This
result suggests that innovativeness is not the sole path to profit in food processing and/or
that some profitable firms incorporate technology via purchases of new machinery or
imitation of other firms rather than by patenting of innovations. Another possibility is that
some of these successful firms prefer to finance R&D in specialized enterprises rather
than to conduct in-house R&D. A number of European firms seem to display relatively
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low patenting activity in spite of their good performances. One possible interpretation is
that these firms patent most of their inventions in Europe exclusively.  As our data reflect
patenting in the US, one could draw the erroneous conclusion that European firms are
weakly innovative vis-à-vis US firms. A second, not exclusive hypothesis, is that
European firms chiefly incorporate new technology by methods other than the patenting
of inventions. Two facts would support these explanations. First, European firms have
shown rapid growth of their fixed assets and capital per worker over the period analysed
in this Section. Second, previous research suggests that a number of European food-
processing industries are innovation-intensive, a situation positively influencing profit
in large firms (Rama, 1994). These findings suggest that learning from spillovers
originating in other firms and in research centres could be a significant source of
technological progress in this industry in Europe.
On the other hand, the mix of different types of R&D - privately and publicly funded -
should also be investigated in this industry. It may well be that European firms rely much
more on publicly financed R&D than do firms based in other countries. If this
explanation is correct, in European firms, low patenting of inventions would be balanced
by adoption of new technology produced by public sources. This situation would
implicitly pose the question of which of the two types of R&D funding is the more
effective in generating productivity growth (Griliches, 1986) and profitability at the firm
level.
The pattern of adoption of technology and its links with economic performance at the
firm level are relevant to the selection of effective technological policies. If European
processors relied chiefly on the adoption of new equipment, for instance, then incentives
to innovation among suppliers and credit at low interest rates for purchases of capital
goods would probably be especially desirable actions. 
3. Innovative intensity, i.e. the number of patents per unit of sales, is not significantly
related to firm size but is related to the home country and to sub-sectors in which the firm
is based. Beyond a certain threshold, size is not likely to affect innovativeness. As this
part of the study focuses on very large firms, such a threshold is largely surpassed by
firms in our sample.  
4. At first sight, innovativeness and profitability are unrelated in this industry. This
finding, however, conceals within-industry differences. The impact of innovativeness on
profit varies depending on the home-country in which the firm is based and on the phase
of the business cycle. In a number of firms, especially those based in the US or in Other
countries, changes in innovativeness are apparently a consequence of foreseen
disadvantages vis-à-vis competitors or of different phases of the business cycle.  
On the contrary, the association of both variables has a positive but statistically
insignificant sign in European firms. If the cause were that they use, as it seems, methods
other than the patenting of innovations to incorporate technological progress, then it
would be difficult to stimulate increases in innovativeness in these firms. If this
interpretation were correct, links between innovation and profitability - links which are
a powerful engine of technological progress in other countries - would be tenuous in
European food-processing firms. European manufacturers would not be likely to view a
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clear cause-effect relationship between their own innovative efforts and the profitability
of their firms.  This perception would render technological policies less effective.  
5. Firms in divergent strategic groups within this industry compete with distinctive
technological features associated, in turn, with different patterns of use of resources and
rates of profit. The highest levels of innovativeness are associated with significant
diversification into non-food technological fields. Diversification may be crucial to
control the supply of upstream technology, enjoy independence from suppliers and
produce (or co-operate in the production of) customized equipment, packaging materials
or chemical additives. Conversely, the least innovative firms specialize in food
technology (and, to some extent, in biotechnology). The latter seems the commonest
pattern in European firms.
6. These technological competencies, as mentioned previously, are associated with
different financial strategies and levels of profit.  The most innovative firms persistently
show the highest levels of profitability and least risk throughout critical phases of the
business cycle.  More importantly, they are the only ones to make profits above the norm
continuously from 1977 to 1989.  
On the contrary, the least innovative persistently display the lowest rates of profit. They
are able, however, to use their capital efficiently. High rates of rotation of capital are
probably connected to their producing a small range of standardized products. Some of
these firms are also able to secure a great volume of external funding because they are
protected by large industrial-financial groups providing them with low-cost loans, such
as some Japanese and probably some French industrial-financial groups.
7. In some cases, strategic groups converge towards similar levels of profitability with
different strategies and divergent innovative intensities. Only the most innovative,
however, continuously attain extraordinary gains. Different rationalities of profitability
may lead to similar profits but some paths seem better than others.
8. Technological experience matters because it helps to transform the firm internally, and
hence achieve good performance. Technological experience, however, is insufficient to
promote extraordinary earnings if it is not associated with current innovativeness.
9. This research suggests an interest in further investigating forms of incorporation of
technology other than by the patenting of inventions. Analysis of spillovers and contract
R&D would be useful to understand patterns of technological change in food-processing
more adequately.  This is especially valid for European firms. We study the “innovation
systems” in the next Chapter.
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Appendix 6.1: Firms Included in the Sample
Name of Firm Home
Country
* Name of Firm Home
Country
*
1. AGWAY INC.
2. AJINOMOTO CO. INC.
3. ALLIED LYONS
4. AMATIL LTD
5. AMERICAN BRANDS INC.
6. ANHEUSER BUSCH CO. INC.
7. ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO.
8. ARLA
9. ASSOCIATED BRITISH FOODS PLC
10.BARLOW RAND LTD
11.BASS PLC
12.BEATRICE CO. INC.
13.BESNIER S.A.
14.BOND CORP. HOLDINGS LTD.
15.BONGRAIN S.A.
16.BOOKER
17.BORDEN INC.
18.BSN GROUP
19.C.P.C. INTERNATIONAL
20.CADBURY SCHWEPPES PLC
21.CAMPBELL SOUP CO.
22.CANADA PACKERS INC.
23.CARGILL INC.
24.CARLSBERG A/S
25.CASTLE & COOKE INC.
26.CIE FINANCIERE SUCRES ET DENREES
27.COBERCO
28.COCA COLA CO.
29.CON AGRA INC
30.DALGETY PLC
31.DEAN FOODS CO.
32.DMV CAMPINA
33.ELDERS IXL LTD.
34.FERRERO SPA
35.GENERAL MILLS INC.
36.GEO HORMEL & CO.
37.GEORGE WESTON LTD.
38.GOLD KIST INC.
39.GRAND METROPOLITAN PLC
40.GUINNESS PLC
41.GUYOMARC’H S.A.
42.H.J. HEINZ COMPANY
43.HANSON PLC
44.HEINEKEN N.V.
45.HERSHEY FOODS CORP.
46.HILLSDOWN HOLDINGS PLC
47.HOUSE FOOD INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD.
48.IMASCO LTD.
US
Japan
UK
Australia
US
US
US
Sweden
UK
S. Africa
UK
USA
France
Australia
France
UK
US
France
US
UK
US
Canada
US
Denmark
US
France
Neth’lds
US
US
UK
US
Neth’lds
Australia
Italy
US
US
Canada
US
UK
UK
France
US
UK
Neth’lds
US
UK
Japan
Canada
1
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
3
2
1
2
3
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
3
3
1
2
2
3
2
1
2
2
52.JOHN LABATT
53.KELLOGG CO.
54.KIRIN BREWERY CO LTD.
55.KONINKLIJKE WESSANEN N.V.
56.LAND O’LAKES INC.
57.LVMH MOET HENNESSY/LOUIS VUITTON
58.MC CORMICK & CO. LTD.
59.MD FOODS AMBA
60.MEIJI SEIKA KAISHA
61.MELKUNIE HOLLAND
62.MOLSON COMPANIES LTD.
63.MORINAGA MILK INDUSTRY
64.NESTLE
65.NICHIREI CORP.
66.NICHIRO GYOGYO KAISHA
67.NIPPON MEAT PACKERS INC.
68.NIPPON SUISAN KAISHA LTD.
69.NISSHIN FLOUR MILLING GO.LTD
70.NORTHERN FOODS PLC.
71.PEPSICO INC.
72.PERNOD RICARD
73.PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES INC.
74.PILLSBURY CO.
75.PROCTER & GAMBLE CO.
76.PROVENDOR GROUP
77.QUAKER OATS COMPANY
78.RALSTON PURINA CO.
79.RANK HOVIS MC DOUGALL PLC.
80.RJR NABISCO INC.
81.S & W BERISFORD LTD.
82.SAPPORO BREWERIES LTD.
83.SARA LEE CORPORATION
84.SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE BREWERIES PLC.
85.SEAGRAM CO. LTD
86.SNOW BRAND MILK PRODUCTS CO.
87.SODIMA
88.SOURCE PERRIER
89.SUNTORY LTD
90.TAIYO FISHERY CO. LTD.
91.TATE & LYLE PLC
92.TYSON FOODS INC.
93.UNIGATE PLC
94.UNILEVER
95.UNION INTERNATIONAL PLC
96.UNION LAITIERE NORMANDE
97.UNITED BISCUITS
98.UNITED BRANDS CO.
99.WHITBREAD & CO. PLC
Canada
US
Japan
Neth’lds
US
France
US
Denmark
Japan
Neth’lds
Canada
Japan
Switz’ld
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
UK
US
France
US
US
US
Sweden
US
US
UK
US
US
Japan
US
UK
Canada
Japan
France
France
Japan
Japan
UK
US
UK
Neth./UK
UK
France
UK
US
UK
3
1
3
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
3
2
3
3
2
2
3
3
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
                    *  Industry:  definitions are in Table 6.3.2.
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7. Inter-firm and national systems of innovation
7.1  User-producer interactions
As explained above in Chapter 5 and in Section 6.2, the food and beverages industry may be
particularly focused on market possibilities and the needs of end-users (despite being so often
classified as a supplier-dominated industry in the sense of Pavitt’s taxonomy). Therefore, we
investigate the degree to which market factors are important to this industry as an inspiration to
innovations. 
Chapter 3 provided the theoretical hypotheses underlying the assumption that user-producer
interactions have an impact on the speed and direction of the innovation process, through more
intense interaction between users and producers helping producers to identify the needs of users.
Proximity in terms such as culture, geography, or common language, facilitates an articulation
and understanding of those needs which may in turn become an input to the innovation process.
It is important to stress that in practice the producers do not usually interact with the end-users
directly. As in all other manufacturing there is a link in-between, most often consisting of a
wholesale firm and/or retail firm before the products reach the final users. Attention should also
be paid to the duality in the term “user”. A firm in this industry may be a user of raw materials
from the agricultural and fishing industry but at the same time a producer of the final food
products to be consumed by final users.
Some of the CIS data does address user-producer interaction. This is the case for example of the
sources of information for innovation activity, where the role of customers, suppliers etc. are
assessed. Also the exchange of technology in terms of firms purchasing or selling various forms
of technology may be taken as an indirect yardstick of the qualitative aspect of user-producer
interaction. We shall return to this measure later.
In Tables 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 results are shown with respect to those of the variables relevant for
user-producer interaction in the light of the former question about the importance of different
information sources for innovation activity. The tables show mean high scores for the groups,
i.e. the share of firms who assess “clients or customers” (for example) as either crucial or very
significant as a source of information for innovation in relation to total responses to that question.
Market factors are generally more important than technology factors. Thus, clients or customers
come out as the most important source of information for innovation, with suppliers of materials
and components and suppliers of equipment as second and third respectively. Except for
“conferences, meetings and journals”, the technology factors 
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Table 7.1.1:  Selected external sources of innovation assessed as very important or crucial, by
country
A: Market factors
Country Ranking Clients or
Customers
Suppliers of
materials or
components
Suppliers of
equipment
Competitors Fairs and
exhibitions
Belgium Total 57 36 45 19 36
Leaders 50 46 55 9* 45
Laggards 55 23 41 27 14*
Denmark Total 67 39 35 28 35
Leaders 60 47 40 20* 13*
Laggards 67 47 40 40 67
Germany Total 76 55 56 57 60
Leaders 75 54 57 54 71
Laggards 70 56 56 59 52
Ireland Total 78 49 42 44 46
Leaders 88 42 33 42 55
Laggards 79 55 55 46 42
Italy Total 37# 28 37 20 28
Leaders 38# 31 36 21 29
Laggards 35# 26 37 17 30
Netherlands Total 70 45 44 23 32
Leaders 65 44 38 21 40
Laggards 71 44 48 29 19
Norway Total 54 48 44 12 32
Leaders 46 58 58 15 35
Laggards 59 41 29 12* 18*
Spain Total 58# 7# 61# 78# 53
Leaders 58# 9*# 73# 79# 52
Laggards 59# 9*# 50# 72# 47
Notes: Calculated from CIS data
All figures represent percentages of firms assessing as very important or crucial
#  Only partly comparable
*  Less reliable data because of low number of observations
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Table 7.1.2:  Selected external sources of innovation assessed as very important or crucial, by
country
B: Technology factors
Country Ranking Conferences,
meetings,
journals
Technical
institutes
Universities
and higher
education
Government
laboratories
Belgium Total 30 13 12 **
Leaders 32 ** ** **
Laggards 27 ** ** **
Denmark Total 35 15 ** **
Leaders 33 20* ** **
Laggards 53 20* ** **
Germany Total 67 8 27 11
Leaders 71 11 29 14
Laggards 59 4* 19 4*
Ireland Total 31 15 13 10
Leaders 36 18 15 12
Laggards 24 18 9* 9*
Italy Total 13 3 2 3
Leaders 14 3 1* 3
Laggards 16 2* 3 4
Netherlands Total 31 ** 9 5
Leaders 33 ** 6* 4*
Laggards 27 ** 8 8
Norway Total 44 25* 5* 12
Leaders 50 27 ** **
Laggards 53 35 ** **
Spain Total 19# 24# 17 13
Leaders 18# 27# 24 12
Laggards 9*# 16# 6* 6*
Notes: Calculated from CIS data
All figures represent percentages of firms assessing as very important or crucial
# Only partly comparable
* Less reliable data because of low number of observations
**  Non-meaningful data because of low number of observations
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have little importance as a source of information to the innovation process in most countries, for
both leaders and laggards. This does not mean that technological institutes, for instance, have no
importance for the innovation process. They are not the spark setting off the process, but they
may be important in carrying the process through. 
There is no clear conclusion that emerges about the sources used by leaders relative to laggards.
The only obvious difference identified is that leaders tend to use more sources of information
than laggards. This result is based on an analysis of all the 13 sources listed in the questionnaire
as opposed to the 9 reported in the tables.
Across countries we find differences both in how many firms use each single source of
information and in how many firms attach great importance to a broad variety of sources. Thus,
we see that German enterprises both assess more sources as important than in other countries and
also assess the sources as important by more firms than in other countries. The same goes for
Irish and Spanish firms, although not to same extent. More specifically “clients or customers”
are particularly important to German and Irish food and beverages firms. The Italian firms within
this industry assess this source of information as of very low importance. Suppliers are important
to firms in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Ireland, but not to Italian firms. Scientific
inputs from universities and higher education institutions, government laboratories and technical
institutes are relatively important to firms in Germany, Ireland and Spain, but - again -
particularly low in Italy. The latter finding corresponds with that of Malerba (1993), who finds
that public research played a very weak role in innovation in Italy, and also corresponds with
findings in the PACE study.
Large firms tend to use more sources than do other firms. This is however for obvious reasons:
a large firm is more likely to have introduced several innovations and it is likely that different
products or processes require different information sources. It then follows naturally that the
more innovations are introduced, the more sources they tend to use.
The other group of indicators of user-producer interaction mentioned above is acquisition and
transfer of different types of technology, regionally distributed. The questionnaire asks whether
the firms are engaged in various types of sale and purchase or not, rather than undertaking
quantification of these transfers. Results are set out in Tables 7.1.3 and 7.1.4.
In general it seems as if geography matters in terms of where food-processing firms buy their
technology. National purchases are by far the most frequent, followed by acquisition from other
EU countries. US and Japanese sources are not used by many firms in spite of their advanced
technologies. Small and generally technologically less advanced countries, like Denmark and
Ireland, are low in national acquisitions and high in EU acquisitions. On the other hand this is
not the case for Norway, though it is not an EU member. Nevertheless, the size of the economy
seems to be an indication of whether acquisitions take place mainly nationally or from the rest
of the EU or other regions. For example, in Germany and Italy, the share of firms who purchase
technology nationally is more than double that of firms who acquire from the EU. Conclusions
from the literature on globalization resemble those above: the size of the national economy
matters for the geography of technology acquisition.
Table 7.1.3:  Regional sources for the purchase of technology (percentages)
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Country National
source
Other  EU
country
Non-EU
European
USA Japan Other source
Belgium 81 72 21 7 4 1
Denmark 67 59 30 11 4 2
Germany 96 41 8 7 2 4
Ireland 65 71 10 14 7 3
Italy 95 33 5 4 2 2
Netherlands 83 44 9 10 1 1
Norway 93 51 na na na na
Table 7.1.4:  Regional sources for the sale of technology (percentages)
Country National
source
Other  EU
country
Non-EU
European
USA Japan Other
source
Belgium 51 82 57 12 30 24
Denmark 54 39 57 11 7 22
Germany 92 24 13 2 0 7
Ireland 35 29 2 21 0 14
Italy 82 32 20 9 3 7
Netherlands 59 52 43 14 4 20
Norway 98 19 na na na na
With regard to the regions to which firms sell technology, the home country is still the most
important but - as could be expected - not so frequently as for technology purchases. At first sight
it might seem strange that so many more firms buy technology domestically compared to those
selling technology. A national acquisition must also result in national sales. But the tables count
only the number of firms selling or buying technology, not the number of transactions. Therefore,
part of the explanation may be one firm selling to several other firms. Another explanation is that
firms may buy technology from the public sector, e.g. technological institutes, or may buy
technology (e.g. consultancy services) from outside the manufacturing sector. When it comes to
the more distant markets it shows that firms are more prone to sell to non-EU European markets
and other areas rather than to North America and Japan. 
Large firms are generally more active in both types of technology transfer and the difference
relative to smaller firms becomes greater the more distant the country of origin or destination.
There are no patterns in differences between leaders and laggards in either purchases or sales.
In essence, national sales and acquisitions are more important than other sources. This may
indicate some importance of proximity between users and producers but also that the nation state
may have some importance for firms in this sector. This is the issue we now turn to.
7.2  National innovation systems
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Amongst both theorists and policy-makers, the concept of the national innovation system is used
increasingly frequently. The importance of the elements in a national innovation system (NIS)
and the interplay between these elements are now widely recognised. But the concept is still
relatively new and calls for further research and practical use. 
One definition of a national innovation system claims that it is
“... constituted by elements and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion
and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge and that a national system
encompasses elements and relationships, either located within or rooted inside the
borders of a nation state.” (Lundvall, 1992, p 2)
It is furthermore argued that the nation state has two dimensions - the social-cultural and the
étatist-political. It is not necessarily the case that these two dimensions coincide. A nation may
thus be defined by its individual cultural, ethnic and linguistic characteristics, but nations, as they
are generally perceived, differ in their degree of cultural homogeneity.
The public elements in a system include cultural and social conditions, the financial system, the
education system, technological infrastructure and government policies for promoting
innovations. Private elements include the way firms organize innovation internally and their
interaction with other firms or the technological infrastructure to acquire external information
supporting or initiating the innovation process. 
The links between elements of the system may be vital for determining how much innovation the
firms can undertake. A further reason for this is closely related to why user-producer interaction
is better promoted when a certain proximity is present: individuals find it easier to communicate
with people with whom they share culture, language and history. These dimensions often
coincide with national borders, although the European countries are somewhat diverse in this
respect. But what further enhances the importance of nation states is the legislative and political
regulatory systems which are primarily national. In addition, the structure of demand is often to
some extent a result of the historical evolution of both production and broader societal
conditions, as we indicate below.
The notion of a national innovation system is not directly addressed in the CIS. Indirect
indicators include the importance of institutions in barriers to innovation and in information
sources. The latter gave little importance to the supply-side factors in dictating sources -
Germany, Ireland and Spain more than others and Italy much less than others. We also saw (in
Tables 7.1.3 and 7.1.4) that proximity matters in respect of acquisitions and sales of technology.
In the PACE study respondents were asked to list the region of origin of the sources of
information for innovation. The results from this study further enhance our claim that national
innovation systems are of importance, both in general and to the food and beverages industry in
particular. Specifically the PACE study shows that there are national differences in the
importance of domestic versus foreign sources of information, independently of national
differences in industry structure. It is also found that there is a marked effect of cultural distance
in the use of information sources for innovation. For example, the general picture is that sources
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from other European countries are the most important ones, followed by North America and
finally Japan. But sources from North America are of greater importance to the UK firms than
sources from other countries in Europe, which could be explained by the small cultural distance
between the UK and North America as compared to the equivalent distance between the UK and
the rest of Europe. 
One view of the relative importance of national innovation systems for different industries claims
that science-based industries are less dependent on the national innovation system compared to
less science-based industries like the food and beverages industry. The PACE study largely
confirms this view. Out of 16 investigated industries, firms in the food-processing industry come
third in attaching greatest importance to domestic information sources. Public research is
assessed as being very important compared to other industries. Across countries the PACE study
confirms the findings in the present study: German respondents attach great importance to
national sources related to technological infrastructure (technical institutes, universities and
higher education institutions and government laboratories) as opposed to Italian firms
(especially).
7.2.1  National Patterns in Patenting
Further evidence on regional and national tendencies to innovate may be derived from the
patenting patterns. The relevant data are all taken from the numbers of patents granted at the US
Patent Office (USPO) between 1969 and 1994. These data are nowadays available on CD-ROM,
but working the data from CD-ROM into usable results still involves intensive effort (such as has
been required for the company-level data used elsewhere in this Report). However, detailed
analysis of these figures in certain respects has recently become more practicable with the
development of software by Pari Patel of SPRU.
The results of this section are based on country aggregations, as defined by the USPO and
narrowed further by the Patel format. Over the period 1969/94 there were nearly two million
patents granted by this Office, almost 60% of which specified the USA itself as the country of
invention (see Table 7.2.1). The remaining 40% or so were distributed around other countries of
the globe in terms of their country of origin. The basic nature of the data should be stressed from
the outset: that what is being referred to is the source country of the patent, not necessarily the
country of origin of the company carrying out the patenting. For example, patenting from France
may stem from French companies, but may also be from US or Italian companies which
happened to carry out patentable activities in France. Conversely, patents from French companies
may come from France (the majority seem to), but may also come from foreign activities of
French companies, in which case they would be listed under the foreign country. 
Table 7.2.1: Numbers of patents, by technological field
Region/ Country Abbrev. Patents
1969/94
Share
%*
Growth %
1969/73-1990/4
Food Patents
1969/94
Growth %
1969/73-1990/4
All Countries ALL 1953497 100.00 35.07 23022 8.37
Western Europe WE 419814 21.49 26.46 5019 65.09
Eastern Europe EE 12543 0.64 -54.42 111 -20.83
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USA USA 1164474 59.61 1.39 14905 -15.77
Other New World ONW 44905 2.30 74.90 718 68.81
Latin America LA 1870 0.10 30.70 57 60.00
Japan JP 285602 14.62 466.92 1888 179.69
East Asia EA 12153 0.62 49977.78 122 4050.00
Other Regions OT 12136 0.62 148.83 202 21.43
Belgium BE 7299 1.74 22.13 85 -8.00
Switzerland CH 32547 7.75 0.46 544 148.94
Germany DE 162938 38.81 40.39 1346 44.33
Denmark DK 4300 1.02 23.88 129 26.09
Spain ES 2412 0.57 112.46 85 450.00
Finland FI 5655 1.35 436.72 60 625.00
France FR 61656 14.69 44.28 648 65.22
UK GB 69172 16.48 -19.77 935 29.41
Greece GR 240 0.06 -3.64 2 -
Ireland IE 776 0.18 167.00 21 500.00
Italy IT 23398 5.57 80.85 412 213.16
Netherlands NL 19138 4.56 41.11 426 79.37
Norway NO 2475 0.59 48.70 32 -30.00
Austria OE 7555 1.80 51.27 68 40.00
Portugal PT 116 0.03 -4.00 4 200.00
Sweden SE 20137 4.80 -6.30 224 2.50
Notes: * Share of All Countries for Regions; share of Western Europe totals for Countries.
Food patents comprise Food (including sugars), Food and beverage apparatus, and Tobacco.
WE includes only the larger countries of Western Europe (as detailed in the lower panel); EE excludes
East Germany; ONW is Canada, Australia and New Zealand; LA is Brazil and Mexico only; EA is
South Korea and Taiwan only.
A further problem is that, for USPO data, the USA itself is the “home country”. According to the
figures in Table 7.2.1, total patents from US sources have scarcely changed between the initial
quinquennium, 1969/73, and the final one, 1990/4; while the overall totals have risen by more
than one-third. Thus the US share in patenting in the USA has dropped. However this does not
necessarily signify declining competitiveness (in terms of patents granted) for the USA. The
expansion of other countries in their patents and patent shares in US patenting has come about
partly because of growing internationalization, implying that firms of foreign countries have
become more concerned with patenting in the USA, and no doubt in other countries apart from
their own as well. How much of the US relative decline is simply this “home country” effect
cannot be estimated from these data alone. For more recent times, comparisons can be drawn
with patenting at the European Patent Office (EPO), but this too is not undertaken here. For the
EPO, of course, the converse situation would apply regarding European companies.
With such limitations in mind, we can nevertheless draw certain inferences about the country
orientation of patenting. Table 7.2.1, and the remaining tables of this section, list global regions,
and also list separately the major countries of Western Europe. In most of the subsequent tables,
abbreviations will be used for the regions or countries; these are given in the second column of
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this Table. The first two data columns give totals of patents from each of these sources for the
whole period and the associated share (share in Western European total for the specific
countries). The next column gives the simple percentage growth for all patents of the
country/region between the first quinquennium and the final one. The last two columns treat
“food” patents alone, here defined as the sum of food proper, food and beverage apparatus, and
tobacco. 
East Asia (South Korea and Taiwan) shows enormous growth in percentage terms, partly because
of the very small initial base. Japan also shows high rates of growth, and over the period as a
whole received about two-thirds of the numbers of patents granted to Western Europe in total.
Eastern Europe shows an absolute as well as relative decline, of considerable proportions - this
decline actually began in the 1980s before the end of communism, though it has accelerated to
date in the post-communist period. Other regions show a degree of “catching up”, at least as
measured through the growth percentage. A similar “catching up” process is partly evident in
Europe, as shown by the figures for Finland, Spain, Ireland and Italy, both for all patents and for
food patents; although some countries like Portugal and Greece still appear to be excluded in
terms of patenting.
Table 7.2.2 breaks down the column of All Patents in Table 7.2.1 (i.e. first data column), as
percentages by technological field. The columns of fields defined towards the left-hand side of
the Table are regarded as food or food-related, though to lesser degrees as one moves rightwards.
The columns towards the right are regarded as having some possible links with food processing,
though they might be of quite small magnitude relative to all their foci. At the regional level, the
shares of food and food equipment patents appear to be strongly correlated with land availability
- the land-abundant countries of Latin America and the New World contrasting with the land-
scarce countries of East Asia, including Japan. Within Western Europe, there seems to be a
different factor operating, in which countries with considerable histories of machine-based food
production (Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, etc.) feature among those with relatively high shares.
These two factors might well be linked at the regional level, as for instance via the argument of
Hayami and Ruttan (1971), that land-abundant countries adopt machine-intensive methods of
land cultivation, which indeed seems borne out by the column relating to agricultural machinery.
However for tobacco there seems to be surprisingly little link between growing the raw produce
and patenting ways of processing it (see the third column of the Table). Climate appears to have
some impact on the patenting of refrigeration equipment and procedures. 
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Table 7.2.2: Percentage of patents by technological field, 1969/94
Field: Food Food
Eqpt
Tob-
acco
Agric
Machy
Refrig Bio-
tech
Chems Drugs Mater Elect Instrts Other
ALL 74 26 17 65 35 105 1871 272 408 1557 1374 4195
WE 65 29 26 55 18 95 2216 419 402 1169 1177 4330
EE 65 27 5 50 17 147 2364 521 314 622 1570 4299
USA 84 27 17 78 39 104 1854 232 378 1485 1323 4377
ONW 97 44 18 187 40 107 1452 217 371 1026 1133 5307
LA 171 123 11 118 37 64 1759 348 652 642 850 5225
JP 49 12 5 11 39 119 1549 222 559 2541 1883 3010
EA 17 61 22 9 72 25 653 55 184 2186 1749 4967
OT 82 59 26 68 43 174 1626 370 279 913 1466 4895
BE 79 32 5 136 12 141 2683 510 836 1600 743 3224
CH 112 27 29 96 14 94 2870 532 269 749 1320 3888
DE 38 20 24 36 14 80 2495 333 412 995 1194 4358
DK 200 84 16 47 126 333 1719 670 426 735 1063 4584
ES 133 95 25 37 21 95 1542 655 294 522 854 5626
FI 90 16 0 48 2 126 1533 129 302 2874 852 4028
FR 60 30 15 55 14 94 1899 499 372 1569 1143 4250
GB 73 17 46 38 14 95 1952 554 452 1339 1253 4167
GR 0 0 83 42 42 83 2500 292 708 1208 792 4250
IE 142 64 64 90 26 116 1637 438 219 1456 1327 4420
IT 52 74 50 41 32 114 2237 605 387 1138 815 4456
NL 155 52 15 167 21 101 2175 197 406 2335 1060 3314
NO 89 36 4 109 28 137 1240 214 331 792 764 6255
OE 48 40 3 95 19 98 1436 214 426 690 1067 5865
PT 86 86 0 172 0 345 2845 431 172 517 862 4483
SE 74 26 11 55 51 118 1227 213 315 923 1186 5802
Note: All figures are percentages of Regional or National totals.
Key: Fields: Food Eqpt = Food and Beverage Apparatus;
Agric Machy = Agricultural Machinery;
Refrig = Refrigeration;
Biotech = Bioengineering;
Chems = Chemicals;
Drugs = Pharmaceuticals;
Mater = Materials (principally glass and plastics, also superconductors);
Elect = Electronics;
Instrts = Instruments;
Other (includes other machinery, metals, paper and print, textiles, vehicles, construction).
Regions / Countries: see Table 7.2.1.
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The other side of the Hayami-Ruttan argument is that land-deficient countries should focus more
on biological and chemical means of solving agricultural problems. This gets only very limited
support from the Table, probably because food-related aspects are only a minority of the
activities encompassed by these fields. The main factor that seems to account for strength in areas
like biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, at least in looking at patenting by European countries,
would seem to be the science base. However it was implied in Chapter 5 of this Report that
Japanese food companies have shown rapid increases in the proportions of their patenting from
biotechnology and drugs, and to that extent the Hayami-Ruttan argument could be re-established.
Where Japan and East Asia score highly, according to the present table, is in the somewhat
predictable areas of electronics and instrumentation. Western Europe is rather low in these fields.
The next table, Table 7.2.3, shows the change in terms of percentage points between the first sub-
period, here 1969/74, and the final one, which remains as 1990/4. The absolute values of course
influence the extent of change, so to compare columns one might also relate these percentage
point differences to differing means, as in the preceding table. Most regions see a decline in the
food and food-related areas (first three data columns), but Western Europe shows some increase.
All areas except Japan show a rise in the share of biotechnology (in Japan and East Asia it is
being overshadowed by the very rapid growth of total patenting), and a rise in pharmaceuticals
that is generally about twice as large, while other chemicals are relatively shrinking. The regional
specificity of the growth of electronics is evident, and corresponds generally with the pattern of
growth of instruments. Within Western Europe, the growth of biotechnology appears to be fairly
well distributed across countries, though some of the disadvantaged countries like Greece or
Portugal seem to be slipping back in some of the high-tech areas. Food patents have grown
rapidly in Switzerland, the Netherlands and Sweden, as shown in Figure 7.1.
Table 7.2.4 gives the shares in patenting in each of the fields displayed.. The USA shares are
influenced by the “home country” factor described above. Its shares are highest for the categories
of agricultural machinery, refrigeration and food, which supports the view of the US as still a
resource-based economy (Wright, 1990). The percentages are of course affected by the levels of
aggregation, which are here much more detailed in such fields as compared with chemicals,
electronics, etc. For Western Europe, the highest shares are for drugs and tobacco; while the
lowest shares apart from refrigeration go to electronics, agricultural machinery, instruments, food
and biotechnology. Considerable variability is evident across particular European countries. This
is also the case for food patents as displayed in Figure 7.2. The same figure illuminates an
argument that we put forward earlier: the CIS data are not covering all the major players in food
and beverages. The UK, France, and Switzerland especially, also Sweden, are among the
countries most active in food patenting, but they are not adequately represented in the CIS data.
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Figure 7.1: Change in Food patent shares for Western European major players, 1969/74
        to1990/94,%
Figure 7.2: Share of Food patents for Western European major players, 1969/74
       to1990/94,%
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Table 7.2.3: Change in Patent Shares, by Technological Field, 1969/74 to 1990/4, %
Field: Food Food
Eqpt
Tob-
acco
Agric
Machy
Refrig Bio-
tech
Chem
s
Drugs Mater Elect Instrts Other
ALL -0.11 -0.10 -0.04 -0.44 0.06 1.13 -3.99 2.60 0.69 5.83 3.24 -8.89
WE 0.25 0.01 0.02 -0.13 -0.02 1.09 -2.68 4.42 0.51 1.05 1.34 -5.86
EE 0.55 -0.13 0.24 0.17 0.23 1.70 2.15 12.98 -0.51 -2.69 1.81 -16.49
USA -0.08 -0.11 -0.03 -0.47 0.06 1.45 -3.01 2.56 0.32 3.51 2.90 -7.10
ONW 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.42 0.24 1.53 -4.24 2.35 0.73 0.39 3.49 -4.06
LA -0.16 1.08 0.00 -0.30 1.12 0.88 -9.96 -0.01 0.78 -1.39 -1.89 9.85
JP -0.43 -0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.15 -0.63 -7.97 1.20 1.15 11.75 1.72 -6.87
EA 0.16 0.55 -7.79 0.09 0.74 0.28 -5.33 0.57 -2.07 5.78 10.13 -3.10
OT -0.67 -0.18 -0.51 -0.64 0.11 1.52 -3.98 3.68 -1.09 6.44 5.30 -9.97
BE 0.33 -0.52 -0.06 -0.51 -0.18 1.99 4.02 6.65 0.56 -10.75 1.59 -3.14
CH 0.71 0.24 0.12 -0.64 0.00 1.06 -8.13 2.59 0.78 -0.34 1.01 2.62
DE -0.12 -0.01 0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.87 -2.43 3.16 0.98 -0.08 0.46 -2.96
DK -0.12 -0.01 -0.10 0.83 -0.32 4.86 -3.41 14.50 0.37 -3.20 3.75 -17.13
ES 1.07 1.52 -0.10 -0.47 0.04 1.44 -1.16 5.28 -2.04 -0.89 5.57 -10.27
FI 0.46 -0.38 -- 0.05 0.00 1.22 2.70 1.65 1.88 7.41 1.76 -16.75
FR 0.38 -0.09 -0.16 0.07 0.03 1.05 -3.07 4.86 0.71 4.16 0.91 -8.86
GB 0.35 -0.10 0.19 0.00 0.04 1.36 -2.68 8.17 -0.40 2.72 4.19 -13.83
GR -- -- 1.89 0.00 -1.39 3.77 0.31 0.50 -8.73 -2.96 8.15 -1.55
IE 0.27 0.75 0.37 -0.48 0.37 1.39 -6.82 7.87 -2.40 18.84 1.89 -22.06
IT 0.21 0.36 0.29 0.09 -0.12 0.87 -6.41 6.28 0.09 -1.33 2.36 -2.67
NL 0.68 -0.14 -0.04 -1.39 -0.16 1.20 -1.91 1.60 0.06 1.97 4.97 -6.84
NO -0.63 -0.63 0.17 -0.98 -0.45 1.60 -4.12 4.53 -2.91 0.47 1.13 1.82
OE -0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.23 1.48 2.59 3.18 1.01 -1.07 -0.22 -6.64
PT 4.17 -3.23 -- 8.33 -- -6.45 11.69 12.50 4.17 -5.51 -22.58 -3.09
SE 0.44 -0.12 -0.17 0.31 -0.42 1.07 -2.03 2.32 0.85 0.92 4.20 -7.37
Note: All figures represent changes in the field‘s share in total regional or national patenting between the beginning and end 
periods defined.
          --  indicates no patents in this field.
          For abbreviations and definitions, see Tables 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.
The patterns are more easily identified from Table 7.2.5, which computes the “Revealed
Technological Advantage” (RTA) for each case. The RTA is now a well-known measure of
comparative technological advantage, being the relative share of a country in a particular
technology - relative, that is, to the country’s own totals and to world averages. USA figures tend
to lie close to unity, the median value, because of the large-country effect. In food, Western and
Eastern Europe, Japan and East Asia all lie below unity, indicating a comparative disadvantage;
though for food equipment, only Japan lies in this category. Other regional patterns are as already
described, with Western Europe being below average in biotechnology, electronics and
instruments, among other things. For the individual West European countries, we see in Figure
7.3 that Germany is well below average in food and food equipment, while Austria, Italy and
France are also low in terms of food patents. Denmark and the Netherlands top the RTAs for
food, with Ireland, Spain and Switzerland also with high levels.
Figure 7.3: RTA for Food products for Western European major players, 1969/74
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       to1990/94,% RTA.
The list of countries indicates a variety of possible reasons, but what does seem apparent is the
niche that the industry offers for technological development in medium-sized countries.
Agricultural machinery is generally correlated with food, though Denmark and Spain are
exceptions to this (Denmark pulls up in refrigeration). In biotechnology, again Germany fares
badly and Denmark does very well, while in drugs most of the larger European countries (apart
from Sweden and the Netherlands) perform well. Conversely in electronics, most of the large
countries are below average, while in instruments all the West European countries are below
average. In the light of what we have had to say in Chapter 5 about the importance of
instrumentation, this appears rather worrying. 
Table 7.2.4: Percentage Share of Countries in All or West European Patents, by Technological
Field, 1969/94
Field: Food Food
Eqpt
Tob-
acco
Agric
Machy
Refrig Bio-
tech
Chems Drugs Mater Elect Instrts Other
WE 18.74 23.45 32.43 18.06 11.24 19.53 25.35 32.90 21.12 16.42 18.35 22.16
EE 0.56 0.66 0.18 0.50 0.31 0.90 0.81 1.23 0.49 0.26 0.73 0.66
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USA 67.00 62.02 58.93 71.43 67.25 59.37 59.10 50.96 55.36 56.73 57.45 62.20
ONW 3.01 3.86 2.46 6.63 2.64 2.34 1.78 1.84 2.09 1.51 1.90 2.91
LA 0.22 0.45 0.06 0.17 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.12
JP 9.64 6.72 4.21 2.48 16.40 16.62 12.11 11.97 20.07 23.81 20.05 10.49
EA 0.14 1.44 0.80 0.09 1.28 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.28 0.87 0.79 0.74
OT 0.68 1.40 0.92 0.65 0.77 1.03 0.54 0.85 0.42 0.36 0.66 0.72
BE 2.13 1.91 0.37 4.33 1.18 2.57 2.11 2.13 3.63 2.33 1.10 1.30
CH 13.33 7.23 8.60 13.72 6.04 7.62 10.09 9.93 5.22 4.87 8.72 6.97
DE 22.92 27.35 35.96 25.47 29.40 32.51 43.90 31.08 39.97 32.39 39.52 39.11
DK 3.16 2.99 0.64 0.87 7.09 3.57 0.80 1.65 1.09 0.63 0.93 1.09
ES 1.18 3.91 0.55 0.39 0.66 0.57 0.40 0.91 0.42 0.25 0.42 0.75
FI 1.87 0.75 0.00 1.18 0.13 1.77 0.94 0.42 1.02 3.25 0.98 1.25
FR 13.55 15.38 8.60 14.85 11.42 14.47 12.64 17.65 13.65 19.32 14.31 14.43
GB 18.44 9.73 28.91 11.40 12.34 16.42 14.58 22.00 18.61 18.51 17.61 15.87
GR 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.06
IE 0.40 0.42 0.46 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.14 0.20 0.10 0.23 0.21 0.19
IT 4.48 14.38 10.70 4.24 9.84 6.67 5.65 8.12 5.38 5.32 3.87 5.74
NL 10.91 8.31 2.65 13.98 5.38 4.82 4.49 2.16 4.62 8.93 4.12 3.49
NO 0.81 0.75 0.09 1.18 0.92 0.85 0.33 0.30 0.49 0.39 0.38 0.85
OE 1.32 2.49 0.18 3.15 1.84 1.85 1.17 0.93 1.91 1.04 1.64 2.44
PT 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
SE 5.47 4.32 2.10 4.81 13.39 5.92 2.67 2.45 3.77 3.71 4.85 6.43
Note: Regional figures (top panel) are percentages of All patenting; Country figures (bottom panel) are 
shares in West Europe totals.
     For abbreviations and definitions, see Tables 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.
The remaining tables in this section undertake correlation and cluster analyses of these panels
of data in Table 7.2.5 just described. Because of the problems of handling the RTA index, i.e.
its tendency to produce a non-normal distribution, especially for small countries or fields, the
correlations and clusters have used transformed data. The transformation employed is a simple
one, with the RTAs transformed to the value of the natural logarithm of (RTA + 1). Apart from
correcting for some lognormality in the raw data, this transformation also has the advantage of
producing very similar results to transformations aimed specifically at inducing normality, such
as the arctan distribution. The median value is now ln(2), i.e. 0.693, rather than 1, but that can
be corrected by another very simple transformation if required. Several of the correlations were
also run on untransformed data, with little significant effect on the results.
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Table 7.2.5: Revealed Technological Advantage (RTA) by Region or Country, 1969/94
Field: Food Food
Eqpt
Tob-
acco
Agric
Machy
Refrig Bio-
tech
Chems Drugs Mater Elect Instrts Other
WE 0.87 1.10 1.53 0.84 0.53 0.91 1.18 1.54 0.99 0.75 0.86 1.03
EE 0.88 1.03 0.28 0.77 0.48 1.40 1.26 1.92 0.77 0.40 1.14 1.02
USA 1.12 1.04 0.99 1.20 1.13 1.00 0.99 0.85 0.93 0.95 0.96 1.04
ONW 1.31 1.68 1.07 2.88 1.15 1.02 0.78 0.80 0.91 0.66 0.82 1.27
LA 2.30 4.68 0.62 1.81 1.08 0.61 0.94 1.28 1.60 0.41 0.62 1.25
JP 0.66 0.46 0.29 0.17 1.12 1.14 0.83 0.82 1.37 1.63 1.37 0.72
EA 0.23 2.32 1.28 0.14 2.06 0.24 0.35 0.20 0.45 1.40 1.27 1.18
OT 1.10 2.26 1.48 1.05 1.23 1.66 0.87 1.36 0.68 0.59 1.07 1.17
BE 1.07 1.20 0.32 2.09 0.35 1.35 1.43 1.88 2.05 1.03 0.54 0.77
CH 1.50 1.02 1.67 1.49 0.41 0.89 1.53 1.96 0.66 0.48 0.96 0.93
DE 0.52 0.77 1.39 0.55 0.40 0.76 1.33 1.22 1.01 0.64 0.87 1.04
DK 2.69 3.18 0.94 0.72 3.61 3.17 0.92 2.47 1.04 0.47 0.77 1.09
ES 1.78 7.41 1.44 0.57 0.60 0.91 0.82 2.41 0.72 0.34 0.62 1.34
FI 1.21 0.61 -- 0.74 0.05 1.20 0.82 0.48 0.74 1.85 0.62 0.96
FR 0.81 1.14 0.88 0.85 0.41 0.90 1.01 1.84 0.91 1.01 0.83 1.01
GB 0.98 0.64 2.64 0.58 0.39 0.91 1.04 2.04 1.11 0.86 0.91 0.99
GR -- -- 4.82 0.64 1.20 0.79 1.34 1.07 1.74 0.78 0.58 1.01
IE 1.91 2.45 3.72 1.39 0.74 1.11 0.87 1.61 0.54 0.94 0.97 1.05
IT 0.70 2.81 2.89 0.64 0.92 1.09 1.20 2.23 0.95 0.73 0.59 1.06
NL 2.09 1.99 0.88 2.57 0.62 0.96 1.16 0.73 1.00 1.50 0.77 0.79
NO 1.20 1.38 0.23 1.68 0.81 1.31 0.66 0.79 0.81 0.51 0.56 1.49
OE 0.64 1.51 0.15 1.47 0.53 0.93 0.77 0.79 1.05 0.44 0.78 1.40
PT 1.16 3.28 -- 2.65 -- 3.29 1.52 1.59 0.42 0.33 0.63 1.07
SE 1.00 0.98 0.66 0.84 1.46 1.12 0.66 0.78 0.77 0.59 0.86 1.38
Note: All figures are RTAs relative to world totals and field shares.
     The RTA is calculated as the share of the field in the country or regional total divided by the  
field‘s share in the overall total (see Table 7.2.2). 
     --  indicates no patents in this field.
     For abbreviations and definitions see Tables 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.
The correlations displayed in these tables are shown as their probability levels, given the number
of degrees of freedom, in order to make comparisons most evident. Negative simple correlations
are shown by minus signs in front of the probability levels. Values significant at the .05 (5%)
level are shown in bold type. Cases where the untransformed data gave significant results while
the transformed data (as shown) did not are marked with asterisks. Because of the nature of the
RTA data, where the values are not independent of one another, negative as well as positive
correlations are very likely. Strictly speaking, this lack of independence invalidates the regression
analysis deployed, but the infringements involved are unlikely to be serious enough to undermine
the broad conclusions.
The cluster analyses are carried out as in Section 6.3 of this Report, using the K-means
procedure. The number of clusters (K) varies between 2 and 5, and is the result of
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experimentation with the data. The two panels display which field or country/region is assigned
to which cluster, and secondly display the F values for discriminating between the relevant
country/region or field in terms of this assignment to a cluster. Thus in Table 7.2.6, the bottom
panel shows that the USA, Other New World, Latin America and Japan were significant at the
.05 level or better in assigning the chosen technological fields of the first panel to the first case,
of two clusters. In this particular example, the second of the two clusters was composed of food,
food equipment and agricultural machinery, hence the high values recorded for the USA etc.
RTAs in these areas plus low values for Japan have dictated the outcome. Similar arguments
prevail in all other cases.
Tables 7.2.6 and 7.2.7 use regional data, i.e. the upper panel of Table 7.2.5 (transformed). The
correlations in Table 7.2.6 show strong positive relationships between the “land-abundant”
countries of the USA, Other New World, and Latin America, and one strong negative correlation
with the “land-scarce” country of Japan. This supports the findings already described. As just
noted in the example, the cluster analysis at the level of 2 clusters does likewise. The 4-cluster
level shows another cluster of fields relating to electronics, instruments, refrigeration, along with
tobacco, in which West Europe generally does rather badly (though - probably because of the
tobacco - its impact is not significant).
Table 7.2.6: Correspondences among regional data, by region
1) Correlation coefficient probabilities (zero-order)
Region: WE EE USA ONW LA JP EA
EE .297
USA -0.059 -0.264
ONW -0.609 -0.739 0.002
LA 0.860 0.562 0.256 0.044
JP -0.177 0.811 -0.102 -0.004 -0.118
EA -0.451 -0.108 0.879 -0.753 0.828 0.69
OT 0.344 0.398 0.698 0.282 0.131* -0.105 0.418
Notes: All figures represent probabilities of not rejecting the null hypothesis of no correlation 
(n = 12). Minus signs in front indicate negative simple correlations.
All data based on transformed RTAs (= ln(RTA + 1)).
Bold data show significant positive or negative correlations at 0.05 level.
* indicates correlation significant at 0.05 level using untransformed RTAs.
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2) Cluster Analysis
Cluster Membership:     2 Clusters     4 Clusters
  Food 2 4
  Food Equipment 2 2
  Tobacco 1 1
  Agricultural Machinery 2 4
  Refrigeration 1 1
  Biotechnology 1 3
  Chemicals 1 3
  Drugs 1 3
  Materials 1 3
  Electronics 1 1
  Instruments 1 1
  Other Fields 1 3
 Discriminating probability (F values)   2 Clusters        4 Clusters
  West Europe .702 .611
  East Europe .981 .104
  USA .023 .077
  Other New World .002 .038
  Latin America .002 .001
  Japan .034 .256
  East Asia .727 .002
  Other Regions .302 .192
Table 7.2.7 examines these data by field rather than by region. Relatively high patenting in food
is positively correlated with agricultural machinery and negatively with instruments and
electronics Food and beverage apparatus is significantly correlated only with Other fields, no
doubt because the latter are dominated by mechanical engineering. Agricultural machinery is also
correlated with Other fields at the 10% level, and negatively with instruments at almost the 1%
level. Tobacco has no significant correlations, while refrigeration has strong negative correlations
with chemicals and drugs, despite being in part a chemicals technology. As expected, chemicals
and drugs are themselves very strongly intercorrelated. The clusters isolate Japan and East Asia
at the 2-cluster level, with electronics and instruments evidently important in this outcome (also
food at the .05 level).
Table 7.2.7: Correspondences among regional data, by technological field
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1) Correlation coefficient probabilities (zero-order)
  Field:    Food   Food   Tob- Agric Refrig Bio-      Chems Drugs Mater Elect Instrts
  Eqpt   acco Machy tech
Food Eq.     .207
Tobacco    -.778    .487
Agric M.     .015    .318   .675
Refrig     -.451    .374   .468 -.614
Biotech      .546   -.296  -.631  .594 -.145
Chems      .211   -.483  -.476  .442 -.000 .071
Drugs      .192   -.864  -.569  .453 -.003 .056 .001
Mater.      .069    .900  -.215  .503 -.434 .814 .290 .428
Elect.     -.047   -.238 1.000 -.056  .160       -.370       -.115        -.032 -.770
Instrts     -.007   -.108  -.573 -.011  .538 .820       -.399        -.396 -.242  .063
Other      .352    .015   .167  .092  .539       -.471      -.578         -.857 -.460 -.137 -.098
Notes: as for Table 7.2.6, except n = 8; correlations of untransformed data not calculated.
  2) Cluster Analysis
Cluster Membership:     2 Clusters     4 Clusters
  West Europe 2 4
  East Europe 2 4
  USA 2 4
  Other New World 2 4
  Latin America 2 2
  Japan 1 1
  East Asia 1 3
  Other Regions 2 1
Discriminating probability (F values)   2 Clusters     4 Clusters
  Food           .043          .006
  Food Equipment            .557          .038
  Tobacco           .624          .480
  Agricultural Machinery           .020          .190
  Refrigeration           .125          .340
  Biotechnology           .236          .072
  Chemicals           .052          .097
  Drugs           .046          .177
  Materials           .747          .011
  Electronics           .004          .045
  Instruments           .039          .051
  Other Fields           .220          .056
Tables 7.2.8 and 7.2.9, give the results for West European countries, i.e. the lower panel of Table
7.2.5. The correlations of country data in Table 7.2.8 do not always make a great deal of sense,
for example in showing Greece as being positively correlated only with Germany and the UK,
or Portugal with Belgium, Norway and Austria. The cluster analyses give some information on
why this is so, especially when it is recalled from the discussion of Table 7.2.5 that there was a
large amount of variability evident in the raw data across European countries. Cluster
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membership of the various fields is very unstable as one goes from the 2-cluster analysis to the
5-cluster one. However at both of these levels, the extremes of Table 7.2.8, there is a group of
food, agricultural machinery, biotechnology, drugs and other fields (also food equipment in the
2-cluster assignment). From the summary of the ANOVA table, we can see that it is basically the
smaller countries that are dictating the results (especially Spain, Greece, Ireland, Norway and
Portugal) - hence the instability.
Analyses of the same panel of data at the level of technological fields, in Table 7.2.9, are in a way
simpler, because there is only one significant positive correlation, namely that between food and
food equipment. This is another reflection of the variability across countries. Study of the cluster
memberships in the second panel reveals, as expected from what has just been said, many strange
bedfellows. At the 2-cluster level, this is because tobacco is the only significant determinant.
When we move to the 4 or 5 cluster level, we can see that other food-related areas plus
biotechnology come in as significant determinants, and with odd exceptions the patterns of
cluster membership begin to make rather greater sense. The overriding impression however
remains one of cross-country diversity.
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Table 7.2.8: Correspondences among West European data, by country
1) Correlation coefficient probabilities (zero-order)
  Ctry:   BE  CH   DE  DK   ES   FI   FR   GB   GR   IE   IT
CH .399
DE .835 .088
DK         -.863       -.913        -.282
ES .808 .260 .617  .076
FI .140        -.579       -.497         -.468       -.602
FR .078 .063 .046 -.835 .130  .490
GB          -.851 .035 .002 -.532       -.650 -.372  .066
GR          -.375 .753 .037 -.248       -.265 -.066 -.866  .025
IE            -.431 .037 .453  .625  .031 -.253  .440  .024  .690
IT -.761 .178 .060  .344  .006 -.091  .111  .047  .294  .009
NL  .150 .499        -.179 -.776  .461  .166 -.961 -.275 -.060  .387 -.653
NO  .131 .977        -.150  .245  .368  .277  .967 -.058 -.023 -.713 -.500
OE  .052       -.977        -.653  .743  .302  .348  .501 -.105 -.062 -.442 -.701
PT  .031  .251       -.869  .348  .134  .205  .173 -.450 -.044  .739  .759
SE -.322 -.246       -.127  .034  .717 -.615 -.161 -.098 -.357 -.540 -.614
(cont‘d)   NL  NO   OE   PT
NO  .112
OE  .247  .000
PT  .096  .006   .007
SE -.451  .052 -.266  .771
Notes: as for Table 7.2.6. For country abbreviations see Table 7.2.1.
2) Cluster Analysis
Cluster Membership: 2 Clusters 3 Clusters 4 Clusters 5 Clusters
  Food      2       1        4         1
  Food Equipment      2             2        2         2
  Tobacco      1       3        3         3
  Agricultural machinery      2       1        4         1
  Refrigeration      1       1        1         5
  Biotechnology      2       1        4         1
  Chemicals      1       1        4         4
  Drugs      2       2        2         1
  Materials      1       1        4         4
  Electronics      1       1        4         4
  Instruments      1       1        1         4
  Other Fields      2       1        4         1
              Table continued overleaf.
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Table 7.2.8 (cont’d); 2) Cluster Analysis (cont’d)
Discriminating probability 2 Clusters 3 Clusters 4 Clusters 5 Clusters
  Belgium     .183     .208      .022      .218
  Switzerland     .205     .274      .304      .229
  Germany     .570     .232      .320      .275
  Denmark     .138     .315      .450      .082
  Spain     .074     .004      .013      .006
  Finland     .387     .117      .017      .065
  France     .198     .046      .021      .284
  UK     .785     .023      .043      .058
  Greece     .063     .016      .050      .022
  Ireland     .341     .003      .009      .002
  Italy     .664     .000      .000      .056
  Netherlands     .183     .851      .447      .558
  Norway     .001     .148      .169      .011
  Austria     .034     .076      .120      .064
  Portugal     .003     .157      .102      .021
  Sweden     .216     .596      .553      .065
Note: discriminating probability based on F values from ANOVA table.
Table 7.2.9: Correspondences among West European data, by technological field
1) Correlation coefficient probabilities (zero-order)
  Field:    Food   Food   Tob-  Agric Refrig Bio-       Chems Drugs Mater  Elect Instrts
  Eqpt   acco Machy tech
Food Eq.     .007
Tobacco    -.386   -.635
Agric M.     .254    .557 -.064
Refrig      .425    .634  .248 -.219
Biotech      .087    .111 -.105  .209  .353
Chems     -.386   -.561  .418  .324 -.220  .751
Drugs     -.356    .058  .114 -.398  .435  .390  .173
Mater     -.086   -.074  .512 -.643  .431 -.350  .358  .912
Elect      .950   -.108 -.970  .909 -.315 -.254 -.990 -.114  .370
Instrts      .376   -.666  .279 -.636  .775 -.398 -.856  .683 -.187 -.934
Other    -.794    .336 -.511 -.395  .313  .923 -.002 -.521 -.180 -.010 -.811
Notes: as for Table 7.2.6, except n = 16; correlations of untransformed data not calculated.
Table continued overleaf.
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Table 7.2.9 (cont’d):  2) Cluster Analysis
Cluster Membership: 2 Clusters 3 Clusters 4 Clusters 5 Clusters
  Belgium        1        1        1        3
  Switzerland        2        1        1        3
  Germany        2        3        3        2
  Denmark        1        2        4        4
  Spain        1        2        4        5
  Finland        1        1        1        3
  France        1        1        1        3
  UK        2        3        3        2
  Greece        2        3        3        2
  Ireland        2        2        4        5
  Italy        2        2        4        5
  Netherlands        1        1        1        3
  Norway        1        1        1        3
  Austria        1        1        1        3
  Portugal        1        1        2        1
  Sweden        1        1        1        3
Discriminating probability 2 Clusters 3 Clusters 4 Clusters 5 Clusters
  Food     .164      .021      .061      .055
  Food Equipment     .207      .001      .001      .002
  Tobacco     .000      .002      .005      .006
  Agricultural Machinery     .155      .021      .016      .041
  Refrigeration     .963      .152      .164      .006
  Biotechnology     .112      .368      .013      .000
  Chemicals     .106      .483      .267      .435
  Drugs     .289      .049      .088      .167
  Materials     .804      .278      .151      .215
  Electronics     .940      .695      .424      .578
  Instruments      .162      .866      .874      .945
  Other Fields     .352      .774      .920      .972
Note: discriminating probability based on F values from ANOVA table.
Two broad conclusions for Western Europe emerge from this scrutiny of the patent data,
conducted on country or regional bases rather than corporate ones. The first is that Western
Europe has generally fared reasonably well in patenting in food and food-related areas. This has
been associated over the period studied here with a strong performance in pharmaceuticals, and
to the extent that pharmaceuticals act as a “paradigm” for the food-processing industry, that may
be some comfort. However if our analysis of trends elsewhere in this Report is valid, and if new
paradigms like biotechnology, electronics and instrumentation come to hold sway over food
technology, then West Europe’s broad disadvantages in these areas could become stumbling
blocks.
The second conclusion is that food processing does have some inherent a priori advantages for
disseminating industrialization across countries. Many currently advanced countries began their
industrialization from strengths in this area. However, in recent times - at least so far as the
127
patents evidence goes - these benefits have been reaped more by the medium-sized countries of
Western Europe than by the smallest and most disadvantaged.
7.2.2  R&D and the NIS
R&D collaborations with different types of partners also indicate some importance of the NIS.
Calculated from CIS data, Table 7.2.10 below shows R&D collaboration by partners in different
countries as a percentage of R&D-performing firms. They are distributed according to four types
of partner. 
The results show that generally domestic partners are preferred as partners in R&D projects. But
if we disregard the German and Dutch cases, then domestic partners and foreign private partners
are equally frequently used. Again we find that German firms benefit from the national
technological infrastructure. 44% of R&D-performing firms in the German food and beverages
industry have some R&D collaboration with domestic public partners, the highest proportion in
this category. On the other hand Germany has the smallest share of firms collaborating with
foreign partners. In Denmark and Ireland foreign partners are relatively frequently used, which
may reflect the smaller sizes of the economies: firms are more likely to find a partner with
competencies matching their own in a large country than in a small country. 
Table 7.2.10: Share of collaborations according to type of partner, among R&D-performing
firms, percentages
Country Domestic,
private
Foreign,
private
Domestic,
public
Foreign,
public
Other
partners
Belgium 30 28 34 11 0
Denmark# 45 40 26 12 3
Germany# 29 10 44 5 0
Ireland# 26 33 25 17 2
Netherlands# 41 13 24 4 5
Norway# 28 26 23 4 5
Notes:  Greece, Italy and Spain not comparable
# based on the original datasets
Compared to other industries we find that food-processing is more oriented towards the domestic
partners than many other industries. This is also the case for other low-tech industries. This
finding may relate to the fact that forefront research usable for high-tech industries is increasingly
international in character. It may also perhaps be the case that, in the high-tech industries, foreign
partners are often sought in order to limit competition. 
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The industry differences are shown for selected industries below. Because of the low number of
observations on this question, calculations on the original datasets in each of the comparable
countries are used. 
Table 7.2.11: Share of R&D collaborations with domestic private partners, among R&D 
performing firms in selected industries, percentages
NACE code  Industry Denmark W.
Germany
Ireland Netherlands Norway Mean
15-16 Food &
beverages 45 29 26 41 28 34
23-25 Chemical, oil,
rubber 36 34 20 43 52 37
28 Iron & metal
42 30 24 47 54 39
29.3, 29.5,
29.7
Machinery*
39 29 18 28 33 29
30, 32 Office
machy,
Telecoms
61 29 24 43 17 35
Note: * Machinery excluding motors, machine tools, weapons
Calculated from the original CIS dataset
Table 7.2.12: Share of R&D collaborations with foreign private partners, among R&D
performing firms in selected industries, percentages
NACE code  Industry Denmark W.
Germany
Ireland Netherlands Norway Mean
15-16 Food &
beverages 40 10 33 13 26 24
23-25 Chemical, oil,
rubber 48 22 31 54 30 37
28 Iron & metal
28 18 26 21 23 23
29.3, 29.5,
29.7
Machinery*
47 17 12 17 51 29
30, 32 Office
machy,
Telecoms
61 19 32 43 5 32
Note: * Machinery excluding motors, machine tools, weapons
Calculated from the original CIS dataset
Tables 7.2.11 and 7.2.12 show that the low-tech industries, metallurgy and food and beverages,
cooperate in R&D with domestic partners to an extent similar to firms in high-tech industries.
But when it comes to foreign partners these two industries are below other industries. As between
leaders and laggards we find no marked differences in the propensity to collaborate in R&D.
A preliminary conclusion from the CIS data is that the NIS indeed is important for the industry.
But the importance is greater on the market side than on the supply side. For example, we saw
that information sources like technological institutes, universities and government laboratories -
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     22 See Askegaard and Madsen (1993) for further elaboration.
information sources that are important parts of a national innovation system - are of less
importance to firms than are their customers and suppliers. Likewise we saw that R&D
collaboration is less frequent with public partners than private partners, and less frequent with
foreign partners than domestic partners. This result is plausible in the light of the great
importance of suppliers and end-users to this industry. 
In spite of these trends, we shall argue that a national innovation system is not limited to the
interplay among firms, between firms and institutions, the legal system, etc. What matters
particularly in this industry are also the cultural and historical patterns of demand. Thus, we shall
argue that the global competition and internationalization of consumption patterns has not wiped
out nationally and regionally based habits of food and beverage consumption, which were
touched upon in Chapter 5. 
The CIS data are not adequate for establishing this argument. Instead we shall include data from
another harmonized questionnaire send out by Centre de Communication Avancé. This research
aimed at investigating the lifestyles of people in 15 European countries (12 EU and 4 EFTA;
Luxembourg is analytically treated as a region of Belgium). The questionnaire was answered by
about 20,000 respondents, and 138 questions related to food. The 15 countries were subdivided
into 79 regions and this disaggregation allows investigating to what extent regions coincide with
nation-states. 
In the analysis22 of the data, factor analysis and clustering of regions reduced the number of
regions into ‘food-habit homogeneous’ regions. First, the 138 food-related questions were
grouped into 41 items by means of factor analysis. Second, the 79 regions were clustered into 12
new, relatively homogeneous regions. In the process of clustering the regions, the degree of
homogeneity of the clusters is displayed. The most homogeneous regions with respect to food
and drink culture are Denmark, Sweden, West Germany except Bavaria, and Switzerland except
francophone Switzerland. The Netherlands, Great Britain and France are also rather
homogeneous, whereas Belgium, Portugal, Greece and Italy are heterogeneous countries. In
addition, French Switzerland is very different from the rest of Switzerland and Bavaria is very
different from the rest of Germany. 
Of the 12 clusters, 7 coincide with nation-states: Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Italy and Greece. The remaining 5 clusters are cross-national: the British Isles; the Netherlands
and Flanders; France and francophone Switzerland; Germany, Austria and German-speaking
Switzerland; Brussels, Wallonia and Luxembourg. 
Two features of the resulting clusters are of particular interest in our context. There is a large
degree of overlap between national borders and regional food culture. A further aspect of this is
that language borders and regions of food culture coincide. In fact there are only very minor
exceptions to this result. The other interesting feature is that nation-states on the periphery of
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     23 In Askegaard and Madsen (1993) it is explained what the actual content of these patterns are.
Europe tend to have their own food and drink culture, whereas the nations of Continental Europe
are more likely to have cross-national cultural patterns.23 
In a wider perspective it can be concluded that, in spite of internationalization trends, Europe is
not homogeneous with respect to food and drink culture. Far from it: there are large differences
both in the actual content of the culture and in the degree of homogeneity of the nations.
Furthermore, the national borders are of great importance in distinguishing different cultures. The
large degree of overlap between linguistic regions and food culture regions suggests that the
consumption patterns are deeply rooted in the historical and cultural development of the nations.
The results clearly indicate that the national consumption patterns are important for the
development of the industry. If firms within the industry are to expand through export markets,
the national differences will be important to take into account. In recent years barriers to free
trade have decreased, better logistics and distribution systems have been developed as have better
methods for preserving and packing of food and beverages. All these factors ease consumer
access to products from abroad and consequently the access for foreign firms to national markets.
But this is no more than the physical access to the markets. It is clear from the above that cultural
barriers also exist and persist despite trends towards internationalization. If the national
innovation system includes the historical, culturally rooted pattern of demand, it follows directly
that the latter is of particular importance to this industry, and indirectly limits the extent of
market innovation. 
This fits with what might be expected from a so-called low-tech industry. It could be argued that
industries where innovations are heavily dependent on new scientific developments would be less
reliant on the national innovation system - in particular the parts of the system which support
research, general education, interplay between universities and industry, etc. Some empirical
evidence for this assertion is implied in the discussion above on partners for R&D cooperation.
However, the more informal institutions are important elements of a national innovation system,
and are not necessarily related to high-tech industries. Furthermore, the principal effect of an NIS
is to increase the ability of firms to take advantage of new scientific developments and to diffuse
the use of technologies to those firms who might benefit from such technologies. As previously
argued, the innovation process in food and beverages is precisely characterised by combining
different, interdisciplinary levels of scientific progress. This further enhances our argument: the
NIS is particularly important to food-processing for reasons related to both demand- and supply-
side features.
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8. Implications for innovation policy
The policy implications to be drawn from this wide-ranging consideration of data, both
from the CIS and from other sources, will be considered at the levels successively of the
firm, the nation-state, and supranational bodies (especially the EU).
Although this is a convenient way of separating the circumstances of policy-makers, it
should also be recognised that our study draws fairly similar types of conclusion at each
level: micro, macro, and international. Our overriding conclusion is thus along the lines
that a co-ordinated policy would involve undertaking more or less parallel strategies at
each level.
The two most consistent findings throughout the Report are somewhat at odds with the
conventional wisdom regarding the food-processing industry. The first is that, though
there is an element of truth involved in seeing this as a rather "low-tech" industry, it is
one that is coming to confront an increasingly complex set of technological conditions.
Instead of being dominated by one major type of supplier - the producer of food-
processing machinery - as it seemed appropriate to envisage it as recently as a decade ago
(e.g. Pavitt, 1984), it is coming to be strongly influenced by a broad range of upstream
technological "suppliers". It may be expected to be crucially important which firms and
which countries succeed best at integrating this ever-broadening technological context
into the production of the industry's products. It may equally be expected that this would
involve the active inclusion of the industry into technological development, in place of
the somewhat passive role assigned by the conventional "supplier-dominated"
perspective. 
The second finding partly underlies the first, and is probably the most important
conclusion of this Report. It is that the industry is shifting from being a supply-focused,
process-oriented industry towards being a demand-focused, product-oriented industry.
More precisely, our findings, and notably those from the CIS data, suggest a high degree
of complementarity between process innovation and product innovation. In this
mutuality, both ends are to a degree acting as driving forces, with the supply side being
pushed by the growing technological complexity just mentioned. If anything, however,
it is the demand side of which greatest note has to be taken, not least because this scarcely
characterised the industry until the 1980s. 
8.1 Policy and the firm
The shift of emphasis towards demand is reflected immediately in the changing nature
of corporate strategy. The traditional international oligopolistic firm of the pre-1980s
type, heavily dependent on standardization and brand name, still flourishes, but has been
joined by newer large firms (including a number from Japan), which aim instead at
product differentiation and market segmentation. This duality of demand appears to be
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characteristic of a large number of industries in this era (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995),
but is particularly marked in food and beverages. This development of product
diversification as an alternative firm strategy has arisen within a pattern of corporate
structure which has continued to be organized primarily according to demand criteria:
that is, the specific lines of business pursued by a firm within any one major branch of
the industry tend to be linked more by demand characteristics (selling to similar markets)
than by supply characteristics (e.g. using similar technologies).
1. Firms in the industry pursue the full range of possible strategies - offensive, defensive,
dependent, imitative. The CIS data allow only limited comparisons among firms
according to their strategies. Even when we make use of other data, we do not find major
differences in economic indicators of success, such as profitability, growth in turnover
or innovativeness, that stem from differences in strategy. In terms of linking
innovativeness to profitability, our data appear to support a midway position between the
first-mover advantages of new entry, and the long-experience advantages of incumbency.
This is consistent with findings in other industries favouring the "fast-second" strategy
as the surest route to profiting from innovation.
2. The food-manufacturing industry is characterised by much higher levels of new
product development than is often supposed. Even firms that lag behind in terms of
turnover growth appear to have relatively high rates of introduction of new products
(recall that the Italian data largely account for the "tail" of relative backwardness of the
industry, cf. p 8). Moreover some sub-branches of the industry appear to be highly
innovative, as the original disaggregated dataset for Denmark showed. It is true that the
main measure provided by the CIS survey is of products that are new to the firm, not
those that may be new to the industry. High ratios of new products in sales may thus be
consistent with following imitative rather than innovative strategies in the sense usually
understood. Nevertheless, the important point is that the shift towards product
development affects all firms. In addition, the data on innovations that were new to the
industry (Table 2.1.2) also displayed reasonably high levels.
3. The industry over recent decades therefore is at odds with the view that it is a
traditional, supplier-dominated, process-oriented industry. What our data show is an
strong association across countries between product development and process
development. To some extent this association may reflect problems in collecting the CIS
data, as our further enquiries have suggested. Nevertheless, it seems valid to argue that
it is the interaction between product innovation and process innovation that firms (and
countries) need to get right. A major aspect of this is the continuing progress toward
overall integration of production processes, including progress towards on-line
instrumentation and quality and safety assurance. This is being hindered by the extent of
fragmentation of the industry.
4. The industry comes out rather low in terms of conventional indicators of
innovativeness, such as patenting; as might have been predicted from conventional views
of its technology levels. Against this has to be ranged the limitations of patents data for
studying this particular industry, with its emphasis on incremental change, application of
existing technologies drawn from other fields, focus on marketing improvements
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1      This paper appeared in the week in which our final Report was being prepared, too late to assess it in
greater detail in the main part of our text.
(including packaging developments), and so on. Either way, the industry remains highly
dependent on "buying in" technologies, or outsourcing technology development to
specialized units. This runs the risk of perpetuating fragmentation along the lines just
indicated. The clear pattern has been one towards a rapid diversification in the kinds of
technology involved. The food-processing industry is no longer technologically
dominated by equipment suppliers, but has to draw on such high-tech fields as
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, instrumentation and IT, advanced materials, etc.
Developing in-house capability at least to interface with these expanding technological
inputs will be a major consideration for food manufacturers over the foreseeable future -
how much they will need to develop their own in-house R&D in these fields remains to
be seen. The extent of diversification appears to be statistically associated with the
strength of innovation/profitability linkages and with the performances of leader firms.
5. Developments in market-related areas appear to be even more important than either
product or process introductions (see Tables 6.2.1 and 7.1.1). Although food and
beverage producers may not link directly to end-users, they are being called on to meet
the criteria increasingly imposed by the retailers etc. who do carry out his function. Thus
the manufacturers confront the rising power and broadening requirements of downstream
marketing as well as upstream technology suppliers. The industry appears to be moving
inescapably towards the network model of management, which has often been taken to
apply only among some high-tech industries.
6. The 1980s were a period of rapid growth in the size of at least the larger firms in this
industry, and external sources of growth were a major contributor to this increase in
average real size. However there are signs that the external route to growth (mergers,
takeovers, etc.) has abated in the first half of the 1990s. Much of our analysis has probed
questions of the relationship between firm size and innovation. In general our work seems
consistent with conventional views about a U-shaped relationship in which innovative
small firms are also important innovators in relative terms (though the totality of small
firms may not be, and we should allow here for well-known results relating to small
firms, such as their under-reporting of R&D). Although we find higher R&D intensities
among larger firms, we do not find firm size to be especially important in relationship to
innovative intensity. Our findings are probably consistent with the paper published very
recently by Cohen and Klepper (1996), in which large firms conduct more R&D because
of being able to spread the costs over a greater amount of output of each particular
product.1 However our findings about technological diversification suggest that the
diversification of products may be involved as well.
7. Our very detailed study of the relationships between innovation and profitability
indicates that they are much more complex than they appear at first glance. One general
inference we draw is that the more innovative firms are on average more profitable, but
the converse does not hold - the more profitable firms are not necessarily the more
innovative (indeed a further reworking of the CIS data for Denmark indicates an inverse
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relationship). The problems of interpretation that arise here mean that we cannot simply
advocate innovation as a strategy for commercial success. Note that innovativeness is
judged purely by internal (in-house) measures, so differences in incorporating external
advances are not allowed for at this point.
8. Nor do financial considerations emerge as important for innovative success. Contrary
to theoretical axioms such as the Modigliani-Miller theorem (which argues that gearing
is irrelevant if appropriate assumptions are met), or the more general view that equity is
favourable to innovation, the gearing of firms in the 1980s was changing towards higher
debt:equity ratios. The debt may have been used in part to finance embodied forms of
technology, purchased from elsewhere. Again, we are not in a position to make strong
proposals regarding corporate financial policy as a factor in innovation.
8.2 Policy and the nation
1. The food-processing industry has to be ranked among the largest of manufacturing
industries in European countries in terms of orthodox economic indicators - share in
value-added, employment, profit performance, and so on. No country can readily afford
to ignore its potential for contributing to economic growth and development. European
countries have moreover tended to maintain a high level of competitiveness in this
industry.  Furthermore, the industry is characterised by a high level of stability in terms
of profitability, hence acting as a natural countercyclical agent.
2. Although the industry is regarded as low-tech, a point which we partially confirm in
respect of its low rate of patenting etc., it is a major user of innovations developed in
more upstream industries, in ways noted above. We have just pointed out that this has
strong implications for the innovation strategies of individual firms, but we would also
stress the potentiality that the industry offers to countries as a "carrier industry". The
various streams of new technology which interpenetrate it (like biotechnology,
informatics, etc.) may be diffused precisely through their usage in such a large sector. Our
historical studies (von Tunzelmann, 1995a) have shown both the importance for
economic growth of the "diffusion phase" of new technologies, and the specific
importance of food-processing in the industrialization of many European countries.
3. However it also must be recognised that the food and beverages industry is, contrary
to popular impression, a very capital-intensive one. In European countries especially, the
growth in employment that it has offered during the 1980s has been very limited, in
conformity with the notion of "jobless growth" which has regrettably characterised many
of them in this era. The substitution of capital for labour has accentuated this weak
impact on employment, and technology has probably played a part in this substitution.
A more reliable assessment of its potentiality for employment creation would, however,
examine the entire food chain.
4. The relative growth of large firms since the early 1980s has had a considerable impact
on the market structure of the industry, tending to reinforce oligopolistic control. The
relationship between market structure and innovation remains convoluted, and our data
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do not really illuminate it. Two points however emerge from the broader considerations
discussed. The first is that internationalization has led towards global rather than national
oligopolies, thus restricting the scope for national policy-making but also reducing its
justification. The second is the shift away from the manufacturing phase in terms of
controlling the food chain: upstream to suppliers of high-tech technologies, but
particularly downstream to retailers linking to consumers.
5. When groups of firms are aggregated at national levels, depending on whether they are
leaders or laggards in terms of turnover growth or new product development, we find
surprisingly little difference in performance according to orthodox evaluation criteria.
That is, there is little difference, say, in the export shares of leaders vs. laggards (if
anything laggards have higher export shares in 1990/2), in the levels of turnover per
employee (i.e. labour productivity), or in the intensity of innovation costs. There is,
however, some indication of leaders having higher R&D intensities overall. Thus the
choice of policies by governments aimed at fostering the companies in their countries
may face contradictions in regard to the "success" they should achieve. In particular, any
attainment of higher rates of internal innovation within firms arising out of governmental
support may not necessarily satisfy other targets, such as success in foreign markets.
Governments need to recognise differences between the various target groups they may
be aiming at. Broad-spectrum policies may be less useful than specific goal-oriented
policies thus differentiated. For example, governments might distinguish between
policies to make non-innovators innovate (indicated by increasing frequency of innovator
firms), policies to make innovating firms more innovative (indicated by higher shares of
new products in turnover), and policies to diffuse innovations to other firms in the same
or other industries (indicated by the difference in products new to the firm vs. new to the
industry, etc.).
6. Nevertheless, our investigations establish significant differences between countries in
terms of their innovative performances. Although much of our evidence is indirect, we
find strong support for the impact of "national innovation systems" in this industry. In an
industry as dependent as this one on external sources of innovation, close ties between
producers and users of technology appear to be crucial, especially as local and regional
sources of technology turn out to be so predominant. Countries like Germany display an
especially powerful user-producer system, despite a relative shortfall in terms of
technology generation. This is not just a matter of supporting the production of
technology, nor even their links to users, important as both of these may be, but
supporting the advance of the knowledge base of the users themselves. Equally, other
findings have established the importance of national boundaries in defining patterns of
consumer tastes, so links downstream also have a strong national orientation. Our results
therefore support the notion of systemic learning, in which the country or region plays a
major role.
7. An important aspect of the national innovation system so far as governments are
concerned is the development of the science base. With food-processing firms still highly
dependent on external developments in new areas of science such as biotechnology, the
governmental laboratories etc. are likely to play an important part. However it is not only
unrealistic but probably ill-advised for smaller and lagging countries in Europe to plan
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for science bases that would become major actors in terms of international scientific
leadership. The driving force for these developments in such countries needs to come
from downstream, and especially from the users in sectors such as food-processing.
Domestic partners emerge from our analysis as being the most important for the upstream
science-based industries. As just mentioned, the progress of the knowledge base in the
users is of critical importance. Their needs, as we have so often pointed out, are for a
breadth of scientific expertise, and governments thus need to give particular attention to
the "transfer sciences" and to the appropriate combinations of sciences. In this industry,
technology is developed principally through the chain-link mechanism of Kline and
Rosenberg (1986), in which firms' capabilities progress interactively through incremental
learning. There is a case for governments to pay greater attention to institutes designed
to transfer and co-ordinate technology, such as the CRTOs or co-operative R&D
institutes. It also needs to be asked whether the shifts of funding of such institutes
towards greater reliance on external funding, while probably desirable in itself, may also
have disadvantages for their overall level of funding and more broadly for their role in
the national system of innovation. 
8. We have drawn attention to the importance of final as well as intermediate demand,
in driving the industry - local markets and tastes, per capita incomes, etc. These directly
influence the nature of product and process innovation in the manufacturing branches of
the industry, where the main trajectories have been towards higher speed in processing
(to satisfy rising levels of demand and particularly demands for freshness etc.), and - most
pronounced in recent years - towards flexibility in processing that underpins the
development of new product varieties. These build upon changes in lifestyles which are
unlikely to be reversed in the near future. A key area in this respect has been in raising
quality and safety standards. Recent scares have highlighted all too clearly the need for
constant and intensified vigilance in maintaining quality standards. Governments have
to play the leading role in imposing and raising standards, primarily of course to protect
consumers, but also to protect the reputations of their producers.
9. The context of this industry as primarily a consumer of innovations, but in a position
to have a major impact on the economic climate of the country, suggests that
governments should give even greater attention than they already do to policies oriented
to the diffusion of innovations, rather than their generation. In general, we would support
the arguments of Ergas (1987) for governments to shift from a "mission-oriented" to a
"diffusion-oriented" attitude to science and technology policy. There is a possibility that
policies to augment diffusion may directly conflict with those to augment innovation, e.g.
policies to strengthen IPRs (see next section, and cf. Stoneman and David, 1986).
However, in the chain-linked innovation model of Kline and Rosenberg (1986) adopted
in this Report, policies to augment diffusion may have a feedback effect of also
augmenting innovation, thus creating a "virtuous circle". These points are further
developed in the next section.
8.3  Policy and the EU
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Most of the conclusions derived for countries apply at the higher level of supranational
bodies such as the EU. To avoid unnecessary repetition, we shall return to the point from
which we began and consider them in the light of the EU's Green Paper on Innovation
of December 1995, and in particular of its "routes of action" outlined in the concluding
part of that Green Paper. We take it for granted that some part of the role of supranational
authority is to harmonize national policies. 
1. Route of action 10 of the Green Paper argues for the development of a favourable legal
and regulatory framework to facilitate industrial innovation. This needs to be interpreted
with great care. As we have just emphasised, a "favourable" regulatory framework should
not be confused with a lenient one, as it so often is by national governments, and
especially by industry itself. The EU should ignore pleas by the industry to regulate itself,
as its past performance has been too poor to give any reassurance. Moreover, it is, as we
are implying, in the industry's best long-term interests to be overviewed by a very vigilant
external regulatory system. The EU has a particularly important role to play in the
harmonization of standards, as it is indeed progressing towards at the time of writing: our
point is that this should be biased towards levelling up, not levelling down. We would
point in particular to the implementation of HACCP standards in this industry, since
orthodox quality assessment criteria such as ISO 9000 are much too weak to meet such
objectives. There is also a case for tightening up regulatory standards in regard to
branding products as environmentally friendly; there appears to be some awareness of
this weakness in EU circles but at present there are substantial differences among
member states.
2. Routes of actions 2 and 12 deal primarily with diffusing innovational behaviour,
especially to SMEs. The evidence we have surveyed suggests considerable innovatory
contributions from the SMEs that can be listed as innovative, but also a long tail of non-
innovative SMEs. We therefore agree with this policy, and emphasise that it needs to be
placed in the broader context of the organization of the industry as a whole. We have
observed that the growth of large firms has been slower in Europe than in major
competitor regions, though we cannot settle the question of how far this has restricted the
growth of European competitiveness. The investigations here need to consider the
relationships in both directions: the impact of innovation on market structure as well as
the impact of market structure on innovation. We echo the call of the Green Paper to use
the Fourth Framework Programme to assist research into this area.
3. Route of action 12 also emphasises the role of regional systems of innovation. Our
findings are very similar, though we would place more emphasis on bottom-up
approaches to enhancing networks and technology diffusion than is done in the Green
Paper. The Green Paper tends towards a top-down view of the diffusion process, in
implicitly seeing the problem as one of shortcomings of the adopters and non-adopters -
this perspective is common in the orthodox economics literature on diffusion. We would
argue for looking at the issue more from the perspective of the adopters (and non-
adopters) themselves, in which the problems may also lie upstream or downstream from
them. Our systemic approach would couple such developments of regional or national
innovation systems with the strengthening of public action for innovation (route of action
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13). This too should look at the issue from the perspective of users of technology, not just
the producers of technology.
4. For similar reasons, we support the route of action 11, aimed at promoting the
diffusion of economic intelligence. We would link this and the previous point with the
areas of shortcoming identified in our Report. This may be associated with route of action
1, favouring the adoption of technology foresight and monitoring. Western Europe is
somewhat deficient in its development (and perhaps utilization) of new technological
paradigms such as biotechnology, advanced instrumentation and electronics; though it
is stronger in fields like pharmaceuticals and food technologies themselves. We again
envisage the problems as not only those of generating such technologies but of
implementing them in users in the manufacturing sector.
5. The promotion of intellectual and industrial property (route of action 8) has to be
reconciled with the need to diffuse these new technologies. In our view, the Green Paper
gives insufficient thought to the kinds of problems this may raise for policy. This is likely
to be especially critical in the later developing countries, such as some of the
Mediterranean regions. The catching-up countries have to some extent been improving
their record in technology generation (e.g. patenting), but there is less indication of
benefiting from technology implementation, at least in the data we have surveyed. The
decline in Eastern Europe, beginning in the 1980s, should also be noted. The food-
processing industry has in fact traditionally maintained a high degree of separation
between its manufacturing segment and the development of new technologies, but with
the growing complexity of technological accumulation described in our Report, it may
prove increasingly difficult to maintain such separation and at the same time attain an
adequate level of technological advance. More research is warranted in this area, too.
6. The Green Paper places considerable emphasis on improving the financing of
innovation as a way of promoting it (route of action 6). In the industry we are studying,
this does not appear to be a major problem, and we would therefore advise that little can
be expected from governmental strategies which place their hopes on, for instance,
lowering the costs of finance.
7. This becomes important in the light of the Green Paper's recommendation of
introducing more beneficial fiscal regimes (route of action 7). The Green Paper's
discussion of macroeconomic circumstances (pp 8-9) is limited almost entirely to supply-
side policies, such as lowering interest rates. Our findings throughout this Report indicate
that it is the demand side of both micro and macro policies which are critical for this
industry, and the ignoring of these in the Green Paper reflects a fundamental deficiency.
Policies to improve the supply side run the risk of being counterproductive or worse if
they cut back demand, and there is considerable evidence that this is precisely what has
happened since the beginning of the 1980s. Paradoxically, the shift from supply to
demand as a driving force in innovation in the industry has coincided with a shift from
demand to supply focus in macroeconomic policies.
This is the strongest conclusion to come out of this study. The primary emphasis on
policy at all levels - firm, country and wider region - must be squared with the changing
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nature of innovation in the industry. Only by considering the primacy of demand can the
industry hope to fulfil its potential for carrying industrialization over the foreseeable
future.
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